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Preface 
Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse and assess recent 
developments which have taken place in that area of law which was once 
referred to as "estoppel byacquiescence ll • 
This head of equitable liability has now become referred to as the 
'Ramsden v Dyson,l. principle, deriving its name from the decision of 
the House of Lords in that case, handed down in 1866. That decision 
served to confirm, but not to establish, the existence of this head 
of the equitable jurisdiction. 
Motivation 
This dissertation has been motivated by the obvious substantial 
revival which this principle has enjoyed in recent years. In particu-
lar the recent decisions of the English Court of Appeal in Crabb v 
Arun District Council,2. Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. 
(in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd.,3. and Habib 
Bank Habib Bank AG Zurich Ltd.,4. have served not only to confirm 
the revival of the principle but to solidify changes in its orienta-
tion which began to become evident as early as the mid 1960's. 
This reorientation of the Ramsden v Dyson principle was set in motion 
largely by the activity of Lord Denning M.R. and in particular in his 
judgments in Inwards v Baker5. and E.R. Ives Investments Ltd. v Hi9h6 .. 
1. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. 
2. [1976] 1 Ch. 179. 
3. [1982] Q.B. 84. 
4. [198l] 2 All E.R. 650. 
5. [1965] 2 Q.B. 29. 
6. [1967] 2 Q.B. 379. 
ii 
Methodology 
Although this head of law is ripe for restatement by the House of 
Lords as yet no definitive decision upon the Rarilsdenv Dyson principle 
has been handed down. There is thus no benchmark decision which can 
be used to assess the existing law~ This has meant reliance upon a 
series of Court of Appeal decisions which, as yet, have not settled 
into a consistent pattern. 
The methodology adopted here has thus been orthodox largely 
following a pathway laid by the cases. Limited attention has been paid 
to the historical development of the principle prior to the handing down 
of the decision in Ramsden v Dyson itself. This has been kept brief 
because df considerations of space and the relatively limited value of 
the very early decisions, individually, as foundations for the contem-
porary law. 
Attention has then been focussed upon what appear as the essential 
ingredients of the principle as revealed by the decisions. 
This has been followed by a consideration of the basis of the 
principle. 
Finally attention has been directed to broader issues including 
the possible future development of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. This 
has necessarily involved a degree of conjecture. 
No attempt has been made to set out a catalogue of cases. 
Although this could have been compelling in some areas, as for example 
in determining what amounts to adequate detriment, it was felt that 
little could be achieved by such an exercise. The courts have shown a 
clear propensity not to be limited by previous decisions in respect to 
such matters. 
References 
Throughout thi.s work reference to the I princi p 1 e I means the 
principle confirmed by the House of Lords in Ramsden\( Dyson. 
The expression I representor I is used to refer to the party who 
iii 
has made the required representation, and thereby raised an expectation, 
and aga"inst whom it is sought to raise the estoppel, that ;s the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. Conversely the expression 'representee' is used to 
refer to the party who has suffered as a result of the expectation which 
has been raised by the representor, and who is, as a consequence, 
seeking to rely upon estoppel, that is the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
These two expressions have been used in preference to plaintiff and 
defendant as being more precise in the context of this work. 
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Abstract 
What is now referred to as the Ramsden v Dyson principle began life 
as nothing more than a bundle of instances in which equity would assert 
jurisdiction. 
It experienced a period of systematisation in the later years of last 
century when attempts were made to encumber it with a series of rules. 
In the middle years of the present century, with Lord Denning taking 
the lead~ the Ramsden v Dyson principle quickly shed these rules and took on 
the wider function of providing the courts with a weapon whereby non 
contractual expectations may be fulfilled, or otherwise protected. 
The basis upon which the courts determine whether the expectation will 
be fulfilled is whether or not it would be unconscionable to the representee 
to allow the expectation to remain unfulfilled. This will normally involve 
some degree of detriment to the representee if the representor is permitted 
to resile from the expectation which he has raised in the mind of the 
representee. 
Thus in order to succeed in invoking the Ramsden v Dyson principle the 
representee has to show the existence of two basic requirements. Firstly, 
that the other party, the representor that is, has raised an expectation 
which would be such to influence a reasonable man. Secondly that it would 
be unconscionable for the expectation not to be fulfilled. 
The present state of the law allows virtually a complete discretion to 
the courts as to when they will assert jurisdiction and as to the remedy 
which will be decreed. The remedy is not limited to a simple specific 
performance of the expectation. 
The basis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle is barely distinguishable 
from that underlying other heads of estoppel such as the High Trees 
principle and the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle. 
2 
With the departure of Lord Denning M.R. from the judicial scene a 
degree of momentum has apparently been removed from the development of the 
principle and there have been signs in some recent cases of attempts to 
limit the further development of the principle. 
The method of investigation has been by orthodox case analysis with 
the division of the work following from the judicial decisions. 
J 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF THESIS 
The Fundamental Question 
The fundamental question which this dissertation seeks to answer 
is, lin what circumstances will the law protect an expectation?1 
The answer which is provided is Iwhen it would be unconscionable 
not to do so I . 
The Ramsden v Dyson principle provides the courts with an 
effective weapon whereby expectations may be protected. 
Statement of Thesis 
The principle of equity confirmed by the decision of the House 
of Lords in Ramsden v Dyson 1. began life, like many other equitable 
principles as a vague, ill defined, head of redress. In the later 
years of the nineteenth century attempts were made to systematise 
this principle by encumbering it with a series of rules. However deci-
sions handed down from the middle years of the present century appear 
to have succeeded in freeing the pdnciple from these rules and have 
enabled it to move towards a broad basis of unconscionability as the 
foundation for its application. This process has turned, what would 
have remained a narrow limited, principle of equity, confined, 
possibly only to transactions relating to real property, into a highly 
diffused and extremely flexible weapon, which can be judicially 
applied, in what now appears to be, an almost limitless number and 
variety of different situations. 
1. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. 
4 
From the mi d 1960' s until the present t"ime the Ramsden v Dyson 
pri nci p 1 e has been consistently app 11 ed by the courts "i n cases where 
it has been considered to be in the interests of justice that an 
expectation which has been raised by one party should be protected 
in the. interests of the other party. 
As the principle stands at present it thus has two fundamental 
ingredients. Firstly~ one party, that is the representor, must rai se 
an expectation. Secondly, the other party, that is the representee, 
must show that it would be unconscionable not for that expectation 
to be protected. 
At the present stage of development the courts have assumed to 
themselves a virtually unlimited degree 6f discretion as to when the 
printiple is applied. This discretion extends to the remedies which 
may be decreed when the principle is successfully pleaded. 
Synopsis of Dissertation 
The principle of equity confirmed by the House of Lords in Ramsden 
v Dyson, of which incidentally, that case, was not itself, an illus-
tration, reinforced the right of action in cases when a party stood by 
and watched another act to his detriment. By the time of the handing 
down of the decision in Ramsden v Dyson this principle was already 
quite well established in equity. But that decision did serve to 
define and focus, albeit to a limited extent, what had previously been 
a very emphemeral concept by according it House of Lords precedent status 
and thus enabling it to assume a definite nomenclature. This head of 
equity is now generally referred to as the 'Ramsden v Dyson principle' 
But the decision of the House of Lords did not restate the existing 
law and, indeed, did not materially add to it; chapter two. 
5 
Recent deci.sions have seen an extension of the scope of the Ramsden 
v Dyson princi:ple to such a degree that its outer parameters are now 
far from clear. It is now certain that the principle is not limited 
to situations with real property as their subject matter. It is also 
clear that it can operate in cases where the representation is, what 
could be described as amorphous. It is not limited to instances where 
silence alone is the only available form of representation. Moreover, 
it now appears that the Ramsden v Dyson principle can operate with the 
same degree of effectiveness against a right deriving from the common 
law as it can operate against a right that is entirely equitable in 
origin; chapter three. 
Several attempts were made to limit this principle by encumbering 
it with a series of rules. That is, in particular, the probanda of 
Fry J. 1 aid down in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wi 11 mott v 
Barber" that a duty to speak was required to be shown as exi sting, by 
the representee, before the principle could be invoked, and that it 
was subject to the equitable concept of mutuality. These rules have 
been frequently used by counsel as defences against the application 
of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. The principle now appears to have 
successfully freed itself from all these constraints which could have 
been used to defeat its application; chapter four. 
The limitation of the principle to merely a defence or a rule 
of evidence could also have dramatically limited the applicability of 
the principle. Although the matter does not appear to have been 
finally settled, and although the judicial dicta upon the matter may 
be described as uncertain, it now appears clear that the Ramsden 
Dyson principle can operate as a cause of action; chapter five. 
With an apparently limitless scope and freedom from constraints 
the courts began a search for a stable base upon which to reset the 
6 
Ramsden v Dyson principle. Led largely by Lord Denning M.R. they 
found this coherent base by resurrecting the old equitable concept of 
unconscionabihty. This concept is presently floating quite free, 
has no clearly discernible form, and is being applied, it appears, 
completely at the discretion of the courts; chapters;x. 
Unconscionabll tty can now be seen as permeating every aspect 
of the appl ication of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. In respect to 
the conduct required of the representor the concept of equitable 
fraud has been retained and there must be some element within the 
conduct of the representor to which equity can attach before it can 
assert jurisdiction in the Ramsden v Dyson principle. The contempor-
ary cases would appear to indicate that primarily the courts are 
looking for the raising of an expectation by the representor in the 
mind of the representee. Most of the decisions handed down within 
the 1 ast twenty years can be seen as fa 11 fng wi thi n thi s rubri c. 
In this respect the state of knowledge of the representor can be a 
relevant factor which the court may, at its discretion, take into 
account. But it is now clear that the state of knowledge of the 
parties and also mistake and bad faith are not conclusive matters, 
in determining the equity, within themselves; chapter seven. 
Likewise unconscionability will be taken into account by the 
court in its examination of the conduct of the representee. In order 
to call the Ramsden v Dyson principle into aid the representee must 
show that an equity has arisen in his favour, that is, that taking 
his position into account, it would be unconscionabl~ for the repre-
sentor to assert his right~ and resile from the expectation which he 
has rai.sed. This normally involves a requirement of some detriment to 
the repre.sentee. This is probably the most diffused and uncertain 
aspects of the principle~ chapteteight. 
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Fi na 11y unconscionabi Hty is again evident in the sat; sfacti on 
of the equHy. The remedies flow;'ng from the Ramsden Y Dyson pri nci pl e 
give the court an almost unlimited discretl~on as to how the unconscion-
ability is rectified. In this respect the courts are not limited by 
any specific proprietary right deriving from the estoppel and there 
would appear to be an almost unlimited spectrum of remedies, ranging 
from an equitable lien to a transfer of the fee simple. Thus whatever 
remedy is deemed appropriate in the circumstances can be applied 
irrespective of whether that specific remedy was sought by the repre-
sentee; chapter nine. 
The Ramsden v Dyson principle can now be seen as providing the 
foundation stone for a vast edifice of estoppel which can be resorted 
to in order to rectify unconscionability ;n many different situations. 
The greatly increased scope of the principle which has become evident 
in recent years means that the principle would now be applied in 
instances where, previously, it was not regarded as appropriate. Thus 
many cases of estoppel by representation could probably now be brought 
within its confines. The principle laid down in Dillwynv Llewelyn2• 
can now also be seen as but one specific aspect of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle. Non contractual waiver could also be based upon the prin-
ciple; chapter ten. 
There are indications that in some recent decisions the limits of 
the principle may have appeared. It has been confirmed for example 
that the principle has limited effect against statutory authority. 
However it is notpossible to ascertain, as yet, whether the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle has reached a period of decline, consolidation, or 
whether, after overcoming these jolts, it will continue to develop; 
chapter eleven. 
2. (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517; 45 E.R. 1285. 
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The emphasis upon unconscionability has not been without its 
associated problems. One of the most obvious of these is that counsel 
are now resorting not to precedent but to a wider ambit and more 
exhaustive analysis of the facts of cases in order to show the situa-
tion as unconscionable to their clients. This has proved very time 
consuming and has given rise to very closely reasoned juc\gments, which 
have obviously been shaped very largely by the submissions of counsel. 
It is possible that this may induce judges of the future to attempt 
to once again limit the scope of the Ramsden v Dyson principle by 
encasing it in rules so as to provide more precise guidelines as to 
its applicability. But at present it must be admitted that there is 
no indication of this and the principle can be said to be in full 
flood. Changing attitudes towards the redistribution of property 
rights by the courts could also have an effect upon the future of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle; chapter twelve. 
Terminology 
The fact that terminology in this area of the law is quite unset-
tled posed a problem. Effective and settled terminology is an 
essential precondition to precise analysis. 
The Ramsden v Dyson principle is most certainly a head of estoppel 
and is of equitable origin. However it is not satisfactority des-
cribed simply as lequitable estoppel I because of the need to differ-
entiate it from other heads of estoppel of equitable origin and in 
particular that confirmed by the decision in Central London Property 
Trust Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd. 3. Owing to its lack of precision, 
3. [1947] K.B. 130 
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therefore, the expression 'equitable estoppe.1.' is not used in this 
work. 
The expression 'proprietary estoppel' is being used with 
increasing frequency. But this expression is also not without problems 
because it implies estoppel gi·ving rfse to rights in respect to 
property. That head of estoppel confirmed in the decision in Ramsden-
Dyson.can give rise to proprietary rights but it is not limited to 
such rights. 
The expression 'promissory estoppel' is also being used to refer 
to that head of estoppel confirmed in Central London Property Trust 
Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd. The expression 'promissory' could also be 
seen as applicable to those instances falling under the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle where the expectation derives from a specific promise, as 
we 11 as to cases of common 1 aw estoppel deri vi ng from a speci fi c repre-
sentation. The expression 'promissory estoppel I is not used in this 
work. 
In an attempt therefore to avoid confusion the expression 'Ramsden 
v Dyson pr-j nci p 1 e' has been used throughout thi s work. 
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Chapter Two 
ORIGINS OF RMiSDEN V DYSON PRINCIPLE 
Introduction: An Early Creation of Equity 
An early creation of the courts of equity was the granting of 
redress in instances where one party has suffered loss as the result 
of another party merely standing by while that loss took place, or 
actively encouragH19 the loss. 
This right of redress received the authority of the House of Lords 
1 in the decision handed down in Ramsden v Dyson . but although that 
decision is sometimes regarded as the 'modern starting point of the law 
of equitable estoppel ,2. there are clear examples of equity allow-ing 
redress in circumstances of acquiescence and, or, encouragement, dating 
back to the later years of the seventeenth century. These earlier 
authorities, are, now however, rarely cited. 
The decision in Ramsden v Dyson is now generally regarded as the 
foundation statement of the equitable principle. It is significant in 
that it provided the maximum of precedent authority to the principle 
and it contains two well reasoned, if not invincible, statements of the 
principle which are frequently cited by the present day courts and used 
as a foundation stone for judgments. But apart from this the decision 
is not without its problems as a precedent. It was not, itself, an 
application of the principle because their Lordships there found 
against the raising of the necessary equity. Also the decision contained 
a short but highly significant dissenting speech by Lord Kingsdown. 
This contains a statement of the principle which is presently regarded 
at least by some, as a more accurate statement of the law than state-
ments of the principle contained in the majority speeches. 
1. (1866) LR 1 HL 129. 
2. As per Scarman LJ, as he then was. in Crabb v Arun District Council 
[1976J 1 Ch.179 at page 194 [1975J 3 All E.R. 865, at page 876. 
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Also the speeches in Ramsden v Dyson itself contain little by way 
of analysis of the existing precedents. They are rather devoted to an 
exhaustive examination of the facts and a statement of the inferences 
which would be dervied from those facts. Although this phenomena 
could be regarded as highly predictive of the future judicial history 
of this principle, the decision itself cannot be regarded as a restate-
ment of the existing law. 
Despite this, it is submitted that the decision warrants consider-
ation because of the prominence which it has now received, and in 
particular because of its subsequent judicial history. The facts of 
Ramsden v Dyson itself also provide a classical example of the type of 
situation in which the principle can be applied. 
The Equitable Background to the Principle 
Although the House of Lords decision in Ramsden v Dyson is now 
generally accepted as the starting point of the modern law it is 
possible to discern the principle confirmed there in a number of much 
earlier decisions. 
There can be no doubt as to the jurisdictional origins of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle. Its roots lay deep within the mainstream 
of equity and its evolution is completely logical when viewed within 
its equitable ethos. 
However unlike some other equitable principles3. that in Ramsden 
v Dyson does not appear to have sustained any clear systematisation in 
the early period of the nineteenth century4. The systematisation, if 
it came at all, appears to have taken place at the conclusion of the 
3. As e.g. the systematic classification of trusts, the rule against 
perpetuities, the doctrine of specific restitution. 
4. The period of systematisation is generally taken to have extended 
from the Chancellorship of Lord Nottingham (1673 - 1682) to the 
time of the introduction of the Judicature Acts 1873 - 75 under 
the Chancellorship of the Earl of Selborne. But it is generally 
accepted to have reached its climax under the Chancellorship of 
Lord Eldon (1801 - 1806; 1807 - 1827). 
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century and especially with the attempts which were made to encase 
the principle in a rigid set of rules by Fry J. in Willmott v Barber. 5. 
The reason for this must remain a matter of conjecture. 6. 
An examination of the very early decisions that appear to indi-
cate the assertion of an equitable jurisdiction in this area reveals 
that they were determined essentially upon the traditional equitable 
concept of unconscionability. In those times there was, of course, 
very little in the way of precedent which could be relied upon. 
A further feature of the early litigation is its very compelling 
factual base. Most of the decisions prior to this century hinged 
around the situation where the representee was allowed into possession 
of the land of the representor who later attempted to assert the 
title which he had at law and eject the tenant representee, in some 
cases, enriching himself by taking advantage of the improvements which 
the tenant had made in the expectation of a secure title. This was 
a situation which was ripe for equitable intervention. It represented 
a clear conflict between the legal rights of one person as against 
the equit3ble rights of another. 
However a number of assumptions had to be satisfied before the 
representee could call equity into aid. Fundamental to the successful 
pleading of the Ramsden v Dyson principle, as indeed with any other 
equitable principle, was the raising of an equity in favour of the 
5. (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96. For discussion of the various attempts to 
encumber the principle with rules vide under liThe Rise and Demise 
of Rules' Chapter four, infra. 
6. It could have been that the Ramsden v Dyson principle did not 
sustain the degree of litigation which other equitable concepts 
attracted. It could have been owing to the fact that this prin-
ciple appears to have taken a long time to disentangle itself from 
somewhat analogous but, by now at least, clearly distinct princi-
ples such as the doctrine of part performance in the law relating 
to contract;the equity to perfect a gift, that is the principle 
laid down in Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De G.E. & J. 517; 45 
E.R. 1285. For discussion of this aspect vide infra, ibid chapter 
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representee. Unless the representee could show such an equity in his 
favour the legal rights of the representor prevailed. In order to 
raise the requisite equity in his favour the representee had to over-
come the following assumptions. Firstly equity would not assist a 
mere gratuitous intervener. Any party who entered into the land of 
another and even improved the property of another, could not, simply 
by reason of that conduct, lay claim to a proprietary right or acquire 
an interest in that property. The legal rights of the owner prevailed. 7. 
Secondly, in order to enable such a gratuitous intervener to 
relinquish that garb and be entitled to call equity into aid so as to 
enable him to obtain an interest in the property, and so prevent the 
legal owner from exercising his prior legal rights, he would have to 
show conduct on the part of the legal owner which was so unconscionable 
as to amount to what would be regarded as fraud. The fraud required 
in this particular instance was, of course, equitable fraud, and as 
such, was deliberately left open ended and was not clearly specified 
in the early decisions. But as time progressed and the precedents 
built up guidelines were laid down as to what was regarded by the 
courts of equity as unconscionable and this process reached a climax 
in the formulation of the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott v Barber8 .. 
Early Decisions Illustrating the Principle 
One of the earliest recorded decisions which indicated the possi-
bility of the assertion of equitable intervention in cases where a 
party suffered loss as the result of a mistaken belief in title and 
where the loss could have been prevented by the holder of the legal 
7. Confirmed in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970J A.C. 777 [1969J 2 All E.R. 385 
8. (1880) 15 Ch.D 96 see under 'The Rise and Demise of Rules', 
chapter four, infra, for further discussion of the probanda of 
Fry J. 
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title appears to be the Earl of Oxford's Case9. of 1615. There lands 
were let to tenants upon titles which were not valid at law and the 
representor brought an action in ejectment to reclaim the lands 
after they had been considerably improved in value by the tenants. 
Redress was granted in equity in the form of a lien to cover the 
cost of the improvements which the tenants had made. 
This early decision appears to have been aimed largely at the 
preventing of the representor taking advantage of the improvements 
which the tenants had made to the property and thus preventing the 
landlord from perpetrating what equity regarded as fraud. 
The judgment obviously makes little reference to previous cases 
but is substantially based upon subjective notions of unconscion-
ability and even refers to Holy Scripture. 
But it was clear that equity would go further than merely 
decreeing a lien 10 . on the property in favour of the representee, 
and would allow quiet possession of buildings which had been erected 
by the representee in circumstances 'where a man has suffered another 
to go on with building upon his ground and not set up a right till 
afterwards when he was all the time conusant (sic) of his right and 
the person building had no notice of the other's right'. 11. 
Indications are that by the time of East India Company v Vincent, 
decided in 1740 the action was well established and recognised in 
equityl2. 
9. (1615) 1 Ch. Rep 1; 21 E.R. 485. This celebrated decision is pro-
bably more notable for the conflict between the Courts of Common 
law and Chancery. The landlord had succeed in an action in eject-
ment and obtained judgment at law. The tenant then succeeded in 
an injunction in equity to prevent the execution of the judgment. 
10. As was done in Unity Joint Stock Banking Association v King 
(1858), 25 Beav. 72; 53 E.R. 563. 
11. Citation of Lord Hardwick in East India Company v Vincent (1740) 
2 Alk. 83; 26 E.R. 451 at page 451. 
12. Lord Hardwick said there are several instances' ... in which the 
court would oblige the owner of the ground to permit the person 
building to enjoy it quietly and without distrubance', ibid. 
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That mere acquiescence may be sufficient conduct on the part of 
the representor to secure the equity was confirmed in Stiles v 
cowper l3 . decided in 1748, where a landlord had continued to receive 
rent and allow building on land which was subject to an invalid lease, 
and later attempted to assert his legal title. 
In 1802 Lord Eldon L.C. in Dann v Spurrier,14. after confirming 
the established cases and that merely 'looking on is in many cases as 
strong as using terms of encouragement,15. went on to point out that 
bad faith must be clearly established by the representee. The action 
in Dann v Spurrier failed because the conscience of the representor 
was not 'affected by the knowledge that is necessary to authorise 
the Court to apply the principle,.16. The tenant had there laid 
out expenditure on the mere expectation of a renewal of his lease 
and the landlord had no knowledge of such expenditure. 17 . 
Summary of The Principle Before Ramsden v Dyson 
As at the time of Ramsden v Dyson it can be said that a discern-
ible but vaguely defined equity existed which could be cal1ed Y'/into 
/ 
I 
aio/' to prevent loss or potential loss, where one party had either 
acquiesced in or encouraged another in the expectation of an interest 
in land, which in law did not exist and which the first party knew 
di d not exi st. 
13. (1748) 3 Atk. 692; 26 E.R. 1198. 
14. (1802) 7 Ves. Jun 231 32 E.R. 94. 
15. 32 E.R. at page 95 
16. Ibid at page 96. 
17. 'It must be shown, that with the knowledge of the person under 
whom he claims. he conceived he had that larger interest! ibid. 
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Thereya-s"quite conclusive dicta to the effect that mere 
standing by would be sufficient conduct on the part of the representor 
although most of the decided cases went further than that and involved 
some degree of active encouragement on the part of the landlord 
representor. But the limits of the representor's conduct were not 
defined and in particular a major gap existed as to the circumstances 
in which acquiescence, in the absence of anything in support, would 
be sufficient conduct on the part of the representor. 
It was clear that the equity could not be called into aid if the 
representee stood to suffer no loss by the representor asserting his 
legal title. There had to be some loss on the part of the represen-
tee if the other party was permitted to assert his legal title. 
This loss could be potential and was not limited to an actual loss. 
But the exact nature and limits of the requisite loss or detriment, 
were, like other aspects of the equity, left quite undefined by the 
early decisions. 
Although the early decisions relate to real property there is 
nothing in them to indicate that the equity was so limited. Land was 
a frequent subject matter of litigation in early times, especially 
in the equitable jurisdiction. Also it was probably easier to show 
the existence of the equity and the requisite detrimental reliance in 
respect to real property than in the case of other assets. But there 
is nothing to indicate. in the early cases, that the principle was 
limited to where the detriment of the representee was visible in 
respect to the subject matter of the representation of the representor. 
At the same time the converse is equally true and there would appear 
to be nothing in the early decisions to prevent later courts from 
limiting the principle to representations involving land. It is 
probably true to say that having a stable base of real property 
assisted in the identification and development of this equity in its 
early stages. 
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By the time then of the decision in Ramsden v Dyson it would be 
fair to say that this equity was not so much a principle as simply one 
of the many bundles of instances in which equity would grant relief. 
The early cases did not therefore provide any barrier to the subse-
quent development of the law. 
Unconscionability the Basis of the Early Decisions 
Unconscionability is very clearly evident as the basis of the 
early decisions. Prior to the decision in Ramsden v Dyson we do not 
see this principle applied in accordance with rules. These were to 
emerge later. 
Equitable fraud was an essential ingredient of unconscionability 
and the courts were quick to find the requisite fraud. In the very 
early decisions the fraud appears to have been seen by equity as rest-
ing in the possibility of the representor taking advantage of the 
value of the improvements which the representee had made to the pro-
perty in the mistaken belief of title. 
However, the later cases appear to go further and indicate a 
willingness to protect the representee in his possession of the inter-
est, which the expectation created by the representor, had led him to 
believe that he had. He was thus able to call equity into aid to 
resist an action in ejectment by the landlord. 
The concept of unconscionability was highly subjective. It was 
applied in a manner which can be described as robust in the extreme. 
The equity judges were clear in their mind as to what amounted to 
unconscionable behaviour. It was even acceptable to call upon Holy 
Scripture as a reinforcement for a finding. This is aptly illustra-
ted by the decision of Lord Ellesmere in the Earl of Oxford's case;18. 
18. (1615) 1 Ch. Rep. 1.; 21 E.R. 485. 
'By the law of God, He that builds a House ought to 
dwell in it; and he that plants a Vine yard ought to 
gather the Grapes thereof ... Deut. 28. v 30. 
And yet here in this Case, such is the Conscience of 
the Doctor, the Defendant, That he would have the 
House, Gardens and Orchards which he neither built nor 
planted; but the Chancellors have always corrected 
such corrupt Consciences and caused them to render quid 
pro quo ,19 . 
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It will be recalled that in that case the representor was attempting 
to take the benefit of the improvements to the property made by the 
representee tenant. This equity was not prepared to allow. 
The expression 'estoppel I was not used in these early decisions. 
The chancery judges spoke of it as 'the raising of an equity'. Indeed 
such an expression is only a relatively recent innovation in describing 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle. It remains doubtful if the equity 
judges would have seen an analogy between the principle which they were 
developing and the principle of estoppel by representation which was 
developed by the courts of common law. But there can be no doubt as 
to the appropriateness of I estoppel I as a description of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. Apart from substituting the raising of an expecta-
tion as required by equity, as against the existence of a specific 
representation, the ingredients of the Ramsden v Dyson principle are 
typical of estoppel in general. 
19. (1615) 1 Ch. Rep 5; 21 E.R. at page 486; 
Facts and Proceedings of Ramsden v Dyson 
The appellant, R, had inherited several blocks of land in 
r 
Hudd1~field under the will of his grandfather, Sir John Ramsden. 
, ' 
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The second respondent, D, was the mortgagee of the first respon-
dent Joseph Thornton, who was a tenant, in respect to two blocks of 
land, of the appellant1s grandfather. 
The estate had instituted a mode of leasing by entry of the tenants 
name in a rent role and fixing of, what in most instances amounted to 
a mere peppercorn rental, by an agent of the landlord. The leases 
were usually negotiated through this agent. Transfers were negotiated 
by notification to the agent who then duly removed one tenant from the 
rent role and substituted the name of the transferee as tenant. 
This was a cheap but quite ineffective mode of conveyance. It 
had apparently been devised by the landlord as a method of assisting 
humble tenants in that it obviated the expense which would have been 
involved in drawing up formal deeds of leasehold. But the tenancies 
were, in fact, under parol agreements. The leases in dispute had 
been negotiated under this system. However not all leases concluded 
by the estate were under this system. It appears that the more 
affluent tenants negotiated formal leases upon a sixty year term. 
Thornton had, upon an uncertain date, negotiated the lease of a 
block of land from the agent of the landlord, Sir. John Ramsden, for 
which a ground rent of £4 per annum was set by the agent. He proceeded 
to layout some £1,800 in building upon the land. 
In June 1845 Thornton made application to the guardians (Sir John 
was by that time deceased) of the appellant for the lease of a further 
block of land agreeing to hold as tenant at will and to pay such rent 
as was fixed by the guardians. 
This second lease was duly concluded at an annual ground rental 
of Ii 9s 7d and the name of the tenant duly entered upon the rent role. 
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In September 1857 Thornton negotiated a loan from the Commercial 
Inn Money Club, through its agent, D, and as security negotiated a 
mortgage of the second tenancy. 
This involved a transfer of the leasehold to D. This transfer 
together with another for the occupation of D, were duly entered in 
the appellant's transfer book. 
The point in issue before their Lordships were the terms under which 
Thornton held these two pieces of land. l~ere they merely tenancies at 
will or did they give the right to the tenant to call for a lease of 
sixty years, renewable every twenty years on the payment of the requi-
site fine. 
Evidence was adduced to show that there existed a general belief 
among the tenants that the entry of a tenant's name on the rent role or 
in the transfer book entitled any tenant, at his pleasure, to call for 
the grant of a formal lease of sixty years. 
In November 1861. in order to try the issue the landlord brought 
an action in ejectment. 
In February 1862 Thornton and D filed a bill in response to this 
action in ejectment. The bill prayed that it might be declared that 
Thornton was entitled to have a formal lease granted or that he and D 
were entitled to a lien on the property in respect to money outlayed 
in improvements; that they would not be turned out of possession of 
the land without being repaid the moneys expended by Thornton on laying 
out the property and buildings on it; or such other compensation as the 
Court might think fit; that directions might be given to ascertain the 
amount of this compensation and that in the meantime the proceedings 
in ejectment might be stayed; and for farther relief. 
In March 1864 the case was heard in Chancery before Stuart V.C. who 
made an order which declared that Thornton was entitled to have a 
lease or leases of the two pieces of land on the terms stated in the bill. 
From this determination R appealed to the House of Lords. 
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Statement of Principle by Lord CranworU(_ 
Speaking for tne majority of the House of Lords Lord Cranworth set 
out the relevant head of equity which he regarded as necessary for the 
determination of Ramsden v Dyson as follows: 
!If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be 
his own, and I, perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting 
him right, and leave him to persevere in his error, a court of 
equity will not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the 
land on which he has expended money on the supposition that the 
land was his own. It considers that, when I saw the mistake 
into which he had fallen, it was my duty to be active and to 
state my adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in me to 
rema"in wilfully passive on such an occasion, in order afterwards 
to profit by the mistake which I might have prevented. But it 
will be observed that to raise such an equity two things are 
required, first, that the person expending the money supposes 
himself to be building on his own land; and secondly, that the 
real owner at the time of the expenditure knows that the land 
belongs to him and not to the person expending the money in the 
belief that he is the owner. For if a stranger build on my 
land knowing it to be mine, there is no principle of equity 
wni ch wi 11 prevent my cl aiming the 1 and with benefit of a 11 the 
expenditure made on it. There would be nothing in my conduct, 
active or passive, making it inequitable in me to assert my 
legal rights!20. 
It is not clear from this whether Lord Cranworth was purporting to 
make an exhaustive exposition of principle or whether he was merely 
accepting the existence of a much wider head of equitable intervention 
20. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129, at pages 140-141. 
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and was adapting it to what he saw as the conditions necessary to 
apply it to the specific facts of the instant case. Lord Cranworth 
stated the principle in terms of 'a stranger building on my land' but 
he does not specifically limit the principle to the building on the 
land of another or, indeed, to situations with real property as their 
subject matter. 
Central to the raising of the equity, in the view of Lord Cran\'JOrth 
is the state of knowledge of the parties. In his view it was essential 
that the representee be ignorant of the fact that he was building on 
the land of another and that the representor be fully cognizant of 
the facts as well as the leqal position. Thus if Lord Cranworth's 
statempnt of the principle is adopted the subjective proof of this 
required state of knowledge could be a vital evidential factor in a 
court decision. 
Two other ingredients given prominence by Lord Cranworth are, 
firstly, that a duty is placed upon the representor to speak, and thus 
prevent the detriment into which the representee is falling, and, 
secondly, that the representor should stand to profit by the mistake 
which he 'might have prevented', 
Lord Cranworth also took the opportunity to confirm the traditional 
equitable concept that there could be no assistance to a gratuitous 
intervener. That is the stranger who 'builds on my land knowing it 
to be mine'. He no doubt considered reference to a gratuitous inter-
vener as important by way of analogy for it was the interposition of 
equity which could turn what would otherwise be a gratuitous inter-
vener into a party entitled to raise the estoppel. 
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of Lord Cranworth's statement 
of the principle is his limitation of it to fa stranger'. What exactly 
was meant by this term is not spelt out. It could be taken to exclude 
from relief a party who had some prior relationship with the represent-
or, such as a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant. 
2.3 
Statement of the Principle in The Dissenting Speech of Lord Kingsdown 
Lord Kingsdown stated the principle as follows: 
'The ru1e of law applicable to the case appears to me to be this; 
If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain 
interest in land, or, what amounts to the same thing, under an 
expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord. that hp 
shnll havp a cprtnin interest, takes possession of such land, 
with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such 
promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and 
without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a court 
of equity will compel 1 the landlord to give effect to such 
promise or expectation. Tnis was the principle of the decision 
in Gregory v Mighell (1811) Ves. Jun. 328, and as I conceive, 
is open to no doubt. 21 . 
No exception can be taken to the statement of Lord Kingsdown to 
the effect that the principle is 'open to no doubt' if it is seen as 
referring to the broad principle only. There would appear to be some 
doubt between himself and Lord Cranworth as to what is required to 
raise the equity. It could be that what Lord Cranworth stated as the 
appropriate conditions for its application are treated as subsumed sub 
silentio in the speech of Lord Kingsdown. 
Lord Kingsdown stated the principle more broadly although in the 
narrower context of landlord and tenant. Here again this can be 
regarded as unfortunate, as it could well have arisen merely from the 
facts of the instant case, and show no limitation of the principle to 
the landlord and tenant situation. 
21. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129, at page 170. 
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An essential difference between the two statements is that Lord 
Kingsdown's does not place the same degree of emphasis upon the state 
of knowledge of the parties. In this respect his aoproach apoears to 
be more objective than that of Lord Cranworth. Rather he refers to 
the raising of Ian expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord'. 
So here, there is no specific requirement, at any rate in terms, that 
the landlord should know or intend that the expectation which he has 
created or encouraged is one to which he is under no obligation to 
give effect. In this view it would be sufficient to raise the equity 
if the reasonable effect of the conduct of the representor was to 
create or feed an expectation in the mind of the representee. The 
state of knowledge or the intention of the representor could be quite 
irrelevant to this raising of an expectation. 
It would appear to be this aspect of the statement of Lord Kingsdown 
which is now proving so attractive to the contemporary courts. 22 . 
A further significant distinction between the two statements is 
that while Lord Cranworth sees acquiescence as the basis of the action 
Lord Kingsdown provides for a wider based equity to include encourage-
ment as well as acquiescence. This possible distinction was not 
developed by their Lordships but in at least one recent case has been 
seen as giving rise to two distinct principles. 23 . 
22. It was, for example, accepted by Danckwerts, L. J. in the Court 
of Appeal in E.R. Ives Investments Ltd. v High [1967] 2 Q.B. 
379 at page 400, [1967] 1 All. E.R. 504 at page 511; by Lord 
Denning M.R. in Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch. 179 
at page 188, [1975J 3. All. E.R. 865 at page 871, by Scarman 
L.J. in the same case, ibid at page 193 and page 876 respectively: 
by Oliver J. in the High Court in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd [1982] 1 Q.B. 133n at page 
148, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576n at page 587. 
23. See Robert Goff J. in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd 
(in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. 
[1982] Q.B. 84 at page 103, [1981J 2. W.L.R. 554 at pages 
569-570. 
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Finally Lord Kingsdown does not emphasise the fraudulent taking 
advantage of another's error as does Lord Cranworth. This omission 
would appear to confirm that Lord Kingsdown is perceiving a much 
wider more broadly based equity than Lord Cranworth. 
The Dissent of Lord Kingsdown 
The very brief dissenting speech of Lord KingsdovJn is significant 
for two reasons. Firstly Lord Kingsdown in no way conflicts with the 
majority in respect to the actual principle of equity involved in the 
case. He fully recognises the right of equity to assert jurisdiction 
in appropriate cases where there has been building on the land of 
another. That is where a 'man under a verbal agreement with a 1 and-
lord for a certain interest in land, or what amounts to the same 
24 thing, under an expectanon, created or encouraged by the landlord ' . 
takes possession of the, land with the consent of the landlord and lays 
out money.25. To this extent the dissent of Lord Kingsdown does not 
amount to any derogation from the effectiveness of Ramsden v Dyson 
as a precedent for the assertion of jurisdiction in respect to the 
particular equity recognised in the case. 
Secondly the dissenting speech is significant for highlighting the 
differences which can arise in respect to inferences which can be 
drawn from facts when the judicial process is applied to equitable 
principles of this nature. It would appear to be in this area that the 
basis of Lord Kingsdown's dissent rests. While fully accepting the 
principle of equity he rested his dissent upon 'the effect generally 
which the evidence produced in (his) mind ,26 .. 
24. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. at page 170. 
25. Relying upon Gregory v Mighell (1811) Ves. Jun. 328. 
26. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. at page 170. 
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The leading speech of Lord Cranworth emphasises that the tenant 
was fully aware of the extent of his interest in the property. The 
majority of the House of Lords focussed upon the legal rights which 
derived from the actual mode of conveyance, used here to create the 
tenancy in dispute, and point out that that was sufficient to give the 
tenant full knowledge of the extent of his interest in the land. In 
the view of Lord Cranworth the tenant representee did 'not thereby, in 
the absence of special circumstances acquire any right to prevent' 27. 
the landlord from taking possession of the land and buildings when the 
tenancy had determined. Thornton, when he erected his buildings in 
1837 did not believe that he had any absolute right against Sir John 
Ramsden to the ,lease he later claimed. Lord Cranworth devoted much of 
his speech to analysing the evidence as supporting this scenario. 
The majority therefore, concerned themselves with the actual lease 
and the legal rights which derived from the lease and assume that that 
fixed the tenant representee with sufficient knowledge of his position, 
and that any future conduct of the representor, in raising an expecta-
tion which was contrary to the terms of the actual tenancy, was irrele-
vant. Lord Cranworth was prepared to construe the silence of the land-
lord not, as creating the impression of a long term tenancy in the mind 
f 
of the tenant, but rather as representing a desire, on the part of the 
landlord, not to disturb the tenants, and to create in their minds the 
impression that 'they might rely on the honour of the (Ramsden) family 
that no such step as evicting them ... would ever be taken so long as 
they °d th' t,28. pal elr ren . 
27. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. at page 141. 
28. Ibid at page 146. Lord Cranworth appears to have been quite irri-
tated with this ' ... new and cheap mode of conveyanceing which 
was certain, sooner or later, to involve difficulties' ibid at 
page 162. 
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The inference taken from the evidence by Lord Kingsdown was quite 
different. He paid attention to the conduct of the landlord in standing 
by, after the tenant had taken up possession of the land. He saw the 
non disturbance of the tenants in the meantime as merely pending the 
grant of a long term lease which the tenants had been assured that they 
might have whenever they required them. 
Lord Kingsdown also paid considerable attention to the inferences 
to be derived from the use of the term 'tenants at will' and accepted 
the respondant representee's view that the term was used, not in a 
strict legal sense but merely to distinguish those who had formal 
leases from those who did not. 
It could be argued that Lord Cranworth merely went further than 
Lord Kingsdown and spelt out the factual conditions which are necessary 
for the satisfaction of the equity while Lord Kingsdown has sub 
silentio accepted these. Lord Cranworth then going on to consider that 
the facts of the case do not show that these conditions have been 
satisfied. That is that the tenant took the lease with full knowledge 
of the actual terms of the tenancy which he held and that he improved 
the property fully aware of the limitations of his title. 
Thus the dissent arose not upon the head of equity but upon the 
inferences to be drawn from the facts. In this respect the speeches 
in Ramsden v Dyson show the possibility of a difficulty which could 
be faced by future courts in applying this principle. If inferences 
from facts are to assume such a degree of importance then those facts, 
as well as the evidence upon which they are based, are going to be 
subject to ever increasing and minute analysis, by counsel, in order to 
throw up possible inferences in support of their client's case. 
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Analysis of the Principle Following the Decision in Ramsden v Dyson 
The decision in Ramsden v Dyson did not greatly extend the pre-
existing law. It can in no way be regarded as a restatement of the 
law. It does little more than confirm the existence of a vague head 
of equity to the effect that redress may be available in cases where a 
party has stood by while another has acted to his detriment. It did 
set out statements of the principle but, as has been indicated, these 
were, to some extent at least contradictory, and are not couched in 
general terms but are substantially limited to the instant facts. 
In particular the problem of the situational limits of the principle 
remained unclear. Did the principle apply to situations apart from 
real property ,or was it confined to land transactions. More specifically 
was it confined to the building upon the property of another or to the 
landlord tenant situation? In Ramsden v Dyson there was a pre-existing 
contractual relationship, of sorts, between the representor and the 
representee, and indeed, this was a feature of most of the earlier 
cases, but we are not told whether the principle is so limited. 
The specific conditions under which relief would be available under 
the principle were not settled by Ramsden v on itself. In particu-
lar there is no indication of the nature or limits of the conduct 
required of the representor. Is his conduct limited to a mere standing 
by or can it include other acts? In his statement of ~he principle 
Lord Kingsdown hints at I encouragement I as a possible basis of repre-
sentor conduct upon which the principle may be set. It is not certain 
whether this is merely one aspect of some amorphous raft of conduct 
which will suffice to found the principle or whether it indicates the 
existence of a distinct heading of equity separate from that based 
upon acquiescence. 
Lord Cranworth in his exposition of the principle, it will be 
recalled refers to 'the mistake which I might have prevented ,29 . and 
29. (1866) L.R. I H.L. 129 at page 140. 
this opens the problem of the sta~e of knowledge required of the 
parties. He continues to lay down quite strict requirements as to the 
state of knowledge required of the parties. But the different approach 
of Lord Kingsdown to this issue leaves a very substantial gap because 
he tends to emphasise the raising of an 'expectation'. The two some-
what conflicting speeches thus serve to leave the entire problem of 
the state of knowledge required of the parties in abeyance. 
At the same time Ramsden v Dyson itself reveals little as to the 
necessary conduct of the representee. Implicit in the decision is 
that the representee must stand to suffer some detriment before the 
principle can be invoked but the nature and form of this detriment is 
not made clear. 
In concentrating upon the facts and the inferences to be derived 
from those facts their Lordships tend to ignore the fundamental basis 
of the principle. The statements of the principles which were laid 
down appear to hint more of a technical solution based upon specific 
rules rather than one based upon any broad conception of what amounts 
to unconscionable conduct. Indeed emphasis upon unconscionable 
conduct ;s rather conspicious by its absence. Whether unconscionability 
was accepted sub silentio as the legitimate basis of the Ramsden v 
LJyson pr;nc;ple~ and the miscellaneous rules referred to as merely the 
conditions to satisfy that unconscionability, or, on the other hand, 
whether the rules themselves formed the substance of the principle, 
must remaln a matter of conjecture. 
A :...:..;;;;;;=-.;;~.......:...~:...:...;::.:...:.. was the resort by 
counsel to precedent from what would now be considered as distinct 
and separate heads of liability in equity. At least one decision 30 . 
30. Gregory v Mighell (1811) Ves. Jun. 238; 34 E.R. 341; dealing with 
the part performance of the terms of an agreement to lease. 
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quoted appears to rest upon the doctrine of part performance in the 
law of contract, while another31 . seems more appropriately considered 
as falling under the principle laid down in Dillwyn v Llewelyn,32. 
that is the equity to perfect a gift. The failure to disengage these 
various heads of equity would tend to indicate that it was believed, 
at the time, that the equitable concepts underlying them were trans-
latable from one to the other even if the circumstances in which the 
unconscionable conduct of the representor arose was different in each 
case. 
Conclusion: Possible Lines of Development Left to Futur~ Courts 
Thus with the handing down of the decision in Ramsden v Dyson 
itself the principle which it most certainly confirmed was still 
left extremely open ended. It was left for the future courts to deter-
mine how the principle developed because the decision of the House of 
Lords left it subject to virtually no constraints. 
Broadly speaking two quite distinct pathways presented themselves. 
Firstly there was the possibility of the approach which, as indicated, 
appears to be hinted at in the decision itself. This was what could 
be referred to as a 'pseudo contractual I approach. This would be an 
approach based upon rigidly prescribed rules, possibly seen as provid-
ing the test of the existence of a representation in the form of a 
promise, by one party, that is the representor, with equally rigid 
rules spel ling out the requirement of some detriment on the part of 
the other party, that is the representee. 
It wi 11 be shown 'Jt:hat for some years the courts did tend to follow 
this quite rigid approach which could be regarded as orienting the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle away from equity and towards the common 
31. Surcome v Pinniger \18~3) 3 De. G. McN. & G. 571; 43 E.R. 224. 
32. \1862) 4 De G.G. & J. 517; 40 E.K. 1285. 
31 
law. This direction would have meant a very narrow principle, limited 
probably to real property and perhaps restricted to the landlord tenant 
situation or to the building upon the land of another. This would have 
meant a very inflexible weapon in the hands of the judiciary. 
Secondly, it was equally apposite that the future development of 
the principle could have assumed a much braoder approach with much less 
emphasis upon rules. If the courts were to travel along this pathway in 
their application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle it is reasonable to 
assume that they would have been compelled to devise some basis with 
which to anchor the principle to counter the reduced emphasis upon rules. 
Had the rules been relinquished and nothing devised to fill the void 
left by the removal of the rules, the principle would have probably 
floated completely free with no indication as to when it was availabte. 
This second, broader, approach is now very much in the ascendant and 
the courts have found, what appears to be a quite satisfactory anchor 
for the Ramsden v Dyson principle in a revival of the old equitable 
concept of unconscionability. 
To some extent these two different approaches are implicit in the 
statements of the principle as set out by Lord Cranworth on the one 
hand and Lord Kingsdown on the other. The former providing for the 
narrow approach the latter for the broader. 
The second approach would mean a much more flexible principle that 
could be used by the courts as a weapon to rectify unconscionability 
in a wide variety of different situations. 
Attention is now directed to the process whereby the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle gradually shed itself of constraints and assumed its 
present guise. 
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SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE 
Introduction: Possible Limitations. 
The decision in Ramsden v Dyson itself left the scope of the 
principle virtually open. It was thus the prerogative of subsequent 
courts to determine where its outer parameters were to be finally set. 
Several areas presented themselves as providing possible 
limitations upon the scope of the principle. The principle could 
have been limited in respect to the subject matter of the 
representation. The very early decisions were almost entirely concerned 
with land~transactions, and in particular, improving the land of 
another, and there was nothing in the early cases to compel later courts 
to extend the Ramsden v Dyson principle beyond representations in 
respect to rights and interests in real property, or indeed even to 
beyond those relating to the improving of the property of another. 
At the same time the courts could have curtailed the scope of 
the principle by limJting the nature of the representation requir§'d 
to be established by a representee. Again the parameters could have 
been set very strictly and the Ramsden v Dyson principle could well, 
for example, have been limited to those situations in which 
acquiescence alone, with nothing else by way of representation, had 
taken place. Other forms of representations, such as those made 
verbally or in writing, even when accompanied by acquiescence, could 
have served to exclude the pleading of the Ramsden v Dyson principle, 
and could have been left as the subject matter of other headings of 
estoppel. 
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The principle has now been extended to situations of convention 
that is where both the parties, possibly mistakenly, assume a specific 
state of affairs and proceed to act upon that basis. Recent decisions 
have shown that the party who seeks to resile from such an assumption 
can be met with the Ramsden v Dyson pri nC"i p 1 e. 
Finally the courts could have limited the principle within the 
equitable jurisdiction and held that it was not applicable to strike 
down rights of a legal nature. At the same time the courts could 
have made some limited moves in this direction and held for example, 
that it was more easy to destroy equitable rights by acquiescence 
than to destroy legal rights with the same weapon. 
Although some tenuous moves have been made to constrain the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle in these directions, these appear now to 
have been quite effectively defeated, The courts have clearly 
indicated that they are now not prepared to limit the scope of the 
principle upon any of the bases set out above. Indeed there has been 
a quite remarkable freedom evident in the extent to which the courts 
have shown themselves ready to adapt the principle in virtually any 
direction. The passing of time has seen the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
pleaded in an increasing number of situations far removed from the 
factual situations of past centuries where it 0as nurtured. There 
has been no hesitation in applying the principle where it has been 
deemed appropriate to do so. 
However a few indications as to possible limits on the principle 
have made an appearance in very recent cases and these have been 
reserved for discussion in a later chapter 1. 
1. IThe Limits of the Principle Make an Appearance' Chapter eleven 
infra. 
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The Ramsden v Dyson Principle is not Limited to Rights and Interests 
Created in and Over Land 
An appropriate starting point for this di scussi on is the quite 
emphatic dicta of Megaw L.J. in Western Fish Prod~ct~ v Penwith 
District Council; 2. 
'We know of no case, and none has been cited to us, in which 
the principle set out in Ramsden v Dyson ... has been applied 
otherwise than to rights and interests created in and over 
land. It may extend to other forms of property: ... In our 
judgment there is no good reason for extending the principle 
further .... The creation of new rights and remedies ;s a 
matter for Parliament, not the judges. I 3. 
With respect it will be shown that this view is not supported 
by the broad drift of the authorities, and that there is no clear 
theoretical reason why the Ramsden v Dyson principle should be so 
limited. In Western Fish Products v Penwith D.C. the representee 
had improved his own land following a representation from a.council 
officer that he had the necessary planning authority. It was held 
that this did not give the requisite proprietary right to secure the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle as no expectation was raised in respect to 
the property of the representor. 
2. [1981J 2 All LR. 204. 
3. ibid at page 218 
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While superficially the view might well appear quite appealing 
there can be no doubt that the Ramsden v Dyson principle is not 
limited to instances of rights and interests in respect to real 
property. 
It is quite true that most of the early cases where the 
principle was successfully pleaded did have land as their subject 
matter. But it must be remembered that in those times little 
litigation where the principle was likely to be relevant reached the 
court of chancery apart from that i'nvolved with real property. Land 
transactions also probably did not provide the evidential difficulties 
which would have been faced in the case of other subject matters. At 
the same time the potential of the principle to o~erate as a blocking 
mechanism to other possible causes of action, such as that in tort, 
was probably not tried because the other rights of action were not 
fully developed. The fact that the early cases where the RaPlsden v 
Dyson principle was successfully pleaded dealt almost exclusively with 
real property was therefore probably very largely fortuitous. 
It is not denied that the principle can give rise to proprietary 
rights exclusive to real property 4. but this is not conclusive 
proof that the principle cannot give rise to rights in respect to 
other subject matters of litigation and that it is exclusively 
reserved to land. 5. 
4. See under 'Remedies': Proprietary Riqhts Deriving From the 
Ramsden v Dyson Principle chapter nine infra. 
5. As for example in Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
11981J 1 W.L.R. 1265 [1981J 2 All E.R. 650 where the principle 
was successfully pleaded to resist an action in the tort of 
passing off. 
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There is, it must be admitted, some very weak judicial authority 
for the proposition that the principle is limited to land. Jordan 
C.J. in N.S.W. Trotting Club v Glebe Municipal Council, 6. would 
have gone further and 1 imited the princi pl e not only to real property 
but to instances where improvements to the land of another had taken 
place. Jordan C.J. seemed to obviate the issue of whether or not the 
principle was limited to land by making a distinction as between the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle and a wider estoppel by acquiescence, and 
limiting only the former to land transactions. It is possible to 
derive some support for such a proposition from cases determined 
shortly after Ramsden v Dyson itself. De Bussche v Alt 7. decided 
by the Court of Appeal in 1878, clearly manifested a principle of 
acquiescence, made no reference to Ramsden v Dyson and was concerned 
with an agency agreement in respect to the sale of a vessel. Simm 
v Anglo American Telegraph Company 8. decided in 1879 by the Court 
of Appeal likewise made no reference to the principle and was concerned 
with estoppel against a company for the registration of a forged share 
certificate. But this does not prevent these cases from being examples 
of the same principle as that manifested in Ramsden v Dyson. 9. 
6. (1937) 37 S.R. (N.S.W.) 288. 
7. (1878) 8 Ch. D. 286 C.A. 
8. (1879) 5 Q.B.D. 188 C.A. 
9. IAnother is where a man by hi s words or by hi s s11 ence, or 
acquiescence, leads another to believe that he is not the owner 
and has no interest in the goods I per Lord Denning M.R. in 
Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchinos [1976] Q.B. 225 [1975] 3 All 
E.R. 314 at pages.242 at page 322 respectively. 
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The principle can apply to personal property. But to submit 
as some writers have tnat 'there is no reason in principle to exclude 
it (the Ramsden v Dyson principle) from personality' 10. is too 
t 
restrictiv~~ __ The contemporary cases clearly show that to limit the 
--
principle to property of any kind, real or personal is quite unrealistic. 
Spencer-Bower and Turner clearly reflect the trend of the 
contemporary decisions on this matter; 
'The rules as to estoppel by encouragement or acquiescence are 
not confined to cases of title to, encroachments upon, real property, 
though these cases undoubtly furnish the greatest variety of useful 
illustrations of the work-ing of the doctrines ... the proposition 
... is as applicable to transactions with respect to money as it 
is to transactions with respect to land' 11. 
The contemporary decisions a1so do not appear to exhibit any clear 
propensity to limit the principle in respect to subject matter. Thus 
the universality of the principle was specifically upheld by Scarman 
L.J. in the Court of Appeal in Crabb v Arun District Council 12. 
where, after referring to the dictum of Lord Kingsdown, in Ramsden v 
Dyson he went on, 'The statement of the law is put into the language 
of landlord and tenant because it was a landlord and tenant situation 
with which Lord Kingsdown was concerned: but it has been accepted as of 
general application' 13. 
10. Meagher R.P., W.M.C. Gummow and J.R.F. Lehane 'Eguity Doctrines 
and Remedies' Sydney Butterworths of Australia Ltd, 1975. 
paragraph 1714 page 366. This work was published in 1975 and 
although the quote set out could possibly have been regarded as 
a legitimate statement of the law as at that time; subsequent 
cases referred to infra have clearly proved it much too restrictive 
as a statement of the scope of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
11. Spencer-Bower G and Sir Alexander Turner (editor) 'The Law Relating 
to Estoppel by Representation' third edition London Butterworths 
1977, paragraph 301 page 295. 
12. [1976] 1 Ch. 179, [1975] 3 All E.R. 865. 
13. ibid at page 194 and page 876 respectively. 
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Confirming this 'universality' of the principle we see its 
application in estopping an action in the tort of passing off; 14. 
in estopping a company from denying the validity of a guarantee which it 
h d · t b k' ttl d t . t b' d' 15. a glven 0 a an ln respec 0 a oan rna e 0 1 S SU S1 lary; 
~ enforcing the provisions of an option which was invalid because of 
non-registration under the Land Charges Act 1925. (U.K.) 16. 
It is clear that the Ramsden v Dyson principle is not limited to 
situations where land is the subject matter of the representation much 
less to situations where the improvement of the land of another is in 
dispute. It is equally lacking in realism to contend that the principle 
may extend to personality; it clearly extends much further. If there are 
any outer limits to the subject matter to which the principle is 
applicable then it is submitted that they have not, as yet, been 
determined by the courts. The present indications are that no limits, 
fn this respect, will be set but that the universal ity of the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle will be maintained. 
Some conjecture will reveal the difficulty which eql.dty would have 
experienced in limiting the principle to real property and, in particular, 
to improvements to the land of another. For example, where improvements 
to property are made this is frequently in the expectation of the future 
exercise of a legal right over that property, such as the exercise of an 
option or the right of renewal of a lease. Once it has been established 
that the principle is available to enforce the terms of an option, albeit 
some might argue by back door means, in respect to real property, this 
logically leads to the application of the principle to enforce the 
provisions of options etc in respect to other transactions, such as the 
14. As in Habib Bank Ltd. v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich [1981J I.W.L.R. 
1265 [1981] 2 All E.R. 650. 
15. As in AIT!i:llg~mated I_nvestment and Property Co Ltd (in liquidation) 
t:~~7.C9mmerce International Bank I1982j: Q.B. 84. [31981J 3 All 
16. Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd 
[1982] Q.B. 133 [1981] 1 All E.R. 397, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576 n. 
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renewal of a loan. Equity would, it is submitted, not find it easy to 
see a distinction between~representee improving the land of another, in 
the expectation of a proprietary right in that property, on the one hand, 
and a representee improving his own land in the expectation of obtaining 
a loan for the purpose of financing the improvements, when he has been 
led by the representor to believe that such a loan would be forthcoming. 
Perhaps a more compelling reason for not limiting the equity to real 
property is that the court of chancery surely did not see its power to 
rectify unconscionable situations limited to real property. The right 
of equity to intervene was not limited to instances where the potential 
loss of the representee was limited to actions which visably related to 
the subject matter in dispute. 
The Ramsden v Dyson Principle is Not Limited to Representations of 
Mere Acquiescence or Encouragement. 
The facts of Ramsden v Dyson itself did not provide an example 
of estoppel upon the basis of what might be referred to as 'nude 
acquiescence'. It will be recalled that the tenant had, at least, been 
put into possession of the land, in dispute, by the representor landlord. 
Thereafter the 1 andl ord stood by whil e the representee improved the 
property in the expectation that he would be able to obtain a long term 
lease. This was not a case where the representee had mistakenly begun 
to improve the property of another and that other party had simply 
remained silent and quiescent and allowed the representee to continue 
acting to his detriment. Ramsden v Dyson did, however, raise the issue 
of estoppel by encouragement as well as or in addition to acquiescence 
and this will be considered later. 
The two expressions 'acquiescence' and 'encouragement' were not 
defined in Ramsden v Dyson and it appears that they have not been the 
subject of any definitive judicial interpretation in later cases. 
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It is emphasised that very few instances are available in recent 
times of parties simply improving the land of another, in the mistaken 
belief of title, while the legal owner, in full possession of the facts 
merely stood by. The insignia of title as well as statutory provisions 
relating to encroachment are now so highly developed that such a situation 
is now unlikely to occur, or if it did happen, to result in litigation. 
It is clear now th~t the Ramsden v Dyson principle is not limited 
to instances where acquiescence alone, or encouragement alone, or even 
the two in some manner of combination, has taken place. The principle 
will accommodate a much wider range of representations. It would appear 
that provided some element of acquiescence or encouragement is present 
any manner or number of other representations will not preclude the 
successful pleading of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
This ready extension of the principle has, no doubt, been 
facilitated by the absence of any clearly developed head of estoppel 
based upon representations other than acquiescence. For example in 
many instances where specific representations have taken place we see 
the counsel and contemporary courts preferring to rely, if at all 
possible, upon the Ramsden v principle rather than to plead or 
assert any principle of estoppel based upon a clear assertion of fact. 
Thus in Crabb v Arun Distri il 17. the representor council had 
given a specific assurance to the representee landowner that he would 
have the requi red access. But the counci 1 then stood by whil e the 
landowner, acting to his detriment in reliance upon the expectation 
which the representor had created, sold some adjoining land, thus 
rendering himself complerely reliant upon the right of way promised by 
the council. The Court of Appeal had no hesitation in applying the 
17. [1976] Ch. 179 [1975J 3 All E.R. 865. 
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Ramsden v Dyson principle tending to ignore the existence of the point 
that the specific representations by the representor council could 
tnemselves nave been tne basis of estoppel. 
Again in Habib Bank Ltd. v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 18. which was an 
attempt to use estoppel to block an action in passing off the plaintiff 
representor bank had, in fact, qiven the defendant representee bank 
specific approval to use the name which the representor later complained 
of and attempted to make the subject of an action in tort in passing off. 
However no objection was taken by the representor of the use of the name 
I Habib I for some four years between 1973 and 1977 and this was considered 
sufficient by the Court of Appeal to bring the action under the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. 
Extension of Ramsden v Dyson Principle to Situations of Convention 
Probaoly an even more remarkable phenomenon is the extension of the 
principle into situations of 'convention~ This is where both parties 
operate upon the assumption that a certain state of affairs exists, such 
as, for example that there is a right to renew a lease or that an option 
is valid, 19. and when it is discovered that the shared assumption is 
invalid one party seeks to resile from it. It has been established that 
estoppel can operate in such instances and estoppel by convention is 
sometimes specified as a distinct heading. 20. Thus we see the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle being relied upon as the significant authority to 
secure estoppel in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co 
Ltd. 21. \tJhere both parties assumed the validity of an option to renew 
a lease, and also in the High Court in Amalgamated Investment and Property 
18. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1265 [1981] 2 All E.R. 650. 
19. Both parties could, for example, be bound by the terms of a contract 
which they have mutually miscontrued and acted upon. 
20. See e.g. Chapter viii 'Estoppel by Convention' in Spencer-Bower 
and Turner op. cit. 
21. [1982] Q.B. 133 [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576. 
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Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank, 22. 
where both parties operated upon the assumption that a guarantee of a 
loan was binding. Both of these cases clearly involved instances of 
convention. Significantly the Court of Appeal decision in the latter 
case makes no reference to the Ramsden v Dyson principle but relies more 
upon vague principles of convention with very substantial reliance upon 
quotes from Spencer-Bower and Turner. .23. 
The extension of the Ramsden v Dyson principle into situations of 
convention is significant in demonstrating that the necessary element 
of unconscionability, and the consequent equity, need not rest only in 
the fact that the representor, by breaking his silence, could have 
prevented the loss of the representee. The move to convention clearly 
shows the Ramsden v Dyson principle extending still further into the 
arena of preventive justice. A very small step forward from allowing 
the principle in cases of convention is the elimination of mistake as 
being a vital factor in the representation. That is irrespective of 
of whether what the parties may have previously agreed was correct the 
principle will be available to prevent a party from resiling from a 
situation of mutual agreement when it would be unconscionable to the 
other party for him to do so. In other words the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle can be resorted to in order to prevent a potential loss. 
Although it could be argued that the Ramsden v Dyson principle has 
been availed of to fill a void left by the lack of judicial development 
of other headings of estoppel, the cases cited, nonetheless appear to 
provide quite conclusive('proof that the principle is not limited to 
22. [1982] Q.B. 84 [1981] 2 W.L.R. 554. 
23. See the judgment of Eveleigh L.J. [1982] Q.B. 84 at page 126 
and that of Brandon L.J. ibid at page 131. The dearth of judicial 
authority put forward in support of the heading of convention as an 
independant form of estoppel is highly significant. 
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instances of acquiescence alone but can clearly be applied successfully 
in other instances provided some element of acquiescence is present. 
This being so it would appear that situations of convention would 
usually provide the required acquiescence in that the essence of convention 
is that both parties mutually stand by while the other fulfills his side 
of the agreement. 
In the High Court in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co.',Ltd. 
v Texas Commerce International Bank Robert Goff J. referred back to the 
apparent distinction which had been made in Ramsden v Dyson between the 
principle enuciated by Lord Cranworth, resting apparently upon acquiescence, 
and that of Lord Kingsdown which appears 'to derive rather from [ 
encouragement or representation' 24. He pointed out that the instant 
case clearly involved encouragement and representation and refused to 
make any clear distinction between these forms of representation as the 
basis of estoppel and acquiescence. He 'rejected an argument founded upon 
rigid categorisation' 25. 
There would appear now to be a clear disinclination to be too 
concerned with the actual nature of the representation which is submitted 
as the basis of a pleading of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. The cases 
would appear to indicate that some element of acquiescence of encouragement 
must be present. It is also clear that relief under the principle is not 
debarred by the presenceof direct representations in addition to elements 
of acquiescence or encouragement. There has been a definite reluctance 
to prescribe rul es tramme:lli ng the representati on. This 1 eaves the door 
open to the evolution of a different basis for the conduct of the representor 
which gauges that conduct not so much by a series of predetermined rules 
but whether, in the circumstances, the conduct of the represntor has been 
24. [1982] Q;B. at page 103. 
25. ibid. 
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unconscionable. This, as will subsequently be shown 26. requires a 
very broad overview of the actions of the representor. 
The Ramsden v Dyson Principle in Equally Effective Against Legal As 
Against Equitable Rights. 
When it is recalled that one of the fundamental basis of the 
equitable jursidiction was to grant relief where none was available at 
common law it may appear trite to argue that the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
is not available to strike down a common law right or that it is easier 
to establish a case of acquiescence where the right which it is sought 
to enforce is equitable only. If the intervention of equity was so 
limited its utility would surely be limited in the extreme. Despite this 
some submissions have apparently been made in recent cases to the effect 
that there is a distinction in the effectiveness of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle as against common law rights on the one hand and equitable 
rights on the other. Moreover these submissions have found limited favour 
with the courts. 
In Shaw v App~egate 27. it was sought to invoke the principle to 
strike down a convenant in a conveyance. 28. The Court of Appeal 
declined to apply acquiescence in that instant and proffered the view; 
26. See under 'The Rajsingof .ArLExpectatlon;chapter seven 
infra. 
27. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 970. 
28. The convenant was to the effect that the land or any part of it 
should not be used as an lamusement arcade I The assignees of the 
vendor had stood by for some five years and allowed the property 
to be used as an amusement arcade before attempting to enforce 
the convenant. 
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lIt requires a very strong evidence to induce the Court to 
deprive a man of his legal right when he has expressly stipulated 
that he shall be bound only by a written document' 29. 
It was conceded that it was easier to establish acquiescence in cases 
where it was sought to destroy equitable rights than where it was sought 
to destroy 1 ega 1 ri ghts; 
IFor my part, I think it is easier to establ ish a case of 
acquiescence where the right is equitable only' 29a. 
In Shaw v Applegate it was clearly a legal right which it was sought to 
defeat by acquiescence. The test which the Court set out in that case 
is quite consistent with that contained in the other recent decisions 
viz; 
and 
IThe real test ..• I think must be whether on the facts of the 
particular case the situation has become such that it would be 
dishonest, or unconscionable, for the plaintiff, or for the person 
having the right sought to be enforced, to continue to see to 
enforce itl 30. 
the test is whether, in the circumstances, it has become 
unconscionable for· the plaintiff to rely on his legal rights' 31. 
Two propositions put forward by this dicta do not, with respect, 
appear to be tenable viewed in the light of other decisions. Firstly in 
making an apparent distinction as between estoppel as based upon 
29. As per BuckleyL.J. [1977] I W.L.R. 970 at page 977 citing from 
Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch. D. 96 at page 105. 
29a. As per Robert Goff L.J. [1977] I W.L.R. 970 at page 979. 
30. As per Buckley L.J. [1977] I W.L.R. 970 at page 978. 
31. As per Robert Goff L.J. ibid at page 980. 
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acquiescence, that is as flowing from the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
and estoppel based upon other forms of representation, or indeed 
actions based upon other aspects of the equitable juris@iction, the 
Court of Appeal seems to have been throwing up quite an artificial 
gloss. It is submitted that once the equity is shown to exist, as 
indeed the quotes set out above appear to indicate, no distinction can 
be drawn as between the effect of an estoppel based upon acquiescence as 
against any other base. The effect is the same. 
Secondly, and more important for the purposes of our present 
discussion, the Ramsden v Dyson principle is, it is submitted, equally 
effective in its destruction of legal rights as against the destruction 
of equitable rights. Unce it can be shown that fit would be dishonest' 
or 'it has become unconscionable' the principle will destroy legal 
rights just as effectively as it will destroy equitable rights. This 
is aptly demonstrated by Pascoe v Turner 32. and Crabb v Arun District 
Counei 1 33. 
This broader view would appear to be supported by the more recent 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Habib Bank v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
34. where it was sought to invoke acquiescence, in conjunction with the 
other equitable heading of laches to defeat an action for the common law 
tort of passing off. In other words equitable devices were being used as 
defences to a common law action. Counsel sought to show that these 
devices only applied where an equitable right was being protected and 
apparently lengthly argument ensued as to 'whether a plaintiff in a passing 
off action is protecting a legal right or an"equilable right' 35. 
32. [1979] 2 All E.R. 945. 
33. [1976] 1 Ch. 179, [1975] 3, W.L.R. 847, 0975J 3 All E.R. 865 
34. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1265, [1981] 2 ,AII.E.R. 650. 
35. ibid at page 1285 and page 666 respectively 
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This argument Oliver L.J. rejected and stated 'that such 
distinctions are both archaic and arcane' 36. This would thus appear to 
confirm the ability of the Ramsden v Dyson principle to strike down 
legal rights in the same manner and to the same extent~ that it can 
strike down equitable rights. Surely no other proposition is tenable. 
The ability of equity to over ride a statute has been confirmed beyond 
any dispute as inSitanced by the application of the doctrine of part 
performance in the law of contract. 37. Also the power of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle to create proprietary rights is not disputed. If 
weapons as powerful as statute and proprietary rights can fall before 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle then what rights can stand in its way? 
Conclusion: The Scope of the Principle Still Extending 
Subsequent to Ramsden v Dyson clear attempts have been made to 
extend the scope of the principle. 
The principle is most certainly not limited to cases where real 
property is the subject matter in dispute. As yet no limits appear to 
nave been set as to the subject matter. It would appear that the 
principle is equally applicable in transferring the legal title to 
property as in acting as a defence to a common law tort. 
In similar manner it is now clear that the principle is applicable 
to behaviour by way of representation which although it may not have 
been envisaged by the earlier courts has now been accepted without 
demurrer. Thus it is no b~rrier to the successful pleading of the 
principle the specific representations have occurred in addition to 
acquiescence or encouragement. The Ramsden v Dyson principle is 
applicable in situations of convention. 
36. ibid 
37. However it must be admitted that the effectiveness of estoppel as 
a whole in the face of a statute is far from clear. 
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The principle is not confined to the destruction of rights 
which are specifically equitable in nature. 
This obvious extention of the scope of the Rati1sden v 
principle has served to provide one step towards the resurgence of 
unconscionabil ity as the only basis of the principle. It has ensured 
that the principle remained free of limits which could have hindered 
its operation as a device to rectify unconscionable situations across 
a wide front. 
In extending the scope of the principle the role of Lord Denning 
as compared with his brother judges can be readily seen. Thus in 
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. v Texas Commerce Interna-
tional Bank Ltd. he was prepared to determine the issue on the basis 
of whether or not it was unconscionable to deny reli~f while on the 
other hand Eveleigh and Brandon L. JJ. took the view that the issue 
was a classic case of estoppel by convention. They thus sought a 
basis for this finding within existing rules, which proved difficult. 
The clear difference between the two approaches is that while 
unconscionability required little by way of justification and has 
little in the way of outer boundaries which can control the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle convention involves a more limited scope for expan-
sion and was seen as bounded by clear rules. 
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Chapter Four 
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF RULES 
Introduction: Attempts to Systematise the Principle. 
Over the years several attempts have been made to encumber the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle with a number of specific and clearly 
identifiable rules, which, had they been successful, would have served to 
spell out the circumstances in which the principle was applicable, and 
would thus have presented the representee with a series of barriers which 
he would have had to overcome in order to call the equity into aid. These 
rules can thus serve to act as defences against the application of the 
principle. 
Although the remnants of these rules still frequently haunt the 
presenta,pplication of the principle their limits and effect are now far 
from clear. However, had these rules been taken up, rigidly applied, and 
possibly developed further, by the contemporary courts, they could have 
had a very stultifying effect upon the applicability of the principle, and 
may even have resulted in it being rendered virtually inoperative. When 
these rules are pleaded today it is usually for the purpose of raising 
a defence against the application of the principle. 
But the rules are still very much alive and the tendency of counsel 
to plead them continues, unabated. Their acceptance by the judiciary, 
however, is now much more circumspect and they have tended to be discarded 
by the courts in the face of the rise of unconscionability as a general 
basis for the application for the principle. Any rigid adherence by the 
courts to constraints attaching to the application of the principle could 
have 1 imited its potential to operate as a device to rectify unconscionable 
situations. Thus the courts are tending to show an apparent degree of 
irritation with the pleading of these limitations on the principle. 
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The probanda laid down by the eminent Victorian Chancery Judge, 
Sir Edward Fry, in Wi llmott v Barber 1. were an attempt to set out a 
comprehensive code for the behaviour of the representee. The second 
requirement considered here is the possif>le obligation on the part of the 
representee to show that a duty to disclose rested upon the representor 
to break his silence, and that that duty had been broken. This like the 
probanda of Fry J. was of a specific nature. 
Also there are some elusive indications to the effect that the 
equitable concept of mutuality could operate in respect to the application 
of the Ramsden v Dyson pdnci p 1 e. 
Unlike the other rules the proposition deriving, apparently from the 
2. 
decision of Bowen L.J. in the Court of Appeal in Low v Bouverie to 
the effect that estoppel cannot operate as a cause of action, is of a 
much more ephemeral nature, concerning the overall application of the 
principle, if indeed it ever did apply to the principle. 
Thus this rule, although like the others referred to here in being 
used as a defence, has been reserved for fuller consideration in the 
succeeding~thaPter. 
, Rules May Result in a Principle Becoming Detached From Its Base. 
In the application of the judicial process there can be a tendency 
for rules, especially those which become firmly entrenched, to result in 
a principle becoming detached from its base. The courts may tend to apply 
the rules with tne assumption that the application of the rules amounts 
to an end in itself. The fact that the rules may have been originally 
intended only as the manifestation of a particular principle of law, and 
1. (1880) 15 eh.D. 96. 
2. (1891) 3 Ch. 82. 
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that they were not designed as an end in themselves, and that they must 
needs be adapted to specific circumstances, could well be lost sight of. 
Should such a process take place the original basis and purpose of a 
principle of law could well become lost in the rules. 
There are some indications that such a process did occur in the 
administration of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. For example there are 
signs that the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott v Barber , in some 
cases, at least, had such an effect. This is indicated by instances 
where the probanda were applied without reference to any requirement of 
unconscionability and where there was no reference at all to the wider 
Ramsden v Dyson principle. 3. In another case it was stated that 'The 
modern appl ication of the doctrine (of proprietary estoppel) starts with 
Willmott v Barber' 4. With respect such a proposition cannot be 
supported. Willmott v Barber merely formulated a series of rules for the 
application of the principle of law confirmed in Ramsden v Dyson. 
Rules can thus be a convenient device whereby the courts can expand 
or restrict the scope of a principle. If there is a desire to expand the 
scope of the principle the rules can be lightly applied or even disregarded 
altogether in favour of a broader application of the basis of the principle. 
On the other hand shoul d it be desired to restri ct the scope of a 
principle the rules can be applied rigidly with even an indifference on 
the part of the courts as to what effect that rigid application may have 
upon the basis of the principle. 
Thus in regard to the Ramsden v Dyson principle a potential conflict 
exists between the rules which have arisen and the basis of the principle, 
be that basis unconscionability or otherwise. 
3. As in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd 
[1971]A.C. 850, [1970J 3 W.L.R. 287, [1970] 2 All E.R. 871, H.L. (E). 
Adaras Developments Ltd v Marcona Corporation [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 324. 
Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 W.L.R. 970, [1978] 1 All E.R. 123, C.A. 
4. As per Jefferies J. in Beech v Beech (High Court Wellington, 24 
February 1982 (A No. 144/80) Jefferies J. at page 11) 
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The Five Probanda Put Forward by Sir Edward Fry in Willmott v Barber. 
According to Fry J. in Willmot v Barber, the requirements to be 
satisfied by the representee before he could rely upon acquiescence may 
be summarised as follows; 
1. The representee must be mistaken as to his legal rights. 
2. The representee must have expended money or must have done some 
act (not necessarily upon the defendant's land) on the faith of 
his mistaken belief. 
3. The representor must know of the existence of his own right 
which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the 
representee. Otherwise he is in the same position as the 
representee. 
4. The representor must know of the representee's mistaken belief 
as to his rights. If he does not, there is nothing to call 
upon him to assert his rights. 
5. Lastly, the representor, the possessor of the legal right, 
must have encouraged the representee in his expenditure of 
money or in the other acts which he has done, either directly 
or by abstaining from asserting his legal rights. 5. 
Willmott v Barber was yet a further case dealing with building upOf,\, 
the land of another. 6. There the representee had taken a sublease, 
from a tenant whose lease, in fact, contained a convenant not to assign, 
and, with the knowledge of the landlord, proceeded to build upon the land. 
The action failed upon the ground that there was nothing to show that the 
landlord knew that the representee pla"intiff had been acting in ignorance 
of his legal rights. 
5. Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96, at pages 105~196. 
6. It is notable, however, that Fry J. does not limit his probanda to 
a real property situation but has framed them with the utmost 
generality. 
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This statement of principle has long been treated iiS classic and 
indispensable. But, be that as it may, it is very doubtful if Fry J. 
was aware of the precedent effect which his decision in Willmott v 
Barber WaS to have. Had he done so he may have spelt out in more detail 
the circumstances in which the probanda were to apply. In Willmott v 
Barber Fry J. appears to have been dealing with a situation of mere 
acquiescence. That is the representee was relying upon acquiescence 
alone with the only element of encouragement being the standing by of the 
landlord. 
It appears clear that Fry J. was taking a very restrictive view of 
the doctrine of acquiescence 7. and he appears to have been primarily 
concerned with sheeting home the requisite equitable fraud to enable the 
equity to be called into aid. Having confirmed that 'the equitable 
doctrine of acquiescence is founded on there having been-a mistake of 
facti 8. he, later in the judgment, continues; 
lIt requires very strong evidence to induce the Court to deprive 
a man of his legal right when he has expressly stipulated that he 
shall be bound only by a written document. It has been said that 
the acquiescence which will deprive a man of his legal rights must 
amount to fraud, and in my view that is an abbreviated statement of 
a very true proposition. A man is not to be deprived of his legal 
rights unl ess he has acted in such a way as woul d make it fraudul ent 
to him to set up those rights. What, then, are the elements or 
requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that description?1 9. 
7. He appears to imply that the doctrine of acquiescence is of greater 
antiquity that the decision in Ramsden v Dyson, and indeed he does 
not refer to that dedsion in his judgment. 
8. (1880) 15 Ch.D. at page 101. 
9. ibid at page 105. 
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Fry J. then proceeds to spell out the probanda which precisely set the 
conditions necessary for the requisite fraud. 
Fry J. was dealing with a situation of mere acquiescence and also 
where it could be construed that the parties had agreed to be bound by a 
written document, that was, a formal lease. It is not clear whether 
these requirements are necessary in situations where the representor has 
gone further than mere acquiescence as, for example, where he has actively 
encouraged the conduct of the representee. In fact in Wi 11 Ba rber 
the landlord had given no encouragement, active, or passive. 
The probanda clearly represent the most concerted attempt to spell 
out requirements for the application of the principle. They amount to a 
confirmation of the equitable background to the principle in clearly 
setting out the formula wtlich will serve to turn what could amount to a 
mere gratuitous intervener into a representee deserving of the assistance 
of equity. At the same time they embody the nineteenth century attitude 
towards the protection of property rights in that a party may not be 
deprived of such rights unless and except in an extreme and clearly 
perceptible circumstance. 
At the same time the prooanda infused a very substantial subjective 
element into the application of the principle in requiring the 
determination of the state of knowledge of both the representor and 
representee. This could have meant that, had the probanda been rigidly 
applied by subsequent courts, the representee could have been presented 
with what, in many instances, would have amounted to an insuperable 
evidential hurdle. Fortunately for the future flexibility of the 
application of the principle and the potential of the courts to adapt it 
to rectify unconscionable situation, Fry J. did not spell out the scope 
of his probanda. This has given later courts a considerable degree 
of latitude in their approach to the probanda. 
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Probably because the probanda provide one of the most potentially 
effective defences against the application of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle, they continue to be frequently cited both judicially and by 
counsel 10. and considerable deference is still paid to them by the 
courts. But the issue remaining for resolution is whether or not the 
probanda are an essential ingredient in all cases where the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle is applied. On the other hand are they merely a gloss 
upon that principle, that is spelling out matters of fact which must be 
proved to establish the principle, or are they applicable only in limited 
circumstances? A definitive judicial statement of the precise role of the 
probanada has not recently been made despite the frequency with which 
they are cited. It is clear that it is not possible to agree with the 
view that IThe modern application of the doctrine (of proprietary 
estoppel) starts with Willmott v Barber' 11. The probanda do not 
constitute the substance of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
The prevailing judicial approach would tend, not it is admitted 
without some doubt, to the view that the probanda are applicable only in 
those instances where it is sought to rely upon silent acquiescence 
alone. That is in those instances where the representor, with full 
knowledge of all the facts, together with full knowledge of his legal 
rights, stands by and allows the representee to act to his detriment. 
That is where there is no conduct on the part of the representor apart 
from merely standing by with full possession of the facts. In such a 
case the probanda would provide an equitable test which is appropriate in 
cases of silent acquiescence, where a party who has remained inactive, 
10. See e.g. Adaras Developments Ltd v Marcona Corporation [1975] 
1 N.Z.L.R. 324; Shaw and Another v Applegate (1978) 1 All E.R. 
123; Beech v Beech (High Court Wellington 24 February 1982, 
(A. No 144/80) Jefferies J. ) as well as the decisions referred 
to infra. 
11. As per Jeffries J. in the High Court in Beech v Beech (Hiqh Court 
Wellington, 24 February 1982, (A No. 144/80) at page 11. 
and is guilty of no representation or wrong, except rel}1qining silent, 
is likely to be deprived of his property. Such being so it is reasonable 
to assume, that in those cases where it is appropriate, theprobanda will 
be applied very strictly. However such cases are not now common. 
Such an approach would be clearly in line with the current policy 
of the courts in maintaining flexibility in the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
in order to utilise it to rectify unconscionable situations. The rights 
of the representee could thus be nicely balanced against those of the 
representor by the court. But the courts now appear to have gone further 
in downgrading the probanda. 
The probanda appeared to find very strong support from the House of 
Lords decision in Kamnins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v Zenith Investments 
(Torquay) Ltd. 12. where they were applied by Lord Diplock on the point 
that the representor was not possessed of the appropriate state of 
knowledge as required by the probanda. But that case was not, it must 
be admitted, a case of acquiescence alone as both parties had concluded 
an agreement as to the date of a hearing under the terms of a lease. 
But that decision does not appear to have influenced subsequent 
courts in their application of the probanda. The more recent decisions 
clearly indicate a more limited applicability of the probanda. This was 
evident in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. 13. 
where in the semi no 1 judgment 01 iver J., as he then was, in the Hi gh 
Court took some time to consider this point. There the strict application 
of the probanda was down graded in favour of 'a much wider equitable 
jurisdiction to interfere in cases where the assertion of strict legal 
rights is found by the court to be unconscionable ' 14. Oliver J. who 
read the judgment of the Court conti nued; 
12. (1971) A.C. 850 at page 884. 
13. [1982] 1 Q.B. 133, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576 
14. ibid at page 147 and page 589 respectively 
lIt may well be (although I think that this must now be considered 
open to doubt) that the strict Willmott v Barber ... probanda are 
applicable as necessary requirements in those cases where all that 
has happened is that the party a 11 eged to be estoppel has stood 
by without protest while his rights have been infringed •... 15. 
Again where what is relied on is a waiver by acquiescence, as in 
Willmott v Barber itself, the five probanda are no doubt appropriate! 
16. 
In Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. 
it was argued that it was essential to distinguish between estoppel by 
acquiescence on the one hand and estoppel by representation and promissory 
estoppel on the other. It was argued that in the former category it was 
necessary for the probanda to be satisifed. 
But it must be admitted that it was difficult to exactly describe 
what the form of the estoppel was in that case. P 1 had there installed 
a lift in the belief that an option to renew was valid. In fact it was 
not valid because it was void for non registration. D did not know 
at the time the lift was installed that the option was void. Hence the 
third probandum was not satisfied. 
The learned judge engaged in an extensive analysis of authorities and 
concluded that the probanda were not an indispensable condition. He also 
rejected a rigid classification of estoppel. 
15. ioid 
16. [1982J 1 Q.B. 133, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576 at page 147 and page 589 
respectively. 
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The broad approach was specifically confirmed by Robert Goff J. in 
the High Court in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. (in 
liguidation) v Texas Comme~ce International Bank Ltd. 17 . 
But such an approach was also evident in earlier decisions. 18 . 
There have been some instances where the application of the probanda was 
merely not referred to as being, presumably, irrelevant. 19 . 
The issue received some further gloss by Oliver L.J. in the Court of 
Appeal in Habib Bank Ltd. v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich. 20 . where he cited 
with approval 'the test for a successful plea of acquiescence or estoppel, 
at any rate as the law has now developed,21. which was put forward by 
counsel for the defandants, viz; 
' ... the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles 
subsequently equitable. Two circumstances always important in 
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the 
acts done during the interval, which might affect either party 
d b 1 f · t' . . t' 22 an cause a a ance 0 JUs lce or lnJUS lce .... 
17. [1982] 1 Q.B. 84 at page 104. 
18. As e.g. in the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Hopgood v Brown [1955] 1 W.L.R. 213, where Evershed M.R. 
distinguished Willmott v Barber as applicable only in cases 
dealing with acquiescence; vide page 223= vide also Shaw v Applegate 
(1977) 1 W.L.R. 970 where the probanda were also downgraded in 
favour of a general test of unconscionability. The probanda were 
however, applied in Crabb v Arun District Council 1976 1 Ch.179, 
where, it is submitted they were irrelevant because the representee 
had representations, apart from silence which he could rely on. 
19. As in Gri ffi ths v Wi 11 i ams (1977) 248 E. G. 947. Pascoe v Turner 
[1979] 2 All E.R. 945. 
20. [1981] 2 All E.R. 650. 
21. ibid at page 665. 
22. ibid at page 666 citing from the judgment of the Board in Lindsay 
Petroleum Co. v Hurd (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 221 at pages 239-240. 
Although this refers to laches the Court presumably took this test 
as equally applicable to acquiescence. 
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This was in reply to counsel for th.e plaintiffs who argued that 
whether or not • all five of those probanda are necessary or not ... 'to 
succeed the defendants must at least establish three things fi rst that 
the defendants have been acting under a mistake as to their legal rights 
Second they must sh.ow that th.e plaintiffs encouraged that course of 
action .... Third they must show that they have acted on the plaintiffs' 
representation or encouragement to their detriment' 23. 
The view of the courts now current would thus appear to be that the 
probanda are probaoly not necessary in all instances where the principle 
is pleaded. There would appear to De, as yet, no clear specification by 
the courts when, if at all, the prooanda must be proved, either in part 
or in their entirety, before the representee can succeed. It is possible 
to conjecture that they could well be necessary with silence and passivity, 
alone, and the complete absence of any further conduct on the part of 
the representor. 24. But no case specifically in that particular straight 
jacket appears to have presented itself for litigation in recent years. 
Generally, however, the probanda, despite the frequency with which 
they are still pleaded as a defence, appear to have been abandoned in 
favour of the general principle of assessing whether or not the situation 
is unconscionable as spelt out in Taylors Fashions. When it is recalled 
tnat the fundamental purport of the probanda was to do justice as between 
the representor and the representee this limited application of the probanda 
would appear to be perfectly legitimate. It is submitted that even in 
cases of silence where the probanda could not be satisfied, but that none-
theless there was sufficient fraud to render the situation unconscionable 
to the representee, there could be equitable intervention and the estoppel 
23. (1981) 2 All E.R. 650 at page 665 
24. This appears to have been the situation in the instance of Willmott 
v Barber itself where 'the lessor was ignorant of his own rights, and 
there was nothing to shrew that he knew that the plaintiff had been 
acting in ignorance of his legal rights' (1880) 15 Ch.D. at page 97 
(headnote) . 
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could be avai.1able. It is clear that the courts wi.ll not allow ttle 
proDanda to be raised as a defence so as to defeat the intervention of 
equity where such is deemed appropriate. 
The Ramsden v Dyson principle itself 25. thus appears to have become 
detached from the probanda of Fry J., at least to some extent. While 
there has clearly been a tendency to restrict the scope and operation 
of the probanda the principle itself has tended in the opposite ~irection 
and has widened in scope from its initial inception. It is now clear that, 
in the interests of rectifying unconscionable situations the application 
of the probanda is not essential in every case where the principle is 
pleaded. 
As the law stands at present the probanda are therefore best 
regarded as an instrument which the courts may, at their discretion, 
apply in their assessment of the wider element of unconscionability. 
No Indication of the Existence of a General Duty to Disclose. 
The proposition that the principle will not be available unless the 
representee can prove that the representor was under a duty to disclose 
and that in remaining silent he consequently breached that duty, is 
theoretically very compelling indeed. 
As the law has never been prone to render mere silence actionable 
it appears reasonable to hold that the representor is not obliged to 
break his silence unless it can be shown that he is under a duty so to 
do. If liability can be secured upon the basis of silence then surely 
there must be some compelling reason, recognised by the law, why that 
silence should be broken. 
25. The reservation is made. that in Willmott v Barber Fry J. did not 
specifically allude to the Ramsden v Dyson principle and, indeed, 
does not refer to that case in his judgment. He was concerned 
rather with IThe Circumstances underwhicb the owner of a legal 
right will be precluded by his acquiescence from asserting it ... ' (1880] 15 Ch.D. at page 97 (headnote). 
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The classical exposition of the principle would appear to indicate 
the reqUl'reme.nt of a duty to di sc lose. According to Lord Cranworth' ... 
when I saw the mistake into which he had fallen, it was my duty to be 
active and to state my adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in me 
to re~~in wholly impassive on such an occasion' 26. Exactly what Lord 
Cranworth is here alluding to is by no means clear. It could be that 
the 'duty' which he refers to is merely part of the wider aspect of 
unconscionable conduct which would be taken into account by equity. Be 
that as it may there was no elaboration of this point in Ramsden v Dyson 
itself. However much has been made of the requirement of a duty by 
subsequent courts and text writers. 
Spencer-Bower and Turner are emphatic that a duty to disclose is an 
essential ingredient of liability under the principle and they proceed 
to rationalise that requirement of a duty to disclose; 
'The main condition subject to which alone silence or inaction 
counts as a representation is that a legal (not a mere moral or 
social) duty shall have been owed by the representor to the 
representee to make the disclosure ... The theory is this. The 
parties to a transaction are entitled to assume ... that the other 
has fully discharged all such obligations of disclosure P •• ' 27. 
With respect this is most unconvincing. There could well be no 
'transaction' and indeed the whole substance of the Ramsden v 
principle is that it may operate in a situation where there is no 
transaction; no relationship, either of a contractual nature or otherwise 
between the parties. Moreover unless it can be shown that a fiduciary 
26. As per Lord Cranworth in Ramsden v Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129 at 
pages 140-141. 
27. Spencer -Bower and Sir Alexander Turner 'The Law Relating to 
Estoppel by Representation' 3d. ed. London, Butterworths, 1977, 
paragraph 55. 
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relationsnip exists between the parties the law has traditionally shunned 
one party being required to disclose his position, or facts within his 
knowledge. It cannot be said that a fiduciary relationship operates in 
the circumstances of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
Does the duty to disclose only extend to those instances where 
the representor is in full knowledge of his own rights and of the 
mistaken assumption of the representee? Does any required duty to 
disclose extends beyond the requisite state of knowledge? In other 
words, once the state of knowledge of the parties has been established, 
does the required duty to disclose follow automatically without the 
representee being called upon to prove anything further to establish it? 
A conclusive decision upon the role of a possible duty to disclose 
does not seem to have presented itself recently, or indeed at all, but 
this aspect of the principle does appear to have received some support 
and to have played a major part in the finding against the representee 
in the New Zealand High Court in Adaras Developments v Marcona Corporation, 
28. where o'Regan J., although citing Spencer-Bower and Turner, and 
considering the existence of such a duty essential, 29. did not elaborate 
upon its nature or extent. The judgment is thus of limited value in this 
respect. 30. 
28. [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 324. 
29. INo legal duty rested upon the plaintiff to speak in the 
circumstances which are put forward as the factual base to this 
submission and I accordingly reject the submission' per O'Regan J. 
[1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. at page 339. 
This is, in fact, enshrined into the headnote to the decision; 110 
An estoppel in pais arises only where the person standing by (the 
representor) allows another person to act inconsistently with the 
representorls rights if the representor has a legal duty to disclose 
his own rights to that other person I [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. at page 
325. 
30. Oliver J .. in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. 
Ltd. [19821 1 Q.B. 133 also made reference to the requirement of a 
duty I ••• in case of mere passivity, it is readily intellig-ible 
that there must be shown a duty to speak' ibid at page 147. 
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It would appear that upon theoretical grounds considerable 
difficulty arises in attempting to encumber the representor with a duty 
of disclosure such as to requi re him to break hi s sil ence. It is 
difficult to see what such a duty could legitimately be based upon. The 
mention of a duty to disclose immediately invites reference to the common 
law tort of negligence. But this analogy is not very fruitful for the 
simple reason that normally liability will not attach in negligence unless 
the duty of care is broken by the commission of some specific act on the 
part of the defendant. This could be sustained in those cases where the 
representor has made some specific representation which could clearly be 
ascribed as negligent, and which has induced the representee to act to 
his detriment. But it is not easy to sustain those instances where the 
only conduct of the representor is merely standing by and acquiescing. 
At the same time, as indicated above, the fiduciary relationship is 
not readily translated to the Ramsden v Dyson situation. The principle is 
clearly much wider in scope that the somewhat limited situations which 
have become ascribed by law as relationships uberrimae fidei and thus 
requiring one party to divulge information, which is known to him, to the 
other party. The relationship as envisaged by the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle is not limited to one of the disparity of power or where one 
party is necessarily in a position to profit by making use of the property 
of another, or to take advantage of the other, possibly by way of 
catching a bargain. Indeed, the principle is wide enough to cover 
situations not only where the representor stands to profit, but also 
where the representee could suffer a potential loss through no fault of 
or profit to the representor. Thi s tends to be the reverse of the 
fiduciary relationship. It is not easy to envisage one party being 
encumbered with a duty to speak in order to prevent loss to another where 
the party so encumbered is not standing to benefit at all and is in no 
way at fault. 
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It must be admitted, however, that it is possible to cite a long 
line of authority which superficially appears to indicate the 
requirement of a general duty to disclose. 31. It is submitted that a 
closer examination of these authorities reveals that where a duty has 
been required by the courts some special prior relationship, usually of a 
contractual nature, has existed between the parties. A great many of the 
cases deal with the banker client relationship, as in Greenwood Martinis 
Bank 32. where the customer of the bank was estopped from recovering 
the amounts of cheques which the bank had paid upon the customerls 
signature which had been forged by his wife, because he was aware that 
his signature was being forged. It was held that the customer was under 
a duty to disclose the forgeries to the bank. 33. 
On the other hand reference must be made to West Country Cleaners 
v Saly 34. where it was held that a landlord was under no duty to 
disclose to a tenant the breach of a covenant to paint, contained in the 
lease, meaning that the tenant lost the right of a renewal, as estoppel 
could not be raised against the landlord. It must be admitted that this 
decision is not easy to sustain especially since the landlord was aware 
of the terms of the lease. It appears at least to be an instance of 
waiver. 
A strong case to the effect that a duty is necessary before the 
representee can succeed in pleading the Ramsden v Dyson principle has 
31. It is this long line of authority which appears to have been 
instrumental in convincing Spencer-Bower and Turner that a duty to 
disclose is a necessary ingredient. 
32. [1933J A.C. 51; [1932J All E.R. Rep 318; and especially at pages 
57 and 321 respectively. 
33. See also the statement of Lord Sumner in the House of Lords in R.F. 
Jones v Waring and Gillow [1926J A.C. 670, where, at page 693, t1e 
specifies duty as the distinguishing feature in cases of the 
relationship between banker and customer and principal and agent. 
vide also London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan [1918J A.C. 777, at 
page 836; also McKenzie v British Linen Company (1881) 6 App. Cas. 
82. 
34. [1966J 3 All E.R. 210. 
65 
been made from Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings 35, which was a 
decision of the House of Lords. This case is cited as authority for the 
't' b S B 36. proposl lon y pencer- ower. It is submitted that that case dealt 
not with the Ramsden v Dyson principle but a completely distinct head of 
estoppel and that is estoppel by negligence. Talk in that case is not of 
a duty to disclose but of a Iduty of carel as in Donoghue v Stevenson 37. 
and Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. 38. The decision in 
Moorgate Mercantile is thus clearly distinguishable and provides, it is 
contended, no authority at all for the proposition that the breach of a 
general duty to disclose is an essential ingredient to the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle. 
In conclusion it would appear not possible to discern the existence 
of a general duty to disclose which is specifically based upon the 
estoppel. In those instances where a duty has been found to be vital it 
will be seen as resting upon some distinct principle such as a contractual 
relationship, as in the case of banker and client, or as part of a wider 
ingredient of negligence, and not the Ramsden v Dyson principle, as a 
basis for the estoppel. Thus not only is it not easy to ascertain the 
nature and extent of any possible duty to disclose, it is not easy to 
determine any clear theoretical basis for it. In the absence of a clear 
formulation by the courts, as to the requirements of such a duty, and the 
actual nature and extent of it, there would appear to be little which 
can be obtained from further speculation upon this aspect of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. 
35. [1976J 1 Q.B. 225 C.A. £1977J A.C. 890 (H.L.(E.)) 
36. Spencer-Bower and Turner, op. cit. para 55 (footnote) 
37. [1932] A.C. 562 (1932) All E.R. Rep 1 at page 11. 
38. [1964J A.C. 465. Both these decisions were cited by Lord Salmon in 
Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings (1977) A.C. 890 at page 908. 
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Mutuality: Reciprocity. 
Although a defence of lack of mutuality would cut a substantial 
swath into the applicability of the principle such a defence would be 
fully in accord with the equitable tradition of maintaining an even hand 
as between the parties. Although nothing resembling a doctrine of lack 
of mutuality exists in respect to the application of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle there are some shreds of authority to the effect, that in 
applying the principle, consideration will be given to the effect which 
that would be likely to have upon the representor, or that, where 
appropriate, the representee, where the principle is applied in his 
favour, may be compelled to undertake burdens which would, in the 
absence of the estoppel fall upon the representor. 
Hints of the existence of such a defence could be derived from 
Ramsden v Dyson itself where Lord Cranworth said; 
' ... another important observation ... is that the supposed 
right is one in which there is no reciprocity ... it is supposed 
that the landlord (representor) was continually making demises 
from year to year, wi th the knowl edge that tflOse who thus became 
his tenants supposed they acquired rights against him without his 
acquiring any corresponding rights against them' 39. 
What this appears to be saying is that if the representee tenants are, 
by virtue of the operation of estoppel, given the right to call for 
long term leases, then the landlord should be given determinable rights 
of a reciprocal nature, as the landlord of the tenants. Although Ramsden 
v Dyson did involve a contractual situation it must be admitted that it is 
not easy to see the force of Lord Cranworth's remarks. It is surely not 
39. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129 at page 152. 
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possible to evolve in estoppel any concept of mutuality similar to 
that existing in the application of, for example, the remedy of specific 
performance in the law relating to contract. In that situation a mutuality 
of remedies was ensured and equity saw to it that the remedy would 
be equally available to the other side should either party fail to perform. 
40. It is submitted that the essence of estoppel is not mutuality but the 
creation of an expectation in the mind of another because of a 
representation of some description and consequent detrimental reliance. 
The purpose of the Ramsden v Dyson principle is to rectify a situation of 
unconscionability; not to ensure that should the principle be invoked 
against one party reciprocal obligations will be available against the 
other party in every instance where the principle is applied. 
However the dicta of Lord Cranworth found favour with Robert Goff J. 
in the High Court in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. Ci.!!. 
liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. where, in a 
flash of ingenuity, or desperation, counsel for the plaintiffs raised 
lack of reciprocity as a defence against the appncation of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. The availability of reciprocfty as a general defence 
aga tnst the principl ewas conceded by Robert Goff J., but he found that 
it was inapplicable in the circumstances of the instant case. It will 
be recalled that the point in issue there was the use of the estoppel to 
prevent the plaintiffs from asserting the invalidity of a guarantee. It 
was argued that if this was allowed the plaintiffs would not obtain the 
oenefit of subrogation rights associated with the guarantee. According 
to Robert Goff. J.; 
40. At common law, for example, equity would not award specific 
performance of a contract concluded with an infant upon the ground 
that the contract could not be enforced against the infant. 
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I can understand the force of such an argument in certain 
cases. No doubt, he who comes to equity must do equity; and 
it might well be contrary to principle that a party should, by 
virtue of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, obtain the benefit 
of rights without incurring the burden of corresponding obligations 
which he would have incurred if the rights had been enforceable 
without the aid of the doctrine of estoppel,~l. 
But he went on to point out that no 'further benefit would have 
accrued to the plaintiffs by virtue of such right of subrogation' and 
there was no reason why the bank should be precluded from relying upon 
the estoppel against the representor company.42. 
Perhaps the operative words in this dicta are 'contrary to principle' 
This would appear to indicate that this issue will be determined upon the 
basis of·what is conscionable. There is no coherent doctrine of mutuality 
attaching to the Ramsden v Dyson principle and it would appear most 
unlikely that one would ever evolve. But it could well be that in some 
instances unconscionability would dictate that the principle could not 
be applied because of the effect which its application would have or be 
likely to have upon the representor. Equity would no doubt consider jus-
tice to the representor just as important as justice to the representea 
It is reasonable to consider that the principle would not be available 
when to call it into aid would involve detriment to the representor which 
was not forseen by the representation. It clearly would be quite contrary 
to the very substance of the principle that a condition of its application 
was that it was equally available to both the parties in any specific 
circumstance. 
41. [1982] 1 Q.B. 84, [1981] 2 W.L.R. at page 109 and page 575 
respectively. 
42. A somewhat similar argument was put forward in Simm v Anglo-
American Telegraph Co.(1879) 5 Q.B.D. 188, by Lord Bramwell at 
page 203. That instance, however, did not involve the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle but estoppel in respect to the issue of a share 
certificate. The cases cited here appear to be only the instances 
where lack of mutuality has been raised in the application of 
proprietary estoppel as a whole. 
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Conclusion. A "Principle 'Shorn of Limitations' 
The courts are exhibiting a definite inclination to keeping the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle free from constraints, and especially those 
constraints which could operate as a defence against the application of 
the principle. In particular, the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott v 
Barber, the requirement of a duty to disclose, and the requirement of 
mutuality, have all, it appears, been relegated to the status of the 
principle itself in that they are not mandatory adjuncts to be rigidly 
applied in each instance where the Ramsden v Dyson principle is invoked, 
but are applicable at the discretion of the court. They can, it appears, 
be applied or ignored as the court sees fit. It is clear that the courts 
have at least at present no intention of allowing any rule to evolve 
which could serve to provide a watertight defence against the principle. 
Thus the current judicial attitude towards these rules can be seen 
as fitting that of the application of the principle itself, and as being 
merely a part of the wider concept of maintaining the principle as flexible 
as possible so as to retain its potential as a device to rectify 
unconscionable situations. There can be no doubt that if the dictates of 
consc;onability so demanded any of the rules here considered would be 
invoked by Ute court. 
In the early years of their application there was some indication 
that the probanda of Fry., at least, could well be elevated to being an 
immutable requirement of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. Significantly, 
however, as time has progressed the attitude of the courts has become 
more fluid towards the application of the rules. None of them can now 
be taken as providing any of the substance of the Ramsden v Dvson 
principle. Rather they are merely a tool which the courts are free to 
avail themselves of in assessing the conscionability of a particular 
situation. 
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The Ramsden v Dyson principle can presently be aptly described 
as a general principle 'shorn of limitations' 43. 
43. I1982J Q.B. 84 at page 122 I1981] 3 All E.R. 577 at page 584. 
as per Lord Denning M.R. 
Chapter Five 
THE RAMSDEN V DYSON PRINCIPLE AS 
A CAUSE OF ACTION 
Introduction: Origins of View That Estoppel Not a Cause of Action 
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In the middle years of last century a view obtained currency that 
I estoppe 11 was not avail ab 1 e to a party as a cause of acti on but operated 
merely as a rule of evidence. That is it could operate as a defence 
against an action by another but it could not form the foundation upon 
which a party could take an action against another. 
It can be realised that had such a proposition been able to obtain 
currency as a widely a"pplied rule of law the value of estoppel would 
have been very much reduced as a weapon available to litigants. Had a 
1 iti gant attempted to use the estoppel as a cause of acti on he cou 1 d have 
immediately been met with the rebuttal that the law did not permit 
estoppel to be used in such a manner. This could have had a dramatic 
effect upon the development of. estoppel in contemporary 1 aw. 
It must be admitted that the courts paid little attention to 
specifying whether such a proposition applied to all categories of estoppel, 
including the Ramsden v Dyson principle, or whether it was limited in 
scope to certain types of estoppel. 1. 
The broad thrust of this discussion is that the view that estoppel in 
general and the Ramsden v Dyson principle, in particular, cannot operate 
as a cause of action is quite without any substantive foundation. The 
belief that estoppel is not a cause of action is a myth, and, moreover, 
even if such a view may have had some credence. in respect to estoppel as 
a whole it was never applicable to that breed of estoppel which has become 
embodied in the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
1. As for example that confirmed in High Trees House v Central London 
Property Trust [1947] K.B. 130 
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As authority for the proposition that estoppel cannot operate as 
a cause of action contemporary decisions usually rely upon dicta of 
B L J . B' 2. owen . . 1 n Low v ouven e 
'Estoppel is only a rule of evidence; you cannot found an 
action upon estoppel. Estoppel is only important as being 
one step in the progress towards relief on the hypothesis 
that the defendant is estopped from denying the truth of 
something which he has said,3. 
It should be noted that Low v Bouverie was a case dealing not 
with acquiescence but with specific representations. In any event its 
force as precedent would appear to be somewhat tenuous. It would 
appear that the dicta in Low v Bouverie was an attempt to preserve 
in tact the decision in Derry v Peek4. to the effect that a repre-
sentation which is inaccurate, but is made without fraud, is not 
actionable. This decision immediately threw a great deal of the law 
then current into confusion. In Low v Bouverie the plaintiff was 
proposing to lend money upon the security of a life interest in an 
estate. The trustee had disclosed some incumbrances on the trust fund 
but had forgotten about others with the result that the plaintiff 
loaned money upon the basis of a security which was insufficient. 
The court was thus faced with the problem of distinguishing Derry v 
Peek which had been determined only a few years before. Had estoppel 
been admitted as a cause of action so that a representation could be 
directly enforced, and the representation thus made good, or some 
other remedy, such as compensation been awarded, the substance would 
have been taken out of Derry v Peek. In order to effect a satisfactory 
distinguishing the court thus seized on the idea that estoppel was 
2. (1891) 3 Ch. 82. 
3. (1891) 3 Ch. 82 at page 105 
4. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337. 
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net a cause of action. 
Low v Bouverie was, of course, a case in equity, and the net 
result of it appears to have been to infuse into equity the rule 
that had long app1ied>in the common law to the effect that a repre-
sentation was, of itself, not directly enforceable. It overlooked 
the fact that equity had long enforced representations directly 
without the need for an attached sause of action. 5. 
Acceptance of v~ew that Estoppel Not a Cause of Action 
Whate~er the propriety of the origins of the view that 
estoppel cannot operate as a cause of action may have been it 
found very ready acceptance both among the judges6. and the texf 
5. See e.g. Burrowes v Lock (1805) 10 Ves. Jun. 470,_a case on very 
similar facts to Lo" v Bouverie where the trusteew&.::. made 
accountable for the deficiency, also there is no hint in 
Jorden v Money (1854) 5 H.L.C. 185, to the effect that estoppel 
is limited to a rule of evidence, indeed had it been so limited 
in that case the plaintiff representee would have been out of 
court immediately. 
6. See e.g. 
lIt is hardly a rule of what is called substantive law in 
the sense of declaring an immediate right or claim. It 
is rather a rule of evidence, capable none the less on 
that account of affecting gravely substantive rights' 
as per Viscount Haldane in London Joint Stock Bank v 
Macmillan (1918) A.C. 777 at page 818. 
I ••• estoppel is a rule of evidence that prevents the 
>person estopped from denying the existence of a facti 
as per Lord Wright in Evans v Bartlam (1937) 2 All E.R. 
646 at page 653. 
I ••• this conclusion must follow from the circumstances 
that an estoppel is only a rule of evidence which under 
certain circumstances can be invoked by a party to an 
action ' 
as per Lord Maughan in Maritime Electric Company v 
General Dairies Ltd (1937) 1 All E.R. 748 at page 754. 
.t 7. wrl ers. In more recent times however there has been a very 
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significant retreat from the view that estoppel cannot operate as 
a cause of action especially by the writers. 8. Even so it still 
appears to find a place in pleadings and the matter cannot be 
regarded as finally settled. Judicially the matter is still far 
from settled. 
Analysis of View that Estoppel Not a Cause of Action 
Whether or not estoppel is limited to being a rule of evidence 
has not been subjected to any clear in depth analysis by the courts. 
What is meant by a 'cause of action'? In any successful action the 
plaintiff must prove firstly, that he has suffered loss, and secondly 
that that loss was the result of some act on the part of the defen-
dant which is recognised in law as the basis for an action. Thus, 
7. See e.g. 
'The doctrine of estoppel by representation forms part of 
the English law of evidence, and an estoppel, except as a 
bar to testimony, has no operation or efficacy whatsoever. 
Its sole effect is either to place an obstacle in the way 
of a case which might otherwise succeed .... Emphatically, 
it is not a cause of action in itself, nor does it create one! 
Spencer-Bower G. and Sir Alexander Turner 'The Law Relating to 
Estoppel by Representation I 3rd ed., London, Butterworths 1977, 
paragraph 8 page 10. 
But, significantly, in specifically relating this rule to 
estoppel by acquiescence subsequent comment in the text would 
appear to water down considerably, if not contradict, the view 
that estoppel is not a cause of action. See e.g. ibid, page 
13 paragraph 11. 
8. Atiyah P.S. asks the question 'Why has this myth that estoppel 
is not a cause of action grown up 'Misrepresentation Warran!l 
and Estoppel I (1971) 9 Alberta Law Review 347. 
See also Jackson D. 'Estoppel as a Sword I (1965) 81 L.Q.R. 
84, Thompson M.P. 'From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel 
as a Cause of Action ' [1983J C.L.J. 257. 
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for example the cause of action could be fraud, negligence, misre-
presentation or breach of contract. It is possible that the 
delusion that estoppel cannot operate as a cause of action 
obtained currency because of an emphasis upon the damage which the 
representee had suffered rather than upon the representation which 
is the basis of the complaint. 
It is admitted that it is easy to see estoppel operating as a 
defence in cases of common law estoppel by representation and in 
the case of that particular breed of equitable estoppel manifested 
in the decision in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees 
House Ltd9. There estoppel is seen as a defence but this, it is 
submitted, is owing merely to the logistics of the particular 
situations in which estoppel may arise and not to any theoretical 
objection to it being extended to beyond being merely a defence or 
rule of evidence. 
In those instances where there is a specific representation the 
representor will, by the operation of estoppel, be precluded from 
denying the truth of his representation. That is the representee 
is suing not upon the basis of a misrepresentation but upon the 
assumption that the assertion which has been made is, in fact, 
accurate. Thus the court in allowing the estoppel requires the 
parties to assume the accuracy of the representation. Irrespective 
of the situation in fact the representee is afforded, by the court, 
the remedy of affirming the representation, that is treating the 
representation as true and then claiming whatever relief would be 
appropriate upon the assumption that the representation were true. 10. 
9. [1947] 1 K.B. 130 
10. To this extent the remedy of estoppel has some analogy with 
that of specific performance in contract in requiring the 
representor to make good what he had represented. 
That is estoppel provides a defence by preventing the proof of a 
particular fact. 
This scenario could, it is admitted, be adapted to the situa-
tion of silence on the part of the representor. In a situation 
relying upon the Ramsden v Dyson principle the representor by 
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his silence can be seen as, in effect, representing that a specific 
state of affairs exists, and the effect of the estoppel is thus 
to later preclude him from denying that such a state of affairs 
does not, in fact, exist. It could well be argued that if estoppel, 
in instances where the Ramsden v Dyson principle is pleaded, does 
require the existence of an independant cause of action, then that 
can be found in the fraud of the representor in not breaking his 
silence in order to disabuse the representee of his mistake. 
But this is tenuous reasoning as in many instances it is diffi-
cult in cases where the Ramsden v Dyson principle is successfully 
pleaded to see any obvious cause of action apart from acquiescence. 
It may be possible to argue that if any cause of action exists 
in cases where the doctrine of acquiescence is applied then that 
cause of action exists only in equity and that it is possible that 
the particular set of circumstances would have given rise to 
equitable relief in any event, and that it is coincidental that 
they would also support an estoppel. It is no doubt true that 
acquiescence could give rise to other equitable remedies such as 
the creation of a constructive trust. Such an argument could well 
be valid but it is submitted that it does not detract from the 
proposition that acquiescence can operate as a cause of action. 
A litigant is surely not concerned whether or not his action lies 
in common law or in equity, it is the reality of the remedy which 
matters to him. 
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Moreover, even if estoppel cannot operate as a cause of action 
there can be no doubt that the Ramsden v. Dyson principle. at least 
can give rise to proprietary rights and to the granting by the 
court of a substantive remedy. It is submitted that these charac-
teristics of the principle are not incidental to it being a rule 
of evidence, but to its being a substantive rule of law. 
This process has now been taken by the courts to the extent of 
enabling the principle to vest a full legal title. 11. 
Also there can be no doubt of the ability of the principle to 
. . t b t t' d f 1" t' 12. glve rlse 0 a su s an lve reme y as, or examp e, lnJunc lon, 
d 13. t' 14. amages or compensa lon. 
This characteristic of the principle which enables it to 
transfer an effect title to property, or to give rise to a sub-
stantive remedy, would tend to confirm its potential as a cause of 
action. If a rule of evidence, or a mere defence, can have the 
effect of transferring property rights then it can surely be 
described as a rule of evidence with quite extraordinary effects. 
The Ramsden v Dyson principle is thus much more aggressive in 
its thrust than other heads of estoppel. 
The issue of the scope of estoppel to operate as a cause of 
action and whether, in this regard the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
11. As in Pascoe v Turner [1979J 1 W.L.R. 431, where the defendant 
representee who was relying upon the estoppel, that is the 
Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle, to defend an action in ejectment 
succeeded in obtaining the full legal title. 
12. As in Crabb v Arun District Council (1976) 1 Ch 179, also 
Shaw and Another v Applegate (1977) 1 W.L.R. 970. 
13. As in Shaw v Applegate (supra) 
14. As was recognised by Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liverpool 
Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd (1982) 1 Q.B. 133 at page 148. 
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differs from other heads has not been settled by the pleadings 
which have taken place in recent cases and the consequent confu-
sion which has followed. 
Very few instances are available in recent years of the propos-
ition that the principle cannot operate as a cause of action 
forming the clear ratio of a decision. But one such does appear 
to be the decision of Beattie J. in the High Court of New Zealand 
in Webb v Blenheim Council 15. where although the principle was not 
directly pleaded, acquiescence was relevant. There a piece of 
land on a street front in a business area, was offered to the 
Council for sale but the Council did not respond. Later the Council 
sealed and land and later still attempted to lay gas pipes without 
the permission of the plaintiff who then sued in trespass. In 
reply the Council raised estoppel based upon the fact that the 
plaintiff had allowed the Council to enter and seal the property 
in dispute. Beattie J. in finding for the plaintiff representor 
used as a basis for his decision the belief that 'the Council 
endeavours to invoke a rule of evidence to found a cause of 
action,16. By this Beattie J. presumably meant that by raising 
the estoppel as a defence the Council was obtaining some proprietary 
right in the land which it had earlier refused to purchase outright. 
With respect the judicial statement in respect to estoppel opera-
ting as a cause of action was unfortunate. 
15. [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 57 
16. [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 57 at page 62 
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Contemporary Decisions Still Leave Confusion 
The matter has not been settled by dicta of Brandon L.J. in 
the later case, in the Court of Appeal, in Amalgamated Investment 
& Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International 
Bank Ltd. 17 . where the Ramsden v Dyson principle was directly in 
issue. These dicta can be seen as nothing but a gloss upon one 
limited aspect of the issue of the principle clearing the way for 
an action. The appellant company had directly pleaded the point 
that the representee bank was here seeking to rely upon estoppel, 
that is the Ramsden v Dyson principle as a cause of action. This 
submission was disposed of by Brandon L.J.; 
II turn to the second argument advanced on behalf of AlP, 
that the bank is here seeking to use estoppel as a sword 
rather than a shield, and that is something which the law 
of estoppel does not permit. Another way in which the 
argument is put is that a party cannot found a cause of 
action on an estoppel. 
In my view much of the language used in connection 
with these concepts is no more than a matter of semantics. 
Let me consider the present case and suppose that the bank 
had brought an action against AlP before it went into 
liquidation to recover moneys owed by ANPP to Portsoken. 
In the statement of claim in such an action the bank 
would have pleaded the contract of loan incorporating the 
guarantee, and averred that, on the true construction of 
the guarantee, AlP was bound to uischargethe debts owed 
by ANPP toPortsoken. 
17. [1982J Q.B. 84 [1981J 3 All E.R. 577 
By their defence AlP would have pleaded that, on the true 
construction of the guarantee, AlP was only bound to dis-
charge debts owed by ANPP to the bank, and not debts owed by 
ANPP to Portsoken. Then in their reply the bank would have 
pleaded that, by reason of an estoppel arising from the 
matters discussed above, AlP were precluded from questioning 
the interpretation of the guarantee which both parties had, 
for the purposes of the transactions between them, assumed 
to be true ,18 . 
Thus in this particular instance the defendant bank was able to 
use the estoppel as a shield in that the estoppel prevented the 
plaintiff investment company from denying the validity of the 
guarantee but at the same time the bank was also able, by virtue 
of the estoppel, raised against the investment company, to 
enforce the terms of the guarantee against it. Had it not been 
possible to raise the estoppel the guarantee would not have been 
enforceable. 
Brandon L.J. continued; 
'This illustrates what I would regard as the true proposi-
tion of law, that, while a party cannot in terms found a 
cause of action on an estoppel, he may, as a result of 
being able to rely on an estoppel, succeed on a cause of 
action on which, without being able to rely on that estoppel 
he would necessarily have failed,19. 
18. [1982] 1 Q.B. 84 [1981J 3 All E.R. 577 at page 131 and 
page 591 respectively 
19. Ibid. 
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But Eveleigh L.J. in the same case is probably even more 
emphatic that estoppel cannot operate as a cause of action 
"An assumption is not to be treated as having the effect of an 
assumpsit". 
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Webster J. adopted a similar view in Pacol Ltd. v Trade Lines 
Ltd. 20 . In that case the defendants 01 were estopped from denying 
that they were parties to a charter part~ when in fact they were 
no~ because their actions had caused P to allow the limitation 
period to expire against 02 and also to induce them not to check 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping in order to ascertain who was the 
shipowner. Webster J. held, applying Taylors Fashions Ltd v 
Liverpool Trustees Co. Ltd. that 01 were estopped from denying 
that they were parties to the contract. He stated that estoppel 
operated as a rule of evidence, to preclude 01 from relying on 
the fact that they were not a party to the contract. 
But surely here in these two cases we see the operation of 
estoppel as a cause of action. Is not an agreed assumption of 
facts in effect the creation of an agreement at law? Also surely 
it is a question of fact whether one party is bound to another. 
This appears to be taking estoppel as a shield much too far. In 
Amalgamated Investment v Texas Commerce Bank agreement was in fact 
created by the estoppel where but for the estoppel it would not 
have existed. Parties were bound where but for the estoppel they 
would not have been bound. 
With respect therefore the judicial view of the role of 
estoppel in these two cases appears somewhat limited. 
20. [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 456. 
On the other hand Jefferies J. in the High Court of New 
Zealand in Beech v Beech 21 . readily accepted the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle as founding a cause of action. 
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The above dicta can be described as unfortunate. With respect 
the Court of Appeal in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. v 
Texas Commerce International Bank was afforded an opportunity to 
lay low the ghost of the proposition that estoppel cannot operate 
as a cause of action, once and for all. In the circumstances it 
chose not to do so but, on the contrary, words such as 'that while 
a party cannot in terms found a cause of action on an estoppel t 
could well be construed by future courts, as well as counsel, that 
the issue is not settled and is still very much alive. It is 
perhaps doubly unfortunate that this dicta should have come from 
such an eminent authority as the Court of Appeal and at such a 
late period in the history of the development of the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle. The way would thus appear to be open for the 
myth to be perpetuated. 
Any rigid application of the rule that estoppel is not a cause 
of action could serve to drastically reduce the effectiveness of 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle to operate to rectify unconscionable 
situations. This would depend, of course, upon some definition 
being given to the expression 'cause of actiont. What the courts 
have done up until the present is to allow the principle to attach 
to a set of facts, which would not of itself, amount to a cause of 
action, and thereby render those facts actionable. It is in this 
way that the principle can be at its most flexible. It is sub-
mitted that, overall, the current mood of the courts is very much 
against allowing the utility or flexibility of the Ramsden v Dyson 
21. (High Court, Well ington to 24" February 1982 (A No.144/80) Jefferies 
J. at page 11) 
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principle to be trammelled by the requirement that it cannot operate 
as a cause of action. 
Conclusion: The Last Word 
Appropriately the final word in this discussion is left to 
Lord Denning who perceives the issue as not being one of whether 
the estoppel is or is not a rule of evidence, or a cause of action. 
but rather who sees estoppel as some all consuming principle of 
justice: 
I Estoppel is not a rule of evidence, it is not a cause of 
action. It is a principle of justice and of equity. It 
comes to this. When a man, by his words or conduct, has 
led another to believe in a particular state of affairs 
he will not be allowed to go back upon it when it would be 
unjust or inequitable for him to do so122. 
This broad view was reiterated by Lord Denning at a later point 
of time in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd v Texas 
Commerce International Bank-where the relatively cursory treatment 
which he accorded the issue would appear to indicate that he 
regarded the matter. by that time, with some degree of disdain. 
He disposed of the issue by simply reiterating his earlier dicta: 
22. 
I (Estoppel ) ... has been sought to be limited by a series 
of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence: estoppel 
cannot give rise to a cause of action: .,. All these can 
now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of 
limitations .... neither of (the parties) will be 
As per Lord Denning in MoorHate Mercantile v Twitchings 
[1976J 1 Q.B. 225 at page 2 I. 
allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair 
or unjust to allow him to do so123. 
This approach completely rejects any procedural limitation of 
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estoppel to being a rule of evidence, a defence, a cause of action 
or not a cause of action: Instead it would appear to present 
estoppel as merging into the general jurisdiction of the equitable 
intervention. It is certainly a much more holistic approach that 
that adopted by Brandon L:J: in the same case 24 . which lends itself 
to a technical analysis as to its true scope and meaning and also 
to the accumulation of precedent even in respect to specific 
aspects of the dicta laid down: If carried to an extreme position 
this approach could mean that the proposition that estoppel cannot 
operate as a cause of action could provide almost a watertight 
defence in virtually any action where the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
is pleaded. 
The view taken by Lord Denning, it is submitted, is far more 
realistic and accords with the attitude found in contemporary cases. 
It clearly indicates the current disinclination of the courts to 
allow the principle to become entangled with rules which could 
provide readily adaptable defences which could be raised to defeat 
the dictates of a solution designed to rectify an unconscionable 
situation. 
The approach of Lord Denning was clearly evident in the earlier 
Court of Appeal decision in Pascoe v Turner 25 . a case based princi-
pally upon the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle but where the Court took 
time off to state, after citing Ramsden v Dyson, Ithat where estoppel 
23. [1982J 1 Q.B. 84, [1981J 3 All E:R. 577 at page 122 and page 
584 respectively. 
24. See supra 
25. [1979J 2 All E.R. 945 
by encouragement or acquiescence is found on the facts those facts 
give rise to a cause of action ,26 . That decision clearly illus-
trated the utility of estoppel in a role as cause of action as 
well as a defence. The representee occupant of the property in 
dispute had sought merely to rely upon estoppel as a defence, that 
was to prevent the representor legal owner of the property, who 
had placed the representee into possession, from denying the 
existence of a trust in her favour. In its desire to best satisfy 
the equity the Court took the matter much further than simply 
recognising a trust in favour of the representee. Of its own 
volition the Court took the action much further than this defence 
and enabled the representee to obtain the fee simple of the residen-
tial property in dispute. Surely no clearer example of the opera-
tion of estoppel as a cause of action could be found. Had estoppel 
not operated as a cause of action here the representee could have 
relied, correctly, upon the ----'-----'-"'-'-----'v----'L_le'-w_e'-l-"'-- principle, to act as 
a defence and prevent the representor from denying the existence of 
a trust in her favour. This would have meant that the representor 
held the property in trust for the representee. The action would 
then have ceased at that point. The fact that estoppel could not 
operate as a cause of action would have prevented the action from 
being taken further. As it was the Court enabled the representee 
to secure the maximum proprietary right in the property. 
The conclusion must thus be that even if some indeterminate 
arguments can be put forward for the view that estoppel by express 
26. Iibid at page 949. This clearly illustrates the point that 
the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle has a basis identical to 
that of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
representation cannot operate as a cause of action, that maxim 
certainly does not apply to the Ramsden v Dyson principle. The 
current attitude of the courts is to maintain the flexibility of 
the principle and not to encumber it with this restriction. The 
view put forward by Lord Denning in in Amalgamated Property and 
Investment Co. would certainly appear to be in the ascendant at 
present. This view clearly confirms that of Robert Goff J. in 
the High Court in the same case when he said; 
it is in my judgment not of itself a bar to an 
estoppel that its effect may be to enable a party to 
enforce a cause of action which without the estoppel 
would not exist l27 . 
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The view that estoppel cannot operate as a cause of action is, 
despite dicta to the contrary, a myth and should be laid to 
rest. The cleavage between judicial dicta to the effect that 
estoppel is not a cause of action, on the one hand, and judicial 
finding, which clearly establish estoppel as a cause of action, 
on the other, is grea4 and at the same time is most unfortunate. 
27. [1982J O.B. 84 at page 105 [1981J 2 W.L.R. at page 571 
Chapter Six 
UNCONSCIONABILITY AS THE 
BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE 
Introduction~ Search for a Basis 
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The propensity of the courts to extend the scope of the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle together with their reluctance to perscribe rules likely 
to constrain its application has opened the door to the resurgence of 
unconscionability and its elevation to the position of being the basis of 
the application of the principle. With the rejection of technicality 
unconscionability can now be clearly seen as the fundamental and virtually 
sole constraint upon the application of the principle. The jurisdiction 
-in the Ramsden v Dyson principle is asserted when a situation presents 
itself which equity regards as unconscionable and requiring of 
rectification. 
The chancery judges up until the early nineteenth century applied 
the concepts of unconscionability in a robust and uninhibited manner. 
They were very clear in their own minds as to what amounted to 
unconscionable behaviour. The decisions handed down were frequently 
highly subjective in content and made no qualms at calling upon extra 
legal sources, including Holy Scripture, to justify their findings. They 
did not confine their judgments to a simple application of established 
legal principles to facts as they found them. Contemporary judges have 
tended to adopt similar techniques. 
The IVJove Towards Unconscionabil ity: And Away From Technical ity 
Decisions handed down since the late 1950·s reflect two quite 
disparate approaches to the application of ' the Ramsden v Dyson pr-inciple. 
The older approach rested upon technicality and has now tended to recede 
in the face of a much broader approach based upon unconscionability. 
88 
This latter approach has been fostered to a very substantial degree by 
the deliberations of Lord Denning, and is now very firmly in the 
ascendant. 
This cleavage to some extent reflects the dissenting judgment of 
Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson itself in relying upon and emphasising 
inferences whi ch may be drawn from facts. 
Although the New Zealand courts have tended to be somewhat more 
circumspect in their application of the principle than their English 
counterparts the more recent decisions of our courts clearly show a move 
towards the broader approach. 
This shift is clearly revealed in a comparison between the decision 
of the New Zealand High Court in McBean v Howey 1. handed down in 1958, 
and that of the same court in Beech v Beech 2. handed down in 1982. This 
shift could have been influenced by the decisions of the English courts in 
the "interim. 
McBean v Howey provides an example of the older approach in not making 
an overall assessment of the facts as a whole but in taking one or two 
specific inferences from the facts and basing the finding essentially 
upon those few inferences. In McBean v Bowey Bgrrowclough C,J, appears 
to have been partly influenced in rejecting the application of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle by the fact that he found no concluded contract in 
existence. He appears to have allowed his attitude towards the pleading 
of the pr"inciple to be influenced by the fact that no contract existed, 
In 1948 the two parties in McBean v Howey had concluded an agreement, in 
the form of a 1 icence, whereby the representee was permitted a vehicl e 
access over part of the representor's property in order to permit entry 
to a garage which was situated upon the representee's property, The 
representor had actually assisted in the work involved in the construction 
1. 11958J N.Z.L.R. 25 
2. (High Court, Wellington 24 February 1982, (A No 144/80.) Jefferi es J.) 
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of the driveway and garage. In thi s respect there was cl early 
encouragement probably sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Ramsden 
v Dyson. The arrangement continued in force for some nine years. Notice 
was then given by the representor to revoke the licence and the 
representee sought to ca 11 the Ramsden v Dyson pri nci p 1 e into aid in 
order to sustain an injunction to restrain the revocation of the right 
of access. 
But this Barrowclough C.J. was not prepared to concede. Having 
established that there was no contract he emphasised that the representee 
did not have a mistaken belief as to his rights and, in particular, that 
he did not believe that he had a right in perpetuity. 3. Ramsden v Dyson 
and the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott and Barber were applied to this 
end. 
A similar approach was taken in the much later case of Denny v 
Jensen 4. where, after it having been concluded that there was no contract 
of sale, White J. applied Willmott v Barber and viewed the application 
of the Ramsden v Dyson principle substantially in terms of the degree of 
knowledge required of the representor to constitute the fraud sufficient 
to raise the equity. 
This narrow approach to the application of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle also found support with the House of Lords in Kammins Ballrooms 
v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd 5. and especially in the speech of Lord 
DiploCK where the prooanda of Fry J. were applied in order to disallow 
3. C.f. Ramsden v Dyson 
4. [1977] 1 N.Z.L R 635 The representee had been let into possession by 
the representor with a mistaken bel ief on the part of the former that 
there had been a contract of sale. But the representor alleged that 
the representee had merely been granted possession upon a tenancy. 
In the mistaken belief of continued and permanent possession, the 
representee carried out repairs, at, it appears considerable expense, 
and the execution of this work was apparently known to the 
representor who took no action to inform the representee of his state 
of mind in respect to the position of the latter. 
5. [1971] A.C. 850 
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the pleading of the principle which had been raised by a tenant 
representee in order to prevent the landlord representor resiling from an 
agreement which they had concluded in respect to a court hearing for a 
new tenancy. Unbeknown to both the parties the date wbich they had agreed 
upon for the hearing was outside the limits allowed by statute with the 
result that the tenant lost any chance of a renewal of tenancy. This was 
a clear case of convention as both the parties had agreed upon the date 
for the hearing of the application. This did not influence their Lordships 
who were prepared to determine the issue upon the narrow point of the 
state of knowledge of the representor. According to Lord Diplock; 
' ... the party estopped by acquiescence must, at the time of his 
active or passive encouragement, know of the existence of his 
legal right and of the other party's mistaken belief in his own 
inconsistent legal right. It is not enough that he should know of 
the facts which give rise to his legal right' 6. 
Although this decision is of the highest authority it appears to 
have been substantially ignored by later courts. 7. 
Had the particularistic approach to the application of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle which is evident in these cases been extended by the 
courts into a general rule for the application of the principle, it 
would be very difficult to see any representee ever successfully pleading 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
6. ibid at page 884 
7. It was brushed aside by Oliver J. In Taylors Fashions Ltd. v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 Q.B. 133 at page 147 
and was not considered at all in Amalgamated Investment and 
Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International 
Bank Ltd (1982) Q.B. 84 where it was clearly relevant. 
91 
These decisions all indicate that the court regarded the simple 
application of the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott v Barber as finally 
deteJ:min:ing the issue and completely overlook that the probanda are, as 
have been indicated by other decisions, merely one specific test which 
may, at the discretion of the court, be applied in specific cirumstances, 
as but one step in the determination of a wider assessment of whether 
the facts, taken as a whole, reveal unconscionability sufficient to enable 
equity to assert jurisdiction. 
To be more specific all of these cases emphasise the actual state of 
knowledge of the representee as to the legal situation and overlook that 
even if that state of knowledge is assumed the subsequent conduct of the 
representor was such that an expectation was raised in the mind of the 
representee, by the representor, that he the represento~ would not fall 
back upon the legal rights and enforce them at a later point of time. 
This is especially evident in McBean v Howey where it could well be 
argued that although the representee was aware of the legal position, the 
conduct of the representor, in actively participating in Ule building of 
the garage and driveway and allowing the arrangement to continue for some 
nine years, was surely sufficient to 05literate any knowledge which the 
representee may have had of his own legal position, and raise the requisite 
equity in h5s favour. 
These decisions reflect a clear propensity to protect formal property 
rights as against any rights of an equitable nature that could be 
perceived as satisfying good conscience. None of these instances 
exhibited any tendency on the part of the court to specify in detail 
what would have been required of the representee in order for him to 
succeed in raising, in his favour, an equity sufficient to allow the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle to be called into aid. 8. 
8. Although White J. in Denny v Jensen made reference to and cited from, 
Inwards v Baker 11965] 2 Q.B. 29; 11965] 1 All E.R. 446, 
it is submitted that his decision represents an approach to the 
application of the principle that is so different in degree as to 
amount to being in conflict with that decision. See under 'A Broader 
Approach to Unconscionability Now in the Ascendant' infra, ibid 
chapter. 
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With respect it is submitted that, in the light of subsequent 
decisions, and also in the light of a number of existing decisions, 
McBean v Howey was most certa"inly wrongly decided and that the decision 
in Denny v Jensen 9, was highly dubious. 
Attention will now be directed to the alternate approach to the 
application of the principle. This approach is now very much in the 
ascendant and has been confirmed by the most recent decisions. 
A Broader Approach to Unconscionabi 1 ity Now in The Ascendant .. 
A concurrent series of decisions, both English and New Zealand, 
exhibits a vastly more expansive approach to the application of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle. In these cases the courts have experienced no 
difficulty in applying the pri'nciple in favour of the representee in a 
vast array of different factual situations. Many of these have been of 
a domestic nature but there is no indication that the principle i.s confined 
to domestic situations, But these deci sions do show that the courts wi 11 
not hesitate to resort to the principle as a device to redistribute 
property rights. 
This broader approach does not rest upon technicality. It has, for 
example shown a decided irritation with the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott 
v Barber. Rather it is directed to making a broad assessment of the 
situation to determine whether, in the circumstances, it would be just 
or equitable to allow the representee to rely upon the principle. Signs 
of such an approach date Back to at least the 1900 l s 10. but its 
formul ation into a coherent concept of unconscionabil ity has only taken 
place in very recent decisions and it not, as yet, by any means complete. 
9. [1977] 1 N,Z.L.R. 635 
10. See· the New Zealand decisions in Cameron v Cameron (1891) 11 N,Z.L.R. 
6421; Re Hume (1909) 12 G.L.R. 61; ReWhitehead 11948J N.Z.L.R. 
1066; for earlier examples of the appli'cation of the princtple. 
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In Hopgood v Brown 11, Evershed M.R. in the Court of Appeal ~ in 
1955, was prepared to distinguish Will~ott v Barber as applicable only 
in cases of acquiescence and he then went on to apply the principle to 
preserve a right of way over land. 
Comments of Lord Denning M.R. in Inwards v Baker 12. clearly confirmed 
this trend if they did not actually set it in train. There a son had 
at his father's request, given up building upon his own land and erected 
a residence upon land owned by the father, both contributing equally to 
the cost of the dwelling where the son remained until the death of the 
father some twenty years later. All parties were apparently clearly 
aware of the legal situation but the court found that it was difficult to 
assess the state of knowledge of the representee except that he expected 
to stay in the house for his entire life, This possible area of 
uncertainty did not deter Lord Denning M.R. from apply-ing Ute Ramsden 
~~ 
principle 13'in favour of the son. The state of knowledge of the 
representee was not regarded as the determining factor but with a strict 
application of the probanda of Fry J. the action probably would not have 
been decided in favour of the son. Rather Lord Denning M,R, was prepared 
to find the requisite equity in the unconscionabil ity of removing the 
representee from the property after the expectation of permanent possession 
had been created by the conduct of the representor father. In a judgment 
quite hereft of technicality he maintained that; 
11. [1955] 1 W.L.R. 213. 
12. {1965] 2 Q.B. 29 
13. With the assistance of Plimmer v IVlayor of Wellington (1884) 9 App. 
Cas. 699, and Di 11 wyn v Llewelyn (l862) 4 De. G. F. & J. 517; 45 E. R. 
1285. 
'All that is necessary is that the licensee should~ at the 
request or with the encouragement of the landlord. have spent 
the money in the expectation of being allowed to stay there. 
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If so. the court will not allow that expectation to be defeated 
where it would be inequitable to do so' 14. 
Two years later Lord Denning. in the Court of Appeal continued this trend 
and applied the principle to protect a right of access to a garage in 
E.R. Ives Investments Ltd v High 15. where he stated the representor 
'created in the defendant's mind a reasonable expectation that his access 
over the yard would not be disturbed. That gives rise to an uequity 
arising out of acquiescence" 16. Danekwerts L.J. in the same case. 
emphasized the highly subjective value judgments which the Court felt 
itself free to apply in assessing the equity; 
'(the representor) stood by and. indeed. encouraged the defendant 
to build his garage in these conditions and for these purposes. 
Could anything be more monstrous and inequitable afterwards to 
deprive the defendant of the benefit of what he has done?t 17 
In these two cases the essential ingredients of the equity was viewed in 
a very straightforward manner by the court. Little attention was paid 
to anythi ng except the actual standi ng by of the representor whil e the 
representee acted to his detriment. There was no concern with applying 
any predetermined rules and in particular the probanda of Fry J. in 
Willmott v Barber were not considered. 
14. [1965] 2 Q.B. 29. at page 37 
15. [1967] 2 Q.B. 379 [1967] 1 All E.R. 504. also Ward v Kirkland 11967] 
1 Ch. 194 [1966] 1 All E.R. 609. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 601. 
16. [1967] 2 Q.B. 379 at page 394. 
17. ibid at page 399. 
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Lard Denning M.R. cantinued this expansive appraach in Crabb 
Arun District Cauncil 18. where the Ramsden v Dysan principle was 
applied by the Caurt af Appeal to. pravide a right af way to. back land 
after the representee landawner, in reliance upan representatians by 
the representar Cauncil tagether with the fact that it had erected 
gates at apprapriate places, had sald adjoining land thus making him 
dependant upan the right af way. Again the vital matter in the raising 
af the equity in favaur af the landawner appears to. have been the 
expectatian which was raised by the representar Cauncil in its canduct 
in erecting the gates, indicating a grant af access, fallawing a meeting 
with the Cauncil. 
Crabb v Arun District Cauncil canfirms that the prabanda af Fry J. 
are but a step in the fabricatian af Ute equity. Of the three Ju~gmarn 
anly that af Scarman L.J. as he then was, pays mare than passing attentian 
to. the prabanda and these he applied in a very braad manner picking aut 
anly the last, that is the requirement af encauragement by the representar, 
far detailed analysis in terms af the facts af the case. Perhaps the 
essence af Scarman L.J.ls assessment af what is required to. establish 
the equity is in his summing up af the effect af the probanda thus; 
IThe caurt therefare cannat find an equity established unless it is 
prepared to. go. as far as to. say that it wauld be uncanscianable and 
unjust to. allaw the defendants to. set up their undaubted rights 
agatnst the claim being made by the plaintiff ' 19. 
This requirement af uncanscianability he faund satisfied by the passage 
af time, the abstentian and the gate. 
18. [1976]1 Ch. 179 [1975J3 All E.R. 865. 
19. [1976] 1 Ch.179 at page 195. 
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Crabb v Arun District Council als,o indicated how in some instances 
it would have been appropriate for the representee to consult with the 
representor in order to establish his legal position and thus furnish 
himself with the appropriate state of knowledge as to his position. 
Failure to do so would destroy any equity which might otherwise arise in 
favour of the representee. However Scarman L.J. did not believe that the 
representee in the instant case was under any obligation to establish his 
legal position and he did not specify the circumstances when the 
representee would be likely to defeat his own equity by not attempting 
to determine what the legal position was. 20. 
A further significant development evident in Crabb y Arun District 
Council was that it exhibited a much greater analysis of the facts in 
order to establish unconscionability than was evident in the cases 
referred to supra. Considerable tracts of evidence are, for example 
reproduced in the judgment of Scarman L.J. 21. 
The modus operandi to be adopted by the court in assessing the 
equity in aptly summed up in the words of Lord Scarman in Crabby Arun 
District Council when he said that I ••• one has to look at the whole 
conduct of the parties and the developing relationship between them' 22. 
Crabb v Arun D strict Council clearly reflects such a view. 
Lord Denning M.R. seized the opportunity to apply Inwards v Baker 
and Crabb v Arun District Council in Jones (A.E.) v Jones CF.W.) 23. 
in an extremely unadorned judgment. This was but yet another domestic 
case where a son had been led to believe by his father that he would be 
permitted to remain in a particular property for the remainder of his 
1 i fe. 
20. ibid at page 198, 
21. See e.g. ibid at page 196, 
22. 11976J 1 Ch 179 at page 198. 
23. l197JJ 2 All E. R. 231. 
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A similar approach was adopted by Jefferies J. in the High Court of 
New Zealand in Beech Beech where it was recognised as necessary to 
subject a family relationship to a strict analysis to ascertain whether 
ld d t d d t · f 't l' 24. an 0 an respec e oc rlne 0 equl y app les. 
The cases considered so far indicate a shift towards the revival of 
a concept of unconscionability as the basis for the equity in the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. But they do not develop this nascent concept to any 
great extent. They confirm a drift away from a strict application of 
rules and especially the particularistic application of the probanda of 
Fry J. to a holistic assessment of the facts and the application to that 
assessment of subjective 25. value judgments as to what is justice in the 
given circumstances. 
The door was thus opened to the formulation of a more visab1e concept 
of unconscionability as the basis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
The Establishment of a Requirement of Unconscionability 
From the mid 1960 ls there has been a clear reversion back to what 
might be termed luntramelled unconscionability' as the fundamental 
ingredient which the representee must prove in order to invoke the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. It is now quite clearly established that 
unconscionability is the essential ingredient of the equity. 
The terminology relevant to this concept has not much troubed the 
courts. The expressions lunconscionability, inequitable, or unjust l 26. 
have all been used as apparently meaning the same thing. 
24. (High Court, Wellington, 24 February 1982 (A No 144/80) Jefferies 
J, at page 9) 
25. See also Siew Soon v Yong Tong Hong I1973] A.C. 836; 11973J 2 W.L.R. 
713, P.C. also the New Zealand case of Van den Berg v Giles 11979J 
2 N.Z.L.R. 111, which was a classical situation of improvements to 
property where Jeffries J. indicated that estoppel would have been 
a possible alternate cause of action. 
26. As per Scarman L.J. in Crabb v Arun District Council 11976J 1 Ch. at 
page 195. 
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The earlier decisions in this period tend to make no overt 
reference to this requirement but tend rather to exhibit a sub-silentio 
acceptance of such. In E.R. Ives Investments, Ltd. v High 27 Lord 
Denning was prepared to concede the equity with a very few words; 
'The right arises out of the expense incurred (by the defendant 
and the representor) standing by and acquiescing in it ... By so 
doing the (representor) created in the defendant's mind a reasonable 
expectation ... That gives rise to an 'equity arising out of 
, , 28. 
acqulescence 
This makes no attempt to formulate any general concept of 
unconscionability but simply assumes that such was present in the particular 
circumstances of the case. 
Later in Crabb v Arun District Council in a more ornate judgment 
Lord Denning again confirmed that '.,. it is the first principle upon 
which all Courts of Equity proceed that it will prevent a person from 
insisting on his strict legal rights .,. when it would be inequitable for 
him to do so , 29 Although he went on to spell out what, in the 
circumstances of the instant case, amounted to inequitable conduct, he 
refrained from formulating any general principle of unconscionability. 
A clear step further to the establishment of 'untrammelled 
unconscionability' as the sole basis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle was 
taken by Oliver J. as he then was, in the Chancery Division in Taylors 
Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. 30. where, after 
apparently having listened to lengthly argument by counsel as to what was 
required to be shown to establish the equity in Ramsden v Dyson he 
concluded 
27. 11967J 2 Q.B. 379 
28. ibid at page 394 
29. 11976J 1 Ch. 179 at pages 187-188 
30. I1982] 1 Q.B, 133 
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the more recent cases indicate, in my judgment, that the 
application of the Ramsden v Dyson ... principle ... requires a 
very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining 
whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be 
unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, 
knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to 
assume to his detriment than to enquiring whether the circumstances 
can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula 
serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable 
behavi our' 31 
Oliver J. continued to the effect; 
'The inquiry which I have to make therefore, as it seems to be, 
is simply whether, in all the circumstances of this case, it 
was unconscionable for the defendants to seek to take advantage 
I. 32. 
This formulation was adopted and applied by Robert Goff J. in 
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texax Commerce International 
Bank. 33 
Oliver L.J. had the unique opportunity to add the authority of the 
Court of Appeal to his formulation of the basis of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle when he reaffirmed it in Habib Bank v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
Ltd. 34. 
31. ibid at pages 151-152. 
32. ibid at page 155. 
33. [1982] 1 Q.B. 44 at page 104. 
34. [1981] 2 All ER at page 666 where he reaffirmed that ' ... the more 
recent cases indicate ... that the application of the Ramsden v 
Dyson ... principle ... requires a very much broader approach which 
is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual 
circumstances, it would be unconscionable ... I ibid. 
THE LIBRARY 
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To summarise at this juncture, The basis of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle, after sqme period of uncertainty, now appears to have settled 
upon unconscionability as its basis. This would appear to be implicit 
in the broader approach to the equity which is not depende.nt upon the 
application of predetermined rules. Although the evolution of 
unconscionability can be detected as far back as the mid 1960's it has 
now been honed into a much sharper and far more explicit basis of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
Judicial Perception of Unconscionability 
If unconscionabil ity can now be looked upon as the basi s for the 
application of the Ransden v Dyson principle the question is raised as 
to the nature and substance of this concept. How do the judges perceive 
it? 
This question could be answered in an ad-hoc manner by an 
examination of the specific conduct and situations which have variously 
been regarded as unconscionable. But it is possible to discern, in broad 
outline at least, the subjective assessment which will be made of a 
particular situation to determine whether or not it can be labelled as 
unconscionable. Thus the courts are seeking something which has been 
yariously described as; 'unfair or unjust' 35. or 'most inequitable! 36. 
In Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich Oliver L.J. accepted the use 
of the expression 'wholly inequitable' 37. which had been used in the 
judgment of the Lower Court. 
35. As per Lord Denning MR in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co 
Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 Q.B. 84 at 
page 123. 
36. As per Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees Co. Ltd 11982J 1 Q.B. 133 at page 158. 
37. As per Oliver L.J. 11981J 2 All ER at page 668. 
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It does not appear to be possible to take the conception of 
unconscionability to any more basic level than this. 38, These scraps 
of dicta amount to nothing more than an indication of subjective judicial 
value judgments which will be applied to the facts of the case. It is now 
being made manifest that indeed the application of unconscionability does 
amount to a subjective value judgment; 
'It would, in my judgment, be most inequitable t 39. 
and 
'I, too, think that it would be wholly inequitable I 40. 
The resurgence of unconsci onabi 1 i ty is not 1 imited to the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle. It has revived in the 'unconscionable bargain' in 
contract 41. and has been incorporated into statute 42. But an 
examination of the judicial perception of unconscionability in other areas 
is of little assistance in ascertaining its nature in respect to its 
application to the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
38. These current conception of unconscionabil tty can be compared with 
ideas put forward in the n-ineteenth century such as 'natural equity', 
'good sense', 'good faith', 'common sense', 'common justice', 
'morality', 'wholesomeness' which the doctrine of estoppel is sought 
to achieve, and 'unfairness', 'mischievousness' 'playing fast and 
loose with justice' which situations estoppel may be resorted to 
to rectify. See Spencer-Bower G and Sir Alexander Turner 'The Law 
Relating to Estoppel by Representation' 3d. ed. London, Butterworths 
1977 paragraph 15, page 21. 
39. As per Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees Co. Ltd. 11982J 1 Q.B. 133 at page 158. 
40. As per Oliver L.J. in Habib Bank v Habib Bank A.G. Zurich Ltd 
[1981J 2 All ER at page 668 line e.2. 
41. C.f. Archer v Cutler 11980J 1 N.Z.L.R. 386, O'Connor v Hart 
11983J N. Z. L. R. 280. 
42. Credit Contracts Act 1981 S. 10 (1) (a) Minors Contracts Act 1969 
S 5 (2) (a). 
In assessing unconscionability the court would most certainly 
take into account any unconscionable behaviour on the part of the 
representee. 43. 
Conclusion: The Incidents of Unconscionability. 
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By a process which has taken something like two decades to reach 
fruition the Ramsden v Dyson principle appears to have divested itself of 
a series of rules which once encumbered it, has assumed much more expansive 
proportions, and appears to have finally come to rest upon unconsionability 
as its basis. The likely consequences of unconscionability and a broader 
assessment of it as the foundation stone for this principle will be 
reserved for consideration at a later point in this work. 44. It remains, 
presently to summarise the apparent incidents of unconscionability as they 
can De gleened from the decided cases. 
Firstly, it appears clear, that there can be no confining of 
unconscionaoility to a 'some preconceived formula serving as a universal 
yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour ' 45. 
Secondly, if unconscionability is not subject to preconceived rules 
then surely what amounts to an unconscionable situation can only be 
determined by the application of a subjective value judgment to the facts 
of specific cases. What amounts to unconscionaoility is thus internal to 
the mind of the individual judge, It follows from this that its 
application is wholly at the discretion of the individual judge and 
surely this is in accordance with the best tradition of the equitable 
jurisdiction. 
43. As in D & C Builders v Rees {1966J 2 Q.B. 617. 
44. See under the subheading The Viability of Unconscionability as a 
Basis for the Principle in 'Conclusion~Whither the Ramsden v Dyson 
Principle' chapter twelve infra. 
45. 11982J 1 Q.B. 133 at page 152. 
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Tb5rdly in assessing unconscionability the court must take into 
account thefacts as a whole. Unconscionability is assessed not in terms 
of one aspect of the case but in terms of the situation in its entirety. 
The conduct and position of the representee are just as relevant to 
unconscionability as the conduct and position of the representor. 
No more precise test of unconscionability has yet evolved. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE RAISING OF AN EXPECTATION 
Introduction: Conduct of the Representor Essential 
In accordance with the classical decisions an essential 
feature to the assertion of the jurisdiction in the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle was the conduct of the representor. That is the 
party against whom the estoppel is raised. Being a product of 
equity it was essential that an equity be raised in favour of the 
representee before the principle could be called into aid. But 
equity was just as intent upon protecting the rights of the 
representor as those of the representee who was seeking the assis-
tance of equity. There must be some element within the conduct of 
the representor to which equity can attach in order to assert 
jurisdiction. If equity sees the conduct of the representor as 
in every respect exemplary, then, {rrespective of any detriment 
which the representee has suffered, it could not assert jurisdic-
tion. 
The conduct of the representor is, in the light of contemporary 
decisibns., still a crucial factor in the assertion of the equity. 
But it appears that the conduct which will be regarded as sufficient 
to support the Ramsden v Dyson principle has widened somewhat in 
scope from that evident in the earlier cases. This has been 
brought about, to some extent, at least, by the more diffused and 
prolix situations which the courts are not faced with. 
The Concept of Equitable Fraud Preserved 
Early decisions speak of the requirement of 'equitable fraud ' 
as necessary to invoke the assistance of equity. But equitable 
'fraud was Ilinfinite ll in the sense that it was discerned in quite 
disparate circumstances so as to make the concept appear amphibo-
10us,l. It is clear that an intention to cheat or deceive was 
not an essential ingredient of equitable fraud. 2. To some extent 
equitable fraud can be seen as an application of the principle of 
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preventive justice, designed to shut out any inducement to perpe-
trate a wrong, rather than to rely on mer~ remedial justice after 
a wrong has been committed. Thus the application of the jurisdic-
tion in the Ramsden v Dysqn principle could be seen as disarming 
the representor of rights which he ma~ apart from estoppel, have 
to fall back upon at law and thus to discourage him from taking 
advantage of a situation in which the temptation might otherwise 
be too great. 
The early cases do generally exhibit an element of what could 
be regarded as 'fraud' in a modern context. Thus it was regarded 
as satisfying the equity if; a landlord, with full knowledge that 
a lease is invalid allows the tenant to improve the land with the 
intention of taking the value of the improvements;3. a landlord 
continues to accept rent knowing that the lease was invalid;4. in 
full knowledge of the legal position an owner allows another who is 
ignorant of the legal position to build upon his property. 5. 
1. Meagher R.P. W.M.C. Gummow and J.R.F. Lehane 'Equity Doctrines 
and Remedies' Butterworths Sydney etc, 1975, page 295 paragraph 
1202. 
2. ' ... it is a mistake to suppose that an actual intention to 
cheat must always be proved' as per Lord Haldane in Nocton 
v Lord Ashburton [1914J A.C. 932 at page 954. 
3. as in the of Oxford's Case (1615) 1 Ch. Rep. 1; 21 E.R. 485 
4. As in Stiles v Cowper (1748) 3 Atk. 692; 26 E.R. 1198. 
5. As in East India Company v Vincent (1740) 2 Atk. 83; 26 E.R. 
451. 
106 
On the other hand there are isolated instances where equity 
would allow redress, in the form of estoppel, for representations 
which were clearly careless but were made with an honest belief in 
their truth at the time they were made. 6. 
The expression 'equitable fraud' is not used in contemporary 
judicial parlance. But the courts have made no attempt to restate 
the classical idea of equitable fraud. Although it is now probably 
more appropriate to speak of a requirement of 'unconscionability' 
as a necessary ingredient of the representor's conduct, it is 
submitted that the modern decisions have fully kept within the 
equitable tradition of fraudulent conduct. 
Equity did not prescr~be the conduct on the part of the repre-
sentor which would bind his conscience. This policy has continued. 
To satisfactorily examine this aspect it is thus necessary to look 
at instances of conduct which have been regarded as unconscionable 
and to draw generalisations from them but at the same time remem-
bering that any generalisations so derived must never be regarded 
as in any way limiting the future conduct of the courts. 
Silence as Binding the Conscience of the Representor. 
A central feature of the Ramsden v Dyson principle is that it 
does not need to rest upon a specific representation. It can go much 
further and rest upon the complete silence of a party. In this 
6. See e.g. Burrowes v Lock (1805) 10 Yes. Jun. 470; 32 E.R. 927. 
where a trustee was required to make good the loss suffered by 
a creditor after representing to him, honestly but carelessly, 
that the interest of a beneficiary was unencumbered. This case 
was not determined upon the Ramsden v Dyson principle but it 
is submitted that any rule laid down in it would be equally 
applicable to the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
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respect equity went much further than the common law. The Ramsden 
v Dyson principle can be seen as representing the outer limits of 
the circumstances in which relief would be granted in equity. It 
could be said therefore that it was necessary for equity to manu-
facture a representation from silence. But would any 'form of 
silence' be sufficient to allow the principle in? How could 
silence, which the law has traditionally shunned rendering action-
able, be made to bind the conscience of the representor? 
Whether or not silence can bind the conscience of the repre-
sentor can only be determined by assessing that silence within the 
context of the entire conduct of the representor. The courts have 
not focussed upon one specific element within the conduct of the 
representor but will assess his conduct taken as a whole. Rarely 
is it that the courts have only silence within the conduct of the 
representor to examine. There will usually be some other conduct 
and this will often serve to 'colour' the silence as being either 
unconscionable or not. 
Relevance of the State of Knowledge of the Representor 
The state of knowledge possessed by the representor has played 
a prominent part in many decisions and it will be recalled that it 
was a central feature in the probanda of Fry J. in Willmott v 
Barber7. and in the statement of the principle, set out in Ramsden 
v Dyson itself, by Lord Cranworth. 8. 
There is no doubt that where the silent acquiescence is relied 
upon by the representee the state of knowledge of the representor 
7. (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96. 
8. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129 at pages 140-141 
108 
can be relevant. A silence coupledwith the requisite state of 
knowledge has been referred to as 'conscious silence (which) implies 
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff was. 
incurring the expenditure and in the mistaken belief that there 
was a contract ... 9. This goes no further than requiring a specified 
state of knowledge on the part of the representor to the effect 
that he knew that the representee was, firstly incurring the expen-
diture (that is acting to his detriment) and, secondly, also that 
the representee was mistaken in his belief that he had a legal 
interest sufficient to sustain the conduct which he was engaging in. 
That is the representor must have full knowledge of the conduct 
of the representee as well as the legal position. 
Where silence alone is relied upon the proof of 
the state of knowledge of the representor would be vital. Without 
the requisite state of knowledge there could not possibly be the 
requisite fraud to bind the conscience of the representor. Thus 
where silence, with nothing else by way of representation, is 
relied upon there would appear to be nothing except the state of 
knowledge, on the part of the representor, to which equity could 
attach the necessary unconscionability. It could be said that the 
represetnor had it within his power to prevent the detriment of 
the representee simply by breaking his own silence, but that he 
failed to do so.10. 
9. As per White J. in Denny v Jenson[1977J 1 N.Z.L.R. 635, at 
page 638. 
10. 'Knowledge of the mistake makes it dishonest for him to remain 
wilfully passive in order afterwards to profit by the mistake 
he might have prevented' Snell 'PrinciDles of Equity' 27 ed. 
page 566. Cited with approval by White J. in Denny v Jensen 
[1977J 1 N.Z.L.R. at page 638. With respect it is not a 
necessary ingredient that the representor stand to profit by 
his silent standing by. 
It could be therefore that no party could be encumbered with 
an .equity should he be unaware of his rights and change his mind 
once he becomes aware of the true situation11 . However this is 
not to say that any party who is unaware of his rights, or of the 
true situation, has an unreserved right to resile from a position 
which he has previously accepted. Whether he could do so in 
specific circumstances would depend upon an assessment by the 
court of the conscionability of his potential conduct in those 
t ' 1 . t 12. par lCU ar Clrcums ances. 
That the representor must himself know the true position 
109 
before estoppel by acquiescence can arise was vigorously argued by 
counsel for the representor in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liverpool 
Vi Trustees. Ltd. 13 . where both parties had acted upon --~--~--------~~-~ 
the assumption that an option, which in fact was invalid because 
it was not registered under the Land Changes Act 1925 (U.K.) was 
binding. 
After lengthly deliberation Robert Goff J., in the High Court, 
rejected this submission. Using as a basis for his finding on 
this point the statement of the principle contained in the 
dissenting speech of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson itself he 
11. 'There is nothing inequitable in a man who has no knowledge 
that an option is his standing by while the option is 
exercised for the benefit of a settlement which he has some 
grounds for believing to be entitled to the option ' 
Re Vandervells Trusts (No.2) [1974J 1 Ch.269 at page 302. 
12. Where both parties are mistaken as to the legal position 
and act mutually upon that mistaken assumption a situation 
of convention could well arise in which case one party 
attempting to resile, after having discovered the mistake, 
could well be unconscionable. See under the subheading 
'Mistake on the Part of the Representor is Irrelevant ... 1 
infra, ibid chapter. 
13. [1982J 1 Q.B. 133. 
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sets out to show that the authorities are very much against the 
requirement that it is necessary in all cases that the representor 
should be aware of the true position. He concludes that: 
ISO regarded knowledge of the true position by the party 
alleged to be estopped, becomes merely one of the rele-
vant factors - it may even be a determining factor in 
t . . th 11" I 14. cer aln cases - 1n e overa 1nqu1ry. 
For this proposition he found clear support in both Inwards v 
Baker15 . and in E.R. Ives Investments Ltd. v High l6 . the latter 
of which he found a Istriking examp1e i • 
The contemporary view would thus appear to be that it is 
not essential in all cases that the representor be possessed of 
knowledge of the true situation, that i~ so far as Taylors 
Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. was concerned, 
what his strict rights were in relation to the option. Thus in 
that case the Court rejected any examination of the state of mind 
of the representor as relevant. Rather it looked at his conduct 
and the results of that conduct on the representee and addressed 
itself to the question whether what the representor was now 
seeking to do was unconscionable. 
Thus the state of knowledge of the representor would appear 
to be only one of the many factors which may, at the discretion 
of the court, be taken into consideration to determine whether, 
in the circumstances, his conduct is unconscionable or not. 
14. ibid at page 152. 
15. [1965J 2 Q.B. 29 
16. [1967] 2 Q.B. 379. 
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From a practical point of view considerable difficulty could 
be experienced in applying Ramsden v Dyson in contemporary condi-
tions if it was a requirement that the representor should be 
fully aware of the legal situation in respect to his own rights 
and the representee should be equally ignorant of his. In most 
of the later cases both of the parties have been fully aware of 
th t 1 1 1 . t t' 17 . d t th t h . d e ac ua ega Sl ua lon an ye e cour save exper1ence 
no difficulty in applying the principle. With improved indicia 
of ownership it is unusual these days that any party will not be 
aware of the legal position. Thus to require knowledge on the 
part of one party and ignorance on the part of the other would 
greatly restrict the applicability of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle. 
Moreover the requirement of a state of knowledge could present 
the courts with difficult factual issues which could, in many 
cases, be very difficult of resolution. Such a requirement would 
tend to throw a considerable element of subjectivity into the 
evidential requirements necessary to establish the principle. 
It would, for example be possible for a representor to act in 
one particular manner, thereby inducing the representee to act to 
his detriment, and then to prove that he, that is the representor, 
acted under a false impression, or that he was mistaken, or that 
he was unaware of what the representee was doing and hence that 
this precluded him from breaking his silence. This could pose a 
17. In v Turner [1979J 2 All E.R. 945, e.g. both parties 
were yaware who held the legal title to the property 
in dispute and the legal title was fully known to the parties 
in Beech v Beech High Court -Wellington 24 February_1982 _ 
A No 144/80,) In many cases the state of knowledge as to the 
legal position is irrelevant to the issue of estoppel. 
major evidential problem to the representee, especially if, as 
indicated by White J. in Denny v Jensen 18 . the standard of proof 
required to verify the state of knowledge of the representor is 
high and 'strong and cogent evidence,19. must be adduced to 
satisfy the requirement. 
Thus what would seem to be more appealing to the courts as a 
pathway out of having to assess such issues as the intention of 
the parties would be something analogous to the finding of an 
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agreement in the common law of contract where the intention of the 
parties may be derived from an assessment which any reasonable 
man would place upon their conduct. This would serve to ease the 
evidential requirements by infusing a high degree of objectivity 
into the situation. This could obviate the position of the 
representee in a case such as Denny v Jensen, where it was clear 
that the representor was aware of the expenditure which the 
representee was sinking into the property, but was able, nonethe-
less, to successfully plead that he thought that the improvements 
were being made in the expectation of a long term lease and not 
in the expectation of attaining the freehold. 
A partial solution, at least, to obviating reliance upon the 
state of mind of the parties, has been found by placing reliance 
upon the raising of an expectation by the representor. This 
approach will now be considered. 
18. [1977J 1 N.Z.L.R. 635. 
19. ibid at page 639 
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The Raising of An Expectation Could Bind the Conscience of the 
Representor. 
In view of recent decisions it is now necessary that the 
conduct required of the representor, in order to raise the equity, 
be subsumed in a much wider context than a mere examination of 
the state of his mind. 
The decisions appear to have moved to the requirement that the 
conduct of the representor be such as would amount to the raising, 
in the mind of any reasonable person, a clear expectation as to a 
specific state of affairs. The expectation must be raised in such 
circumstances that it was either intended or likely to be acted 
upon by the representee. But it need not be specifically directed 
to the representee. 
The current emphasis upon the raising of an expectation as 
the central element required in the conduct of the represetnor 
represents a clear reversion back to equity and an acceptance of 
the dissenting speech of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson itself; 
'If a man, under a verbal agreement .... or what amounts 
to the same thing, under an expectation, created or 
d ,20. encourage .... 
In some instances this has been overtly accepted 21 . while in many 
others it has been tacitly followed. 22 . 
20. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. at page 170; 
21. As for example, by Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd [1982J 1 Q.B. 133 at 
page 144, by Lord Denning in Crabb v Arun District Council 
[1976J 1 Ch. 179 at page 188, and by Scarman L.J. in the 
same case, ibid at page 196. 
22. See infra, ibid subheading. 
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The requirement of the raising of an expectation in the mind 
of the representee by the representor as vital to the establishment 
of the equity is a consistent theme running through the decisions 
and has now been clearly confirmed. Lord Denning M.R. specifies 
that the expectation must be 'reasonable,23. He has not set out a 
gloss upon this but it would appear that the expectation which is 
to be derived from the conduct of the representor would be that 
which any reasonable man would derive from the conduct. It would 
seem that it would not be open for the representee to contrive in 
his own mind some quite unreasonable expectation from the conduct 
of the representor, and expect a court to satisfy such a phantasy. 
Lord Denning M.R. has gone further and indicated that the 
raising of the expectation may be all that is required of the 
24 
representor. . But this, it is submitted, does not detract from 
the fact that the court must view this conduct within the entire 
circumstances of the case. 
The essential element in the conduct of the representor is thus 
the raising of an expectation in the mind of the representee. This 
has the effect of infusing a substantial degree of objectivity 
into the determination of cases where the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
is pleaded. The court is able to direct attention to what the 
representor has done, or said, and ask the one essential question 
23. 'By so dOing the Wrights created in the defendant's mind a 
reasonable expectation .... I as per Lord Denning M.R. in E.R. 
Ives Investments, Ltd. v High [1967J 2 Q.B. 379 at page 394. 
IOn the basis of that reasonable expectation ... I as per Lord 
Denning M.R. in Jones (A.E.) v Jones (F.W.) [1977J2 All 
E.R. at page 235. . 
24. 'All that is necessary is that the licensee should, ... have 
spent money in the expectation ... I as per Lord Denning M.R. 
in Inwards v Baker [1965J 2 Q.B. 29 at page 37. 
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'what expectation would that conduct give rise to in the mind of 
any reasonable representee?' 
As an essential feature in the establishment of the principle 
is the raising of an expectation rather than any specific form 
of the representation the making of a distinction as between 
acquiescence and encouragement as the foundation stone for the 
erection of the principle is now seen as futile: Indeed the 
courts have not been concerned in defining or distinguishing the 
expressions 'acquiescence' or 'encouragement': 
The requirement of the raising of an expectation rather than 
any specific form of representation is a further example of the 
reversion back to requirements necessary while this principle 
was within its original jurisdiction;25. 
The Nature and Form of the Expectation,Regui red of the Representor 
Understandably the courts have not sought to restrict the 
manner in which the raising of the necessary expectation can take 
place or the form which it may assume~ Frequently it has involved 
the placing of the representee in possession of property together 
with conduct which is clearly indicative that the representee has 
a definable interest in the property.26. It can, of course, 
25. he would not have done, but upon an expectation' per 
Lord Eldon L.C. in Dann v Spurrier (1802) 7 Ves. Jun. 231 
at page 236. 
26. As in Pascoe v Turner [1979J 2 All E.R. 945, where the male 
party to a defacto relationship placed the female party in 
occupation of a house property and led her to believe that 
he had made a gift of it to her: See also Inwards v Baker 
[1965J 2 Q.B. 29, where the representor induced the repre-
sentee to relinquish building upon his own land and build 
upon the land of the representor. 
involve standing by while the representee makes improvements to 
the property without any specific representation on t~e part of 
th t 27. e represen or. It can involve the purchasing of property 
in the name of the representor and placing the representee into 
possession in such a manner as to raise in the mind of the 
representee the expectati on of a speci fi c -j nterest in that 
property.28. 
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In most of the successful cases the representor has manifested~ 
either by an overt act~ or by failure to act, conduct consistent 
with the proprietary right which he has led the representee to 
be 1 i eve that he has in the property;-
It is possible to extend the raising of the requisite expec-
tation to situations with property other than land as their subject 
matter. In Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich 29 . the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle was successfully raised to resist an action in 
the common law tort of passing of. The representor had consented 
in the representee bank assuming its trade name and had allowed 
27. As in Hauhungaroa Block v Attorney General [1973J 1 N.Z.L.R. 
398~ where the oWner representor stood by while the representee 
constructed a road through the property, 
28. As in Beech V Beech (High Court~ Wellington, 24 February 1982 
o No. 144/80)Jefferies J~~ where a farm had been purchased 
in the name of the representors because the representee, who 
was of limited means, would have experienced difficulty in 
obtaining the necessary finance. But the representors then 
placed the representee in possession and acted at all material 
times as if he had the fee simple of the property. See also 
Jones (A.E.) v Jones (F.W.)[1977J 2 All E.R: 231, where the 
deceased representor had ind~ced his son to move from his 
existing property by purchasing another property in his own 
name, accepting a contribution from the son towards the cost, 
and subsequently acting as if he had made a gift of the 
property to the son. See also Cameron v Cameron (1891) 11 
N.Z.L.R. 642. 
29. [1981J 2 All LR. 650. 
the use of the IHabib l name for some four years between 1973 
until 1977 thus raising an expectation that no objection would 
be taken to the continued use of that trade name. 
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Mistake on the Part of the Representor is Irrelevant To the Raising 
of the Required Expectation 
It has previously been indicated that the state of mind of 
the representor is only one factor which the court may, at its 
discretion, consider relevant to the assessment of whether or not 
the situation is unconscionable. It now appears clear that a 
mistake on the part of the representor will not necessarily 
prevent him from raising the required expectation. The representor 
can be completely ignorant of the true situation and still raise 
an expectation necessary to call the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
into operation. 
It is thus the objective effect of the conduct of the repre-
sentor which the court will examine. A mistake on the part of 
the representor is quite irrelevant to this. A representor can 
quite unwittingly give rise to an expectation which, in effect, is 
based upon a total misconception of the real state of affairs. 
If the representee has acted upon that expectation the courts 
1 d h 1 d t h t t . t d . t h . . t k 30. cou 0 e represen or 0 1 esp1 e 1S m1S a e. 
This is aptly illustrated by both Taylors Fashions Ltd. v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. 31 . where both parties were 
mistaken as to the validity of an option to renew a lease, and 
30. ISO here, there is no specific requirement, ... that the 
(representor) should know or intend that the expectation 
which he has created or encouraged is one to which he is 
under no obligation to give effectl as per Oliver J. In 
Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liver 001 Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. 
1 Q.B. 3 at page 145 
31. supra 
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co: ltd;--{in-l'iquidation) v 
Texas Commerce Internationa18ank btd~32 where both the parties 
were mistaken as to the validity of a guarantee. 
It seems to follow that it is now irrelevant that the 
representor could have prevented the loss of the representee, 
ab initio. A significant movement in this direction was taken 
in the extention of the Ramsden v Dyson prinicple to situations 
of convention. This development meant that the principle is 
no longer limited to cases where the loss of the representee 
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could have been prevented, from the beginning} by the representor. 
It will be recalled that Lord Cranworth did specify this as an 
element in his statement of the prinicple. 33 : 
It is Immaterial Whetherfue Expectation Created by the Representor 
is in Respect to Fact or Law 
It would appear that the evolution of a requirement that the 
representor should raise an expectation could serve to overcome 
what has long been a source of confusion in the administration of 
the law of estoppel. 
There is authority for the proposition that there can be no 
estoppel in respect to a statement of law as distinct from a 
statement of fact. 34 . It is true that any rule to the effect that 
32. [1982J 1 Q.B. 84 
33. in order afterwards to profit by the mistake I might 
have prevented' (1866) L.R. 1 H:L~ 129 at page 141. 
34. 'One realises ... that in dealing with the doctrine of estoppel 
one must always be careful to see that the court is not 
saying that a man is estopped from stating what is the law' 
as per Cassels J. in Algar v t4iddlesexCounty Council [1945J 
2 All E.R. 243 at page 251. 
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estoppel was limited to statements of facts has long since disin-
tegrated and for example, mixed statements of fact and law have 
been treated as subject to estoppe1 35 . and there has been a 
tendency to treat many clear statements of law as subject to 
estoppel. 36 . 
A question of the validity of a written contract would normally 
be treated as a matter of law. However in both Taylors Fashions 
v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. and in Amalgamted Investment 
and Property Co. Ltd. v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd., 
where the estoppel was raised upon the validity of an option and 
a guarantee, respectively, the court found no difficulty in 
applying estoppel. Citing the opinion of the Privy Council in 
Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. v Craine37 . where the Board regarded 
it as a matter of indifference whether the representation was 
that the claim made was actually valid, which was a question of 
law, or that it was the insurers' intention to treat it as valid, 
which was a matter of fact, Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. concluded; 
lIn a sense most representations of law can be approached 
on the footing that, whatever the law may be, it is the 
35. As in Burrows v Rhodes [1899J 1 Q.B. 816; 
36. As in Reynell v Sprye (1852) 1 De G~M~ & G. 660, where a state-
ment that the representee took no interest under a will was 
treated as a statement of fact: in Bank of Australasia v 
Adams (1890) 8 N.Z.L.R. 119, the bank was estopped in respect 
to a representation as to the binding effect of a bond, In 
Lyle-Mellor v A. Lewis & Co. (Westminister) Ltd., [1956J 
1 All E.R. 247 Denning L.J. was prepared to hold that a 
representation of law was capable of supporting an estoppel. 
But the Privy Council held against this view in Kai Nam v 
Ma Kam Chan [1956J 1 All E.R. 783 n; [1956J A.C. 358. 
37. [1922J 2 A.C. 541. 
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existing intention of the party making the representation 
to treat the law as it is represented to be as the conven-
tional basis for the particular transaction which he has 
. . d.' 38. ln mln 
This would appear to subsume any distinction between a 
representation of law and a representation of fact as a basis 
for the expectation raised. While it is admitted that Oliver J. 
did not accord this issue extended treatment it would appear 
from an exam; nabon of the cases that the 
elimination of the distinction between law and fact as a basis 
for the expectation is fully in accord with the current tendency 
to extend the basis for the Ramsden v-Dyson principle. 
Irrelevant That Expectation in respect to Future Intention or 
Opinion 
Although the courts do not appear to as yet~ specifically 
directed attention to the matter it would appear to be irrelevant 
that the expectation has been raised upon the basis of an expres-
sion of future intention. If having made an expression as to 
his future intention the representor then engages in conduct, 
possibly by acquiescence or encouragement, which would induce 
the representee to believe that that expression of future inten-
tion will be fulfilled, then the necessary expectation to support 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle will be satisfied: 
Many specific instances are illustrative of this: In Crabb v 
Arun District Counci1 39 . the conduct of the representor council 
38. [1982] 1 Q. B. 133 at page 151 
39. [1976] 1 Ch. 179. 
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was surely tantamount to a statement to the effect that 'the right 
of access which has been agreed upon will be granted in the 
future~ could not the statement of the representor in Pascoe v 
Turner40 . very readily be turned from a categoric representation 
that 'the house is yours' to 'the house may be yours at some time 
in the future'. No distinction appears now to be relevant as to 
the representation of future intention. Indeed it would appear 
quite contrary to the basic policy of the Ramsden v Dyson princi-
p1e to exclude expectations which are based upon expression of 
future intention as subject to the principle. 
The requirement of the raising of an expectation would thus 
appear to contribute still further to the laying to rest the 
celebrated but much criticised decision in Jorden v MOney.41. 
Likewise the status of an expression of opinion as the basis 
of the expectation does not appear to have received the attention 
of the courts. However an argument similar to that regarding 
expressions of future intention could probably be applied to 
expressions of opinions as bases for the expectation. 
It has traditionally been held that a statement of mere 
opinion is not sufficient to found an estoppel. 42 . But this 
proposition also could well be subsumed in the raising of the 
expectation. The basis of the representor's conduct is surely 
not the opinion but his total conduct in relation to that opinion. 
40. [1979J 1 W. L. R. 431 
41. (1854) 5 H.L.C. 185; 10 E.R~ 868. 
42. See, for example, George Whitechurch Ltd. v Cavanagh [1902J 
A.C. 117; National Westminister Bank Ltd. v Barc1ays Bank 
[1974J 3 All E.R. 834. 
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If this conduct, irrespective of the expression of opinion is 
sufficient to raise the expectation then the requirements of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle, in respect, that is to the conduct 
required of the representor, have, it is submitted, probably been 
met. But, on the other hand, if there is a simple representation 
of opinion with nothing else then it is probable that the 
requirement has not been met because there would then probably 
be nothing to raise the required expectation. In other words it 
would be reasonable to assume that an expectation could not raise 
upon an opinion alone. 
It is Not Necessary that the Representor Actually Create the 
Expectation But it is Sufficient if he Merely 'Feed' it. 
In order to raise the required expectation it is not necessary 
that the representor actually create it. The basis of the expec-
tation can come into existence quite beyond the actions or indeed 
the control of the representor. But if, once having been created,it 
is enough if the representor feeds that expectation to such an 
extent that the conduct of the representee is thereby influenced. 
This has been emphasised by both Taylors Fashions Ltd. v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. an~ ~malgamated Investment & 
Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International 
Bank Ltd. 
In the latter of those two cases Robert Goff J. in the High 
Court specifically directed attention to this particular issue; 
it is, in my judgment, no bar to a conclusion that 
the other party's conduct was so influenced, that his 
conduct did not derive its origin only from the encourage-
ment or representation of the first party. There may be 
cases where the representee has proceeded initially on 
the basis of a belief derived from some other source inde-
pendent of the representor, but his belief has subsequently 
been confirmed by the encouragement or representation of 
the representor. In such a case, the question is not 
whether the representee acted, or desisted from acting, 
solely in reliance on the encouragement or representation 
of the other party; the question is rather whether his 
conduct was so influenced by the encouragement or repre-
sentation ... that it would be unconscionable for the 
representor thereafter to enforce his strict legal 
. ht I 43. rlg s. 
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This indicates, quite vividly, the extent to which the courts 
are now prepared to stretch the conduct required of the representor 
in order to allow the Ramsden v Dyson principle in. It would 
appear to say, firstly, that the representor need not actually 
bring the basis of the expectation into existence. Secondly, 
accepting that the substance of a possible expectation is in place, 
any conduct of the representor, intentional or otherwise, which 
can be construed as 'feeding' that expectation will suffice to 
allow the principle in. The only proviso being that it must 
'be unconscionable for the representor thereafter to enforce his 
strict legal rights' That is the Ramsden v Dyson principle can 
be called into aid if the representor attempts to resile from the 
situation when it would be unconscionable, viewed substantially 
in termsof the position of the representee~ to do so: 
43. [1982J 1 Q.B. 84 at pages 104-105: 
Having Created the Expectation the Representor Must Then Resile 
From It 
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Once having created the expectation in the mind of the repre-
sentee the representor must then commit an act in contradiction 
to the expectation. This is an act which serves to disintegrate 
the expectation which he has previously created. To put the 
matter in other words there must be a discrepancy between the 
expectation and what the representor subsequently alleges or 
sets up in litigation between himself and the party claiming the 
benefit of the Ramsden v principle. The subsequent conduct 
of the representor must be such that its effect is to destroy 
the expectation which he earlier raised. 
This aspect has not generally caused much in the way of 
difficulty to the courts and in most instances is relatively clear 
cut. In many cases where the representee has been allowed into 
possession of property with an expectation that he can remain in 
possession the resiling will merely be the subsequent attempt to 
remove the representee from the property. 
Conclusion: Expanded Scope For the Ramsden v Dyson Principle as 
Against other Forms of Estoppel 
If the Ramsden v Dyson principle can be established as resting 
upon the raising of an expectation it can be seen as having a much 
wider scope than other heads of estoppel. 
A comparison with estoppel by specific representation will 
show the scope of the Ramsden v Dyson principle as compared with 
that basis as the starting point of the action: It has been main-
tained that in order to succeed in estoppel by representation the 
representation must be precise, not an expression of opinion, or 
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future intention. and an expression of existing fact and not law. 
Requirements of this complexion serve to dramatically limit the 
scope of estoppel by representation in throwing up almost 
insuperable barriers to the success of the representee. 
The Ramsden v Dyson principle, on the other hand. allows the 
representee a much greater scope in requiring only that he show 
that the representor raised an expectation which was such as 
would influence any reasonable man. that he then sought to resile 
from that expectation, and that as a result he (the representee) 
would suffer detriment. The representee is therefore required 
to direct his proof not to bringing the representation under a 
series of predetermined rules, but to showing that the facts of 
the instant case were such as to give rise to the required 
expectation. As has been indicated it is possible that part of 
this proof of the required expectation could include a specific 
representation by the representor. 
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Chapter eight 
DETRIMENT TO THE REPRESENTEE 
Introduction: Is Detriment to the Representee a Separate Requirement or 
Merely a Part of the Wider Requirement of Unconscionability? 
The requirement of some detriment to the representee before the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle can be applied in his favour has assumed varying 
degrees of importance. A few cases can be seen as having been decided 
substantially upon this point while in others it has played a negligible, 
if not non existant role, The result is that it is not clear whether 
detriment to the representee is a specific requirement of the principle 
or whether it is merely but one aspect of the wider test of 
unconscionability. In other words does the court look to the position of 
the representee and determine whether he has detrimentally relied upon 
the expectation of the representor and, if the answer to that examination 
is in the affirmative, then move to the conclusion that the test of 
unconscionability has been satisfied? While it is true that in many 
instances the detriment of the representee will be a vital factor in the 
determination of the presence of unconscionability it is possible to 
conceive of cases where the court may be prepared to consider wider 
factors and conclude that a situation is unconscionable despite that there 
is no detriment to the representee. 
Converse 1 y there are many cases upon record vJhere although the 
representee has clearly suffered detriment in a specific situation, the 
test of unconscionab"il ity has not been satisfied for the simple reason that 
the detriment of the representee can in no way be ascribed to the conduct 
of the representor. That is the representor has not committed the 
requisite fraud. 
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At the same time no specific tests naye been laid down as to what 
constitutes suffl'cient detriment and this means that detriment can be 
highly subjective to the individual judge and idiosyncratic to the 
individual case. It is thus possible to contrive some detriment to the 
representee in virtually any case where the wider test of unconscionability 
is satisifed. 
Some may therefore be inclined to argue that it may not be important 
what terminology is used to determine whether the representor is bound by 
his representation. Unfortunately the matter cannot be disposed of so 
readily because the cases do tend to throw up the two concepts as distinct. 
There is here a quite noticable cleavage between the decisions of the New 
Zealand Judges and their English counterparts. The former tending to be 
somewhat more insistent upon the requirement of some detriment while the 
latter tending to adopt the wider test of unconscionability. Also there 
has been clear judicial recognition of a possible distinction between the 
two concepts. 1. 
Theoretical Justification for the Requirement of Detriment in Equity 
In order to resolve the question of whether there is a need for a 
specific requirement of detriment to the representee it is tempting to 
examine tbe old cases in order to try and find some justification for 
the requirement in the origins of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
1. Such a distinction was for example recognised by Lord Salmon in 
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 
2 Lloyds Rep 109 at page 127; by Robert Goff J. in Societe Italo 
-Bel e our le Commerce et I'Industrie SA v Palm and Vegetable 
Oils I~alaysia Sdn Bhd "The Post Chaser" [1982] 1 All ER 19 at 
page 26; by Lord Denning M.R. in W.J. Alan & Co Ltd v El Naser 
Export and Import Co [1972] 2 QB 189 at page 213, [1972] 2 All 
E.R. 127 at page 140. 
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Unfortunately s,uch an exerci.se does not bear much fruit. The older 
cases tend to make 1 ittl e if any reference. to a s·pe.cific requirement of 
detriment but use the wider 'unconscionability' or ~inequitable' 2. 
The phenomenon of detriment appears to be a creation of much more recent 
times following the implementation of the judicature system. 
Despite, thi s, however, it is possible to contri ve detriment to the 
representee in virtually every case where estoppel was successfully 
pleaded within the original jurisdiction. 3. Equity, before it would 
assert jurisidction required the raising of an equity in favour of the 
person who was seeking assistance. An integral part of that equity would 
be some prejudice or detriment to the representee. If the representee 
had suffered no loss or clearly stood to suffer no loss, if the 
representor was permitted to assert his legal rights, then there was no 
need for equity to assert jurisdiction. 
But equity did not give a clear answer to the question of the extent 
to which the prejudice suffered or likely to be suffered by the 
representee featured in the overall assessment of unconscionability. 
Despite this the more recent decisions clearly reveal the evolution of a 
requirement of detriment which, as the law stands at present, appears as 
a more specific requirement related to the position of the representee, than 
the wider unconscionability. 
2. This is especially evident in the cases founding the High Trees 
principle; Hughes v Metropolitan Railways (1887) 2 AC 439, 
Birminqham and District Land Co v London and North Western Rail Co 
(1888) 40 Ch. D. 268. 
3. As most of those cases dealt with land the detriment of the 
representee could be related to the subject matter of the property. 
Equity usually intervened to prevent the representee from being 
evicted from the property in circumstances where he would clearly 
suffer prejudice by being evicted; as for example, where he had 
improved the property with the knowledge of the landlord as in the 
Earl of Oxford's Case (1615) 1 Ch. Rep. 1, 21 ER 485, East India 
Company v Vincent (1740) 2 Alk. 83, 26 ER 415. 
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Attentfon will th.us. be. focus.ed upon the requirement of detriment~ 
and its nature and incidents, before reverting back to an assessment of 
the relationship between detriment and unconscionability and whether the 
latter merely flows from the former. 
No Cl ear Di stinction in Respect to Detr"iment as Between Different Heads 
of Estoppel 
No clear distinction has yet emerged in respect to the nature of the 
detriment required as between the various heads of estoppel. There are 
indications of a requirement of detriment as essential to the establishment 
of the several different 'breeds' of estoppel and it is not possible to 
discern any clear differences in the nature of the detriment as between 
them. This means that it seems quite acceptable to assume that detriment 
seen as essential to, for example, the establishment of High Trees 
estoppel, would be equally applicable to the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
The requirement of detriment would appear at first sight to be 
substantially an equitable concept but there is no doubt that from the 
earliest times there are indications that detriment was required as an 
ingredient of common law estoppel. 4. Most of the contemporary cases 
where detriment has been considered relevant have, indeed, invol~ed heads 
of estoppel other than the Ramsden v Dyson principle, but it is submitted 
that until some clear differentiation is made between the vari.ous heads of 
estoppel decisions made in respect to other heads on the matter of 
detriment are equally applicable to the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
4. See for example the foundation case of estoppel by representation 
Pickard v Sears (183n 6 Ad. & E. 469, which was at common law, and 
which clearly specified detriment as an ingredient of that head of 
estoppel. Moreover the concept of detriment is not limited to 
estoppel. It is clearly a requirement in other areas of law, as for 
example in the doctrine of part performance, see Viscount Dilhorne in 
Steadman v Steadman [1974J A.C. 53 6, at page. 555. Also ther~ is an 
increasing tendency for it to be incorporated into statute in New 
Zealand, see, in particular section 94B Judicature Act 1908, section 9 
(6) of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
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However Lord Denning has expressed the vi.ew that where there has 
been a s'pecific representation it is sufffci:e,nt merely ff the representee 
acts upon the representatfon, that is he has conducted his affafrs on 
the basi s of the repres'entati on and that it is immateri a 1 whether he has 
suffered any detriment by so doi.ng. 5. He thus sees a clear distinction 
between the requirement in cases of an express representation where,simple 
acting on the promise may suffice and cases of acquiescence where detriment 
may be a requirement. 6. This distinction does not seem to have received 
widespread acceptance but was recognised by Robert Goff J ih SOti~te 
Italo-Belge v Palm Oils. 7. 
For Detriment to be Effective it Must.Have B~en Sustained in R~liahc~Upon 
the Representation of the Representor. 
It will avail the representee nothing in his attempt to call the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle into aid unless he can show that that detri.ment 
was incurred as a direct result of him relying upon the representation which 
has been made by the representor. It is not suffici:ent if he would have 
incurred the detri.ment irrespective of the conduct of the representor. 
In other words the representee must show not simply detriment but 
detrimental reliance. He must show a clear nexus between the representation 
of the representor and the detriment whi ch has befallen him or ,<"hich he is 
likely to suffer. 
5. c.f. W.J. Alan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export and ImpOrtahtCo [1972] 
2 Q.B. 189 at page 213. 
6. Seealso (1952) 15 M.L.R. 1 at page 5. 
7. Supra at page 26 
This point would appear to be well established and can be 
illustrated clearly in cases concerning landlord and tenant; 
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a lessor knowing and permitting those acts, which the lessee 
would not have done ... but upon an expectation, that the lessor 
would not throw an objection in the way of his enjoyment I 8. 
Where the lessee is already in possession it is therefore necessary to 
distinguish detriment, possibly in the way of expenditure, resulting from 
the current enjoyment of the property, which is not sufficient to amount 
to detrimental reliance, as against expenditure in anticipation of a 
larger interest, which the lessee is seeking to secure by invoking the 
Ramsde.n v Dyson principle. If the lessor has fostered an expectation of 
this larger interest any outlay in anticipation of it could amount to 
sufficient detriment. 
For this reason the representee in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool 
Victori.a Trustees Co Ltd 9. failed because the detriment which he claimed, 
in the form of expenditure for the installation of a lift, was referable 
to an existing lease of the building which the representee held and the 
belief that there was a validly exercisable option was not in any way 
created or encouraged by the representor. 
Again in the New Zealand High Court in Denny v Jensen 10. the 
re.presentee experienced di fficul ty in rel at-j ng the detriment which he there 
claimed, in the forms of expenditure to the property, to the conduct of the 
representor because the latter was able to claim that he believed it 
related to the tenancy which the tenant representee denied and not to an 
expectation of the transfer of the fee simple via a contract of sale which 
8. As per Lord El don L. C. in Darin v Spurrier (1802) 7 Ves. Jun 231 at 
page 236; also in Wi 11 mott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch. D. 96, where the 
same point arose Fry J. felt unable to say that the expenditure 
was incurred on the faith of the option rather than on the faith of 
the plaintiff's exist-jng possession of the land on which the building 
took place. 
9. [1982] 1 Q.B. 133 [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576. 
10. [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 635. 
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the, tenant was, trytng to estab 1 i.sh. The conduct of the repres.entor bad 
not contributed to the detriment of the representee. 
On the other hand it has been held sufficient in some cases that an 
active alteration of position may not be necessary and that it could be 
sufficient " ... if the person to whom the statement is made rests 
satisfied with the position taken up by him in rel iance ... II 11. 
Uncertainty as to the Standard'of'Proof of Detriment 
Consi derabl e uncertainty still pers; sts as to the burden of proof and 
the standard of proof of detrimental reliance.- This issue has surfaced in 
several recent decisions. Significantly the requirements as to the burden 
and standard of proof have tended to fluctuate in accordance witb the 
overall tendency of the judge to allowing the principle or disallowing tt. 
Two quite distinct aspects of proof present themselves. There is 
firstly the onus of proving that the acts which are relied upon as 
detriment have flowed from the representation and the standard of proof 
there required. Secondly there is the proof that those acts did, in fact, 
amount to actual detriment in the instant situation. 
There is clear conflict as to the required proof in the first aspect. 
According to Lord Eldon L.C. ' ... it must be put upon the party to prove 
that case by strong and cogent evidence: leaving no reasonable doubt, 
that he acted upon that sort of encouragement' 12. According to this the 
representee must show beyond any reasonable doubt that he acted upon the 
representation. This high standard was reiterated by White J. in the 
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New Zealand High Court in Denny v Jensen. 
11. As per Farwell J in Duncan v Kennaway and Co [1900] 1 Ch. 833 at 
page 838 cited with approval by North J in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Morris [1958] N.Z.L.R. 1126 at page 1138. 
12. Dann v Spurrier (1802) 7 Ves. Jun. 231 at page 236. 
13. [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 635 at page 639. 
1 
On the. othe.r hand Lord Denning M.R. adopted a completely different 
approach to the matter of proof. According to him I ••• ·once it is shown 
that a representation was calculated to influence the judgment of a 
reasonable man, the presumption is that he was so influenced ' 14. Thus 
if the representor has made a representation which is of such a nature that 
any reasonable man could be expected to act upon it, to his detriment, and 
indeed the representee so acts, it is then upon the representor to prove 
that the conduct of the repre.sentee was not infl uenced by the representation. 
In other words the onus is upon the representor to rebutt the presumption 
that the representee was influenced by the representation. Doubts can be 
cast upon this very low requirement as to proof placed upon the 
I representee by Lord Denni ng. Indeed Wall er L. J. also in Greas 1 ey V Cooke 
appears to demand a some.what greater requirement of proof from the 
representee and does not allow the representee the benefit of a 
presumption. According to Waller L.J. I If the defendant is to succeed she 
has to prove that she. acted to her detriment as the resul t of her bel i ef 115. 
Turning to the second aspect of proof it appears clear that once it 
is established that the representee did act upon the representation, the 
onus is upon him to prove that, in the instant circumstances, the acts 
alluded to did, in fact, amount to a detriment to him. 16. 
In regard to the actual standard of proof required to secure the 
necessary detriment the decisions so far do not proffer much in the way 
of specific guidelines. The decisions appear to indicate that generally, 
apart that is from the decision of the New Zealand High Court in HOllidge 
v Bank of New Zealand l7 . that this standard is not set very high. In 
14. Greasley v Cooke [1980J 3 All E.R. 710 at page 713 citing from his 
own judgment in the. earlie.r case of Brikom InVestments Ltd'll Carr 
[1979J 1 Q.B. 467. 
15. [1980] 3 All E.R. 710 at page 710 citing with approval from the judgment of the Court below. 
16. lIt is I think clear that the onus of proof under s 94B rests on the 
payee. It is for him to demonstrate that repayment would be. 
inequitable' as per Hardie Boys J. iri Hollidgev Bank of New Zealand 
(High Court, Nelson, 28 March 1982, (M 1840) page 9) 
17. supra. 
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thj,s, 1;ls,pect the English deci.sions appear to indicate a cleavage from the 
New Zealand. While the English judges have accorded little consideration 
to this issue and apparently require only a minimal standard of proof the 
very few New Zealand cases seemingly indicate a much high standard of 
proof. As indicated above this may reflect differing overall attitudes 
11 ' . t 1 18. to a oWlng es oppe . 
A Contingent Detriment Will be Sufficient 
It is clear that the prejudice to the representee can be potential 
and need not be actual or liquidated, in order to satisfy the 
requirement of detriment. This was aptly illustrated by the Court of 
Appeal decision in Greasley v Cooke 19. where the representor had 
attempted to plead that there had been no detriment to the representee, in 
ordering her from the house property in dispute, because she had not 
outlayed any expenditure on the property. 
Lord Denning M.R. in rejecting Snell's proposition. that 'A must have 
incurred some expenditure or otherwise have prejudiced himself' 20. did 
not consider such expenditure necessary but regarded it sufficient 'if 
the party to whom the assurance is given acts on the faith of it, in such 
circumstances that it would be unjust and inequitable for the party making 
the assurance to go back upon it' 21. 
18. C.f. e.g., the decision of the New Zealand High Court in Hollidge 
v Bank of New Zealand supra, with that of the English Court of 
Appeal in Avon County Council v Howlett (1983) 1 All ER 1073, on 
very similar facts. Both these cases are referred to infra, ibid 
chapter. For a consideration of what would amount to adequate 
detriment see under·the subheading 'The Nature of the Detriment 
Required' ibid chapter, infra. This will indicate the relatively 
1 imited nature of the detriment required as well as the somewhat 
contradictory factors within it. 
19. supra 
20. 27 edition page 565. 
21. As per Lord Denning M.R. [1980] 3 All ER at page 713. 
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This confirms the expectationary or contingent nature which the 
detriment can assume. It is not only the loss which the representee has 
sustained so much as the potential loss which he might sustain should the 
representor be permitted to resile. 22. 
It ;s no barrier to the successful pleading of detrimental reliance 
that the representee has imposed upon the benevolence of the representor, 
or that a mutually satisfactory relationship of a social nature has 
subsisted between the parties for years. 23. It is no barrier that the 
representee has benefited from the representations and made all that he 
possibly could from the desirable situation which the representor had 
created. The detriment is sustained in the prejudice which would result 
to the representee from the breaking of the relationship between the parties, 
provided, that is, that the break will result in the representor resiling 
from the expectation which he has raised in the mind of the representee. 
That detriment can be based upon contingent loss was clearly brought 
out by Lord Denning in Greasley v Cooke. However the other two judgments 
which were handed down in that case do not directly stress this pOint. 24. 
22. It would appear that this approach to the detriment necessary differs 
somewhat from that required to secure the part performance of a 
contract, where, it seems, that something more in the nature of an 
actual liquidated detriment must exist before specific performance 
will be decreed; see for example Steadman v Steadman [1976] A.C. 
536, Lord Reid at page 540, and Lord Simon at pages 558 and 565. 
23. In many instances, for example, the representee had been in possession 
of the property of the representor and had resided in the property 
for years at little or no expense; Greasley v Cooke [1980] 3 All E.R. 
710; Pascoe v Turner [1979] 2 All ER 945; Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 
Q.B. 29. 
24. Indeed Waller L.J. would appear to support the view that detriment 
must be based upon what has been done, see [1980] 3 All. E.R. at page 
714. . 
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It must be admitted that basing the required detriment upon a possible 
contingent liability is not without its difficulties. There does not 
appear to be much in the way of authority to support Lord Denningls view. 25 . 
What he has done is to sUbstitute an injustice and an inequity for actual 
detriment. This could mean that a very substantial amount of judicial 
discretion would enter -into the assessment of any possible potential 
detriment and it would seem not to be possible to lay down clear rules 
whereby executed acts could be assessed as to whether or not they qualified 
as sufficient detriment. Such an exercise probably could be carried out 
if the detriment was based upon an actual sustained loss. As the law 
stands at present the issue of detriment is very substantially one of fact. 
One decision which shows the difference between the requirement of an 
executed detriment as against a contingent detriment is that in Crabb v 
Arun District Council· 26. The landowner representee, in reliance upon a 
representati on made to him by the Di stri ct Council, that he wou 1 d be 
granted access over Council property to a block of land which he owned, sold 
off another piece of property which meant that he was entirely 
upon the access promised by the Council. The Council then resiled from the 
representation which it had previously made. It is difficult to see that 
the representee could have recovered upon the basis of executed detriment 
becallsehe had~ simply;notsustai,nedarw .. His detriment, which was the possible 
loss of any access at all to his land, was completely contingent upon the 
Council not granting the access which it had promised. 
25. Lord Denning did cite by way of support the two recent Court of Appeal 
decisions upon which he deliberated, Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings 
[1976]Q.B. 225, .Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch. 179. This 
approach emphasising contingent detr"iment would also appear to be 
supported by Dixon J. in the High Court of Australia in Grundt v The" 
Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1938) 59 CLR 641, where he said I ••• 
the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection 
is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption 
were deserted that led to it l This was cited with approval by Hardie 
Boys J. in the High Court of New Zealand in Hollidge v Bank of New 
Zealand (High Court, Nelson, 28 March 1982 (M 1840) at page 5) 
26. [1976] Ch. 179 
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Although neither Crabb v Arun District Council nor Greas1ey v 
Cooke appear to have been brought to the attention of the New Zealand 
High Court in Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand the approach of Haride Boys J. 
in that case would appear to confinn the approach of Lord Denning that 
detriment can be based upon a contingent loss. 27. 
The Nature of The Detriment Required 
Understandably the courts have not sought to restrict in any way the 
actual acts which can amount to detrimental reliance. It being an issue of 
fact the representee is granted virtually an open ended option as to what 
he submits as being to his detriment. 
Although in many instances the expenditure of money is relied upon 28. 
it is clear that 'that is not a necessary element' 29 The expenditure of 
money could amount toa sufficient detriment if, by resiling from his 
representation, the representor would prevent the representee from enjoying 
the benefit of his expenditure. But the required detriment is most 
certainly not limited to a situation in which the representee has expended 
money. 
There is a consistent line of authority to the effect that the prospect 
of the removal of a representee from possession of a house property 
following representations to the effect that he would be permitted to remain 
in occupation, will amount to sufficient detriment. 30. This can also apply 
to other property, such as a farm. 31. 
27. For a more detailed consideration of Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand 
see under the subheading 'The Nature of the Detriment Required' ibid 
chapter, infra. 
28. As in Pascoe v Turner supra but this was accompanied by the prospect 
of the loss of possession of the property should the legal rights of 
the representor be permitted to prevail. 
29. As per Lord Denning in Greasley v Cooke supra at page 713. 
30. See e.g. Pascoe v Turner (supra) Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29; 
Griffiths v Williams (1977) 248 E.G. 947. 
31. As in Beech v Beech (High Court, Wellington, 24 February 1982, 
(A No. 144/80) Jefferies J.) 
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Detrimental reliance could also arise where the representee, 
relying upon the representation, disposes of part of his land without being 
able to obtain access to the remainder except over the land of the 
representor.· That is the prospect of the land being rendered unless by the 
discarding of the representation can suffice. 32 . 
The question is raised as to whether the detrimental reliance must be 
of such a nature as to clearly relate to, the property which is the subject 
matter of the dispute. 33. While it is true that most of the successful 
cases have involved situations where the detriment can be related to 
property which stands at the centre of the lis, there is no clear judicial 
indication that the concept is so limited, and the fact that most 
successful representees have related their detriment to property could well 
be the result of what might be termed simple Isituational logistics l • 
It is usually much easier to demonstrate detriment, when for example, one 
is in possession of property and could be required to move than in a case 
where one is seeking the performance of a promise which is completely 
executory, that ;s has not been acted upon at all. In Habib Bank Ltd v 
Habib Bank AG Zurich 34. the Ramsden v Dyson principle was called into aid 
to provide a defense against an action in the tort of passing off. The 
detriment which would have been suffered there by the representee, had he 
not succeeded, rested in him not being permitted to continue to use the 
name of the Bank which the representor had permitted him to use for some 
years. There would no doubt have been some financial loss and disruption 
to the business activity of the representee. 
32. As in Crabb v Arun District Council (supra) 
33. C.f. the doctrine of part performance where the delivery and 
acceptance of the property, the subject matter of the contract, in 
other words the fact that the contract was executed, was generally 
regarded as conclusive part performance, sufficient to allow the 
doctrine in and thus enable the court to grant a decree of specific 
performance. 
34. [1981] 2 All ER 650, see also Pascol Ltd v Trade Lines Ltd [1982] 1 
Lloyd1s Rep. 456. 
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Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand 35. provides one of the few instances 
where detrimental reliance has received relatively definitive treatment by 
the courts. This was an action not involving real property and was decided 
aga inst the representee. In Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand the Bank had 
incorrectly credited the sum :of $1,133.68 to the account of its customer 
Hollidge, who was the representee. Hollidge had telephoned the Bank to 
query the credit and it was confirmed by a clerk of the Bank that it was 
'his money' His grandmother had died in England about a year before and 
he bel i eved that the amount cou ld have been a bequest from her wi 11 . He 
then proceeded to spend the money upon, paying off creditors, ordinary 
living expenses, and the purchase of a new machine for his wordworking 
business. The amount had been credited to the representee's account in 
April 1978 and it was not until January 1979 that the error was discovered 
whereupon the Bank immediately debited the account and allowed the 
representee overdraft accommodation to a 1 imit of $1.150 and it payed 
another two cheques of the representee. Thereafter the representee did not 
operate the account and the Bank sought to recover, in an action based 
upon quasi contract, the debit balance in the representee's account. The 
representee raised the defences of estoppel and section 94B of the 
Judicature Act 1908. 
There is no doubt that a clear representation was made in this 
instance. The entry in the bank statement, which was confirmed by the 
telephone conversation, was conceded as sufficient to found an estoppel. 
Indeed 'counsel were agreed and that all the i ngred i ents necessary to 
constitute such an estoppel existed in this case save one' 36. The one that 
was missing was that 'the representee has in some way acted to his 
prejudice on the faith of his supposed right to enjoy the benefit of such 
payments or credits' 37. 
35. (High Court Nelson, 28 March 1982 (M 1840) Hardie Boys J) 
36 .. Supra at page 3 
37. per Hardie-Boys J. citing with approval Spencer-Bower and Turner 
'Es toppe 1 by Re8resentati on' 3rd ed. London, Butterworths, 1977 page 
296. Ibid. 
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The District Court~ which had heard the issue at first instance ~ 
held that this requirement had not been met because the appellant had not 
satisfted the Court that las a consequence of the representation he had 
altered his mode of living' nor had the appellant satisfied the Court that 
it would be inequitable for him to be required to repay the money. 
The decision of the High Court in Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand rested 
substantially upon one authority and that was the decision of the Queens 
Bench Division in United Overseas Bank v Jiwani. 38 . This was a decision of 
Mackenna J. which had virtually identical facts with Hol1idge v Bank of 
New Zealand~ and where it was held that the representee must show; 
that because of his mistaken belief he changed his position in 
such a way which would make it inequitable to require him now to 
repay the money' 39. 
According to Mackenna J. three previous cases in which detrimental reliance 
was successfully pleaded could be distinguished from the present case; 
'There was reason for believing in each of these cases that the 
defendant would have acted differently if he had not mistakenly 
believed that he was richer than he was~ that because of his mistake~ 
he had. to use Goff & Jones words (The Law of Res ti tu ti on 2nd ed 
p. 555) altered his mode of living. There was the further fact in 
Holt's case that the defendant had invested part of the overpayment in 
a company which had since gone into liquidation' 40. 
38. [1977] 1 All E.R. 733. 
39. As per Mackenna J. in United Overseas Bank v Jiwani [1977] 1 All E.R. 
at page 737, cited with approval by Hardie Boys J. in Hollidge v Bank 
of New Zealand, cited supra~ page 3. 
40. As per Mackenna J. ibid at page 737 cited with approval by Hardie-
Boys J. in Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand ibid at page 4 of judgment. 
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Hardie-Boys J. confirmed the proposition set out supra that the true 
test of detrimental reliance is whether or not it would be inequitable to 
now require the representee to repay the money.41. He concluded that the 
mere spending of the money was not sufficient to establish the requisite 
detriment nor was it relevant that the representee had altered his mode of 
living. The basic issue according to Hardie-Boys J. was thus whether or 
not the representee would suffer detriment by being required to repay the 
money. Thi s bei ng an i ssu e of fact the Court concerned i tse If with the 
itemisation of the expenditure which had been outlayed by the representee 
and the nature of the debts which he had repaid as well as the effect of 
the purchase of the machinery for his business. 
T~sdecision emphasises that the onus of establishing the required 
detriment is upon the representee. He must show whether, should the 
situation be reversed, he would suffer. To what extent this suffering 
must exist before the requisite detriment is established is not by any 
means clear. Thus the reversability of the situation was regarded as a 
crucial factor and the effect of restoration upon the representee highly 
relevant. This situation thus was quite different from that, say, in 
Crabb v Arun District Council, where the failure to grant the access way 
would have had a permanent effect in rendering useless the land of the 
representee. It could not have been possible to argue such a situation in 
Ho 11 i dqe v Bank of New Zealand. 
At the same time it is not easy to reconcile this decision with others 
where the courts have, for example, considered as adequate detriment the 
prospect of losing occupation of a house property. Surely the 
inconvenience of having to repay funds is just as great as having to find 
alternate accommodation. 
41. Citing with approval from Grundt v The Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines 
Ltd (1938) 59 C.L.R. 641; 
' •.• the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give 
protection is that which would flow from the change of position 
if the assumption were deserted which led to it' 
1 
Also there is a very substantial element of subjectivity in the 
decision. It could be assumed, for example, that the financial status of 
the representee would be relevant. A wealthy customer would be more 
capable of effecting restoration than a poorer customer. It would be less 
inequitable that a rich man should be called upon to satisfy restoration 
as against the same demand being made of a poor man. Paradoxically it 
appears possible that Hollidge might have been more successful in pleading 
detriment had a very large sum, which he could never possibly have repaid, 
been credited or if he had completely lost the money in a gambling bout. 
Moreover the minute consideration which the Court found compelled to make, 
of the financial state of the representee does not appear to be a very 
firm foundation upon which to build durable and broadly applicable legal 
principles. 
It would be very difficult to ascertain the point at which the 
detrimental reliance crystallises to the extent that it can be rectified 
42 only be the permanent exclusion of the rights of the representor. . 
The prospect of the rectification of the detriment and the resumption of 
the status quo means that the detriment to the representee would have to 
be measured very delicately against the detriment to the representor 
in having his rights permanently expunged. The reversability of the 
situation does not appear to have been given much consideration in previous 
cases. 43. However in Norto"1 k County Counci 1 v Secretary of State for the 
Environment 44. where the Council was able to cancel an order which it had 
made for machinery and thus revert to the status quo this did provide a 
basis for the finding of the Court. 
42. C.f. Fu Kai Sun v Chan Fui Hi [1951] A.C. 489. 
43. C.f. the operation of detrimental reliance in cases dealing with the 
applicability of the doctrine of part performance in contract. Although 
it is generally conceded that some detriment is required of the party 
seeking specific performance the courts have never been inhibited in 
applying the doctrine even when it was clear that the position of the 
parties could very readily have been restored to what it had been before 
the conclusion of the contract. 
44. [1973] 3 All E.R. 673. 
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It seems that extraneous forces entered into the judgment in 
Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand. It could be argued that the Court was 
there concerned to maintain a balance between unjust enrichment on the one 
hand as against detriment to the representee on the other. There would 
appear to be a general move on the part of the New Zealand Courts to limit 
any evolution of a broad head of law which would permit unjust .' 
enrichment. 45. It is true that here the Bank simply made a mistake and 
it is not unreasonable to conjecture the possibility of some vast sum being 
credited to an account in error, thus giving the customer an unwarranted 
windfall. 46. Significantly the precedents resorted to in both Hollidge 
v Bank of New Zealand and United Overseas Bank v Jiwani did not extend to 
cases beyond the banking arena and it would be possible to limit the 
precedent effect of Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand to cases dealing with 
banking and suchlike activity. But there is nothing, of course, to prevent 
these rules being extended to a wider arena. 47. 
45. [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 124, and especially at page 144 et seq. 
46. This consideration appears to be more evident in Overseas Bank v 
Jiwani, where Mackenna J. did, for example put to counsel for the 
representee the possibility of the representee purchasing a gilt-
edged security which rose in value as between the time of purchase 
and the time the error was discovered. With respect it would appear 
that, assuming the amount of the incorrect credit was recoverable by 
the bank, any profit made by the representee dealing with the money 
would have given rise to a constructive trust in favour of the bank. 
47. One is inclined to conjecture whether the customer would have been 
any more successful had he based his action upon simple tortious 
negligence on the part of the bank. Most certainly in Hollidge v 
Bank of Neltl Zealand the representee had attempted to confirm the 
accuracy of the balance and this ought surely to have been sufficient 
to place the Bank upon inquiry and that fact that it took no inquiry 
would appear to indicate negligence. The preference for estoppel as 
against negligence would probably rest in the proof of a duty of care 
on the part of the bank which would have been necessary for a 
successful action in negligence. For a further explanation of the 
high standard of detriment required, in Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand 
see under subheading 'Conclusion Detriment and Independent Requirement 
etc' ibid chapter, infra. 
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Taking an overall view of the decision in Hollidge v Bank of New 
Zealand the conclusion which one must arrive at is that the representor 
Bank appears to have been placed in a somewhat favourable position as 
compared with the' representors who have been prepared to allow the 
representee into possession of property. 48. 
It has been held that a mere act of indulgence is insufficient and 
there must be a clear alteration of position in reliance upon the waiver. 
Thus in the New Zealand case of McCathie v McCathie 49. the remission of 
part of the purchase price of a farm was held insufficient. In view of 
subsequent decisions it is submitted that this view is too narrow and that 
a vital consideration is the detriment likely to ensue to the representee 
from being compelled to restore the waiver. 
No Division of the Detriment; Unjust Enrichment May Arise Because No Pro 
Tanto Effect of Estoppel. 
The decision of the New Zealand High Court in Hollidge v Bank of New 
Zealand can be contrasted with that of the English Court of Appeal in Avon 
County Council v Howlett. 50. The facts were somewhat similar. The 
representor County Council had made overpayments of wages to its employee, 
Howlett, who was the defendant in the action, for the restitution of the 
money paid by mistake. The conditions for estoppel by representation had 
been satisfied. However when assessing detriment it was found upon the 
evidence, that it would not be unjust for the representee to be required 
to repay part of the overpayment. That is that part which he had not spent, 
as only part of the money had been expended, and the balance remained in 
a bank account. 
48. As for example in, Inwards v Baker [1965]2 Q.B. 29 Griffiths v Williams 
[1977] 248 E.G. 947; Pascoe v Turner [1979] 2 All E.R. 945; Greasley 
v Cooke [1980] 3 All E.R. 710; Beech v Beech (High Court Wellington 
24 February 1982, (A No. 144/80) Jefferies J). 
49. [1971] N.Z.L.R. 58. 
50. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1073. 
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But the Court of Appeal found itself unable to apply estoppel so as to 
have a pro tanto effect which meant that the representee was not required 
to repay any amount of the overpayment of wages. The end result was that 
the representee enjoyed unjust enrichment, a result of the mistake of his 
employer, to the extent of that part of the overpayment which, without 
injustice, he could well have repaid. 
In other words the Court found itself unable to partition the detriment 
as between the parties. According to Cumming-Bruce L.J. I ••• it is not easy 
to determine whether and when the court will restrict the effect of an 
estoppel if to apply it with the full rigour will clearly produce injustice ' 
51. He went on to point out that in R.E.Jones Ltd,vWaring & Gillow Ltd 52. 
Viscount Cave L.C. 'evidently thought that the court should find a way of 
preventing a party so using estoppel as to make a profit' 53. 
The approach of the Court of Appeal in Avon County Council v Howlett 
can be seen in contrast so that of the New Zealand High Court in Hollidge 
v Bank of New Zealand. Although it was clearly aware of the need to 
establish detriment, and, indeed, did allude to the somewhat destitute 
position of the payee representee, it .did not engage in the prolix 
assessment of the position of the representee which was found necessary by 
the New Zealand Court. Instead it took a much broader view of the situation. 
One is inclined to conjecture what the position would have been had 
the payee stood to ,gain a considerable fortune as a result of the over-
payment. There does not appear to be any theoretical objection to the 
court engaging in a partitioning of the detriment. There must surely be 
situations where the detriment suffered by the representor must become 
relevant and be taken into account by the court. This would be especially 
true in cases where the representor stood to suffer a greater loss than 
that of the representee. 
51. ibid at page 1075. 
52. [1926] A.C. 670. [1926] All E.R. Rep 36. 
53. [1983] 1 All E.R. at page 1075. 
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The quite flexible remedies which have been devised to satisfy the 
equity when estoppel had been successfully pleaded would indicate that the 
same degree of flexibility could be exercised in this area and the 
detriment opporti oned as between the parties. In Avon County Counci 1 v 
Howlett this would have resulted in the employee being required to repay 
only a part of the overpayments which he had received by mistake. 
The Nexus Between the Res Gestae and the Representation. 
Usually the detriment which the representee complains of will derive 
from the res gestae - things done - in reliance upon the representation of 
the representor. It is essential that there should be a connection between 
the conduct of the representor and the acts which the representee had 
executed in reliance upon that conduct, and which give rise to the detriment. 
There must be a causal relationship between the representation, which is the 
subject of the estoppel and the acts of the representee performed in reliance 
upon that representation. The representee must have suffered detriment while 
acting upon the representation of the representor; it is not sufficient if 
the detriment is suffered while acting upon his own belief. 54. Also it 
is not sufficient if the representation merely provides an occasion for the 
conduct of the representee. The representee must, if he is relying upon a 
mere representation, show that it was because of the representation of the 
representor that he suffered loss. To illustrate the requirement in the 
converse; that had not it been for the representation he would have 
suffered no loss. 55. It is not sufficient if the representee would have 
54. Western Fish Products v Penwith District Council [1981] 2 All E.R. 204, 
at page 217. 
55. According to Spencer-Bower and Turner 'The Law Relating to Estoppel b,y 
Representation' 3rd. ed. London, Butterworths, 1977, paragraph 76, a 
causal relationship is equally applicable in those cases where silence 
is relied upon by the representee as in those instances where he 
relies upon an express representation. 
1 
taken the action in any event, irrespective of the representation. 56. 
It would appear that a quite high standard is required in the proof 
of the causal connection. The courts can require a clear and strict 
relationship between the two to be proved. 57. But there has been no 
attempt to extend this relationship to the level of sophistication of the 
lunequivocally referable test l as has been required in the application of 
the doctrine of part performance in the common law of contract. 
The causal connection would appear, in many cases, to merge into the 
detrimental reliance itself. Had the representee customer in Holli v 
Bank of New Zealand, for example, been a man of substance and been able to 
meet all the commitments, which he had in fact met from the amount of the 
incorrect credit to his account, from other sources, and simply left the 
incorrect credit in his account, neither the detrimental reliance itself 
nor the causal relationship would have come into existence. 
Had the representee left the amount in the account but entered into 
commitments with other funds upon the understanding that he had 'the amount 
in his account it would probably have been very difficult for him to prove 
any causal connection because the decision to enter into the committment 
because the incorrect credit stood in his account would have been entirely 
subjective to his mind and may not have lent itself to any external 
evidence. Problems of this nature which can face the representee in his 
proof of causal connection were brought out by Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions 
Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. (1981)2 W.L.R. 576, where the 
56. IHe (the representee) said he bought timber which was necessary in 
any event l as per Hardie-Boys J. in Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand 
supra at page 7. 
57. I ... the appellant had not satisfied him that he had as a consequence 
of the representati on "a ltered hi s mode of 1 ivi nglll 
and 
as per Hardi e Boys J. in Holl idge v Bank of New Zealand supra, at 
page 3 of judgment. 
he must show that because of his mistaken belief he changed his 
position 
ibid, citing in support MacKenna J. in United Overseas Bank v 
Jiwani [1977] 1 All E.R. 733 at page 737. 
1 
representee sought to proffer as detrimental reliance, expenditure upon 
business premises which he claimed he had undertaken in the expectation 
of having the right to exercise an option for a renewal of the lease. 
But as Oliver J. stated I ••• what is there to indicate that the work was 
undertaken "on the faith of" that belief. rather than merely "in" that 
belief. I 58. The unexpired portion of the lease had some eighteen years 
still to run and the res gestae was equally referable to the unexpired 
portion of the lease, still to run, as to the expectation of the exercise 
of the option thus giving rise to continued occupation of the premises. 
Thus assuming that I •••• it must be put upon the party to prove that case 
by strong and cogent evidence; leaving no reasonable doubt, that he acted 
upon that sort of encouragement I 59. i t.woul d appear that the representee 
will not succeed in proving the causal connection where his res gestae is 
equally referable to any other motivating force as well as to the 
representation of the representor. 
No clear rules emerge from the decided cases beyond that some 
relationship is required to be shown between the res gestae and the 
representation. As with detrimental reliance itself it would appear in 
many practical situations it is purely a matter of chance whether the 
representee is able to satisfy this requirement. 
Assessment of Detriment. 
Few cases have rested entirely upon detr";mental reliance and the one 
recent decision which was based upon this concept, that is Hollidge v 
Bank of New Zealand, does not present anything like a contribution to the 
systematisation of the concept. 
58. [1982] 1 O.B. 133 page 156. 
59. As per Lord Eldon in Dann v Spurrier (1802) 7 Ves. Jun. 231 at page 
236; cited with approval by Oliver J. in Taylors Fashions Ltd v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 O.B. 133 at page 156. 
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The following propositions would appear to follow from the decided 
cases. Detrimental reliance, in some form or other, would appear to be 
an essential prerequisite of all heads of estoppel including the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. The courts will require that the res guestae giving 
rise to the detriment is the result of the representee relying upon the 
representation of the representor. There must be a proximate cause between 
the conduct of the two parties. This again would appear to be a requirement 
of every head of estoppel but, as yet, the courts have not endowed this 
notion with any high degree of sophistication. The cases clearly indicate 
conflict in regard to the nature of the detriment required and in 
particular as to whether or not it is relevant that the situation is 
reversible. 
Detrimental reliance is an aspect of estoppel which clearly illustrates 
that estoppel can operate in favour of parties who fail to secure their 
expectations with a rigid compliance with conveyancing requirements. This 
could be because, l-ike lY1iss Cooke, they are bereft of professional advice 
or negotiating skill, or they are carried along by the exigencies of the 
moment and are prepared to rely, in blissful faith, upon the word of the 
representor. 
On the other hand it would appear that this aspect of the estoppel 
could infuse a very substantial element of fortuitousness into its 
application. A representee may, in good faith, act upon the representation 
and whether or not those acts amounted to sufficient detriment would be 
largely at the discretion of the court. On the other hand, once the 
concept of detrimental reliance became reasonably systematised, it would 
be possible for a representee, with astute legal advice, to deliberately 
place himself in a position which he knew would be treated by the courts 
as sufficient detriment, thus securing his title as against the 
representor. It is even possible to envisage conveyancing techniques 
evolving which would have the effect of securing the enforceability of 
the representation~ thus serving to create something in the nature of a 
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contract out of what was initially nothing more than a gratuitous promise. 
While such practices would never be condoned by a court of equity 
evidential problems may face a representor who tried to prove this in a 
modern court. At the same time the representee who either through indolence, 
ignorance, lack of legal advice, or whatever, fails to secure the 
requisite detriment could well be left without a remedy, at least in 
estoppel. 
The decisions handed down so far do not leave us with any very clear 
distinction between the mere acting upon a promise and detriment as a 
result of acting. As indicated above what actually amounts to detriment 
as against the mere acting upon a representation, is very subjective to 
the opinion of the court. This serves to infuse a substantive element of 
mora 1 i ty into the app 1 i cati on of the es toppe 1 and one cou 1 d challenge the 
propriety of such a situation. 
In view of the relative absence of established rules in many areas of 
estoppel it is not difficult to conceive of a point being reached where 
detrimental reliance assumes the status of providing a basis for the 
application of estoppel~ This is especially so if estoppel is regarded 
as la principle of justice and of equity'. The Ijustice and equity I will 
rest essentially in the detriment which the representee has suffered. If 
the rules pertaining to the required detrimental reliance are not 
prescribed by the courts its application must essentially rest upon the 
subjective judgment of the individual court. This being so it is 
inevitable that judgments of morality and social value must assume a 
substantial role in the administration of the estoppel. 
The courts do not appear to have concerned themselves with balancing 
the detriment of one party against the possible detriment to the other. 
If justice and equity ;s to form the basis for the application of the 
principle itis reasonable to assume that the courts would deny relief 
under the estoppel in those instances where to do so would cause detriment 
to the representor which was out of proportion of that which would be 
caused to the representee by not allowing the estoppel. 
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Conclusion. Detriment an Independant Requirement or Merely an Aspect of 
a Wider Requirement of Unconscionability? 
Reverting now to the question posed at the commencement of this 
chapter; is the requ i rement of detriment merely an aspect of a wi der 
concept of unconscionability which is necessary before the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle can be invoked, or must the representee establish both detriment 
and unconscionability? On the other hand is the true test unconscionability 
rather than detriment? 
As has been indicated it is possible to ascertain detriment in 
vi rtua 11y every instance where the Ramsden v Dyson pri nci p 1 e, and indeed 
estoppel in its wider aspects, has been successfully invoked. Until this 
detriment can be seen as encumbered with specific rules of its own it 
appears best vi ewed as but an aspect of the wi der unconsci onabil ity. That 
is the representee must show that he has or wi 11 suffer detriment shoul d 
the representor be permitted to resile from the expectation which he has 
raised. Without the detriment there can be no equity in favour of the 
representee and thus no jurisdiction to intervene. Once having established 
detriment the court will then make an assessment of the overall situation 
as to unconsci onabi 1 ity, taki ng into account the detriment of the 
representee. 
This approach which regards the detriment as but one aspect of the 
wider unconscionability appears to be confirmed by Robert Goff J. in 
Societe Italo - Belge pour. le Commerce et IIIndustrie SA v Palm and 
Vegetable Oils .(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd liThe Post Chaser ll 60. when he adopted 
the test laid down by Lord Cairns L.C. in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Co 61. to the effect that the representor will not be allowed to enforce 
his rights Iwhere it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings 
60. [1982J 1 All ER 19 
61. (1877) 2 App Cas 439. [1874-80] All E.R. Rep 187. 
which have taken place between the parties' 62. 
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It must be admitted that Hardie Boys J. in Hollidge v Bank of New 
Zealand appears to have taken a much more precise view of detriment than 
his English counterparts. But even in that decision the detriment could 
be construed as part of a wider assessment of unconscionability. What 
Hardiie-Boys J. appeared to be sayi ng is that even although there may be 
detriment it would not be unconscionable for the money to be repaid. 
The overall assessment of the contemporary law upon this point is 
that it is sti 11 in such a diffused and unsystemati sed state as to give the 
courts an almost unlimited discretion as to how they apply it. 
Some of the dicta upon detriment can with respect be described as 
unfortunate. The view, for example, that mere acting upon the 
expectation ts adequate is clearly not appropriate to the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle even if, and this seems doubtful, it is appropriate in cases 
where the estoppel is founded upon an express representation. Clearly 
more is required than merely acting on the expectation. 
It appears certain that resting satisfied in the status quo, as a 
result of the expectation, will be sufficient, if as a result of the 
representor resiling from that expectation the representee stands to suffer 
detriment, That is a loss or potential loss resulting from abstaining 
from acting can be a sufficient detriment providing that abstaining is a 
direct result of the expectation. Thus it is submitted that to talk of 
'change of position' or 'change of circumstances' can be misleading. 63. 
The wider expression 'detriment' far more accurately describes the 
requirement. To talk of a change of position could be accurate if what is 
referred to is not so much the change of position resulting from the 
representee relying upon the expectation but rather the change of 
62. (1877) 2 App. Cas. 439 at page 448, (1874-80) All ER Rep 187 at page 
191. . 
63. C.f. Jones G,H. 'Change of Circumstance in Quasi-Contract' (1957) 
73 L.Q.R. 49. 
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circumstqnce which would flow from the representor deserting the 
expectation which he has raised. 
The statement of Dixon J. in the High Court of Australia in Grundt 
v Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines Ltd. 64. has stood the test of time; 
'In stating this essential condition, it is often said simply 
that the party asserting the estoppel must have oeen induced to act 
to his detriment. Although substantially such a statement is 
correct , •• it does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the 
doctrine. That purpose is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the 
party asserting the estoppel by compe 11 i ng the opposite party to 
adhere to the assumption upon which the former party acted or 
abstained from acting. This means that the real detriment or 
harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would 
flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted 
that led to it, So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party 
who altered his situation upon the faith of it cannot complain' 65. 
rt is noted that the concept of 'change of circumstance' is not limited 
to estoppel but is also to be found as a defence in the English law of 
restitution. 66, If there is any development of estoppel along with 
development of detriment within the area of restitution there could be 
a tendency for the concept of detriment as developed in this other area 
to be translated and applied in Ramsden v Dyson cases. 
However the view has been expressed that I ••• the quantum of detriment 
necessary to establish an estoppel is less than that necessary to establish 
64. (1938) 59. C.L.R. 641. 
65. Ibid at page 674. 
66. See also sections 94A, 94B Judicature Act 1908 for the New Zealand 
Law. See also section 142 of the U.S. Restatement of Restitution. 
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the defence of change in circUJ]lstances~ Un re$tituionL J.n th.e 
estoppel cases the English courts have been concerned more with the 
element of representation than with detriment. Any detriment will do; 
and in the recent quasi-estoppel line of cases it is difficult to 
discover any detriment suffered by the representee 67. 
This could provide an explanation of the apparently, extraordinarily 
high standard of detriment required of the representee in Hollidge v Bank 
of New Zealand where although the issue was determined basically upon 
estoppel the Court there applied the quantum of detriment established as 
applying to restitution cases. 68. 
A more precise differentiation of the quantum and nature of _ 
detriment as between estoppel and restitution cases will probably be an 
issue which future courts will be required to address. As the law stands 
at present it would appear that so far as estoppel is concerned a 
representee who attempts to found his detriment upon money wrongfully 
received, and subsequently paid over, is in a much worse position than a 
representee who can fall back upon other forms of detriment. This would 
appear to be especially so in respect to the attitude of the New Zealand 
courts. 
67. Jones G.H. OPt cit. at page 56. 
68. The Court in Hollidge v Bank of New Zealand clearly recognised a 
general distinction between estoppel and section 94B of the 
Judicature Act. But this raises a much wider question of the 
availability of both section 948 and estoppel as defences to an 
action in restitution under current New Zealand law. 
Chapter Nine 
REMEDIES: PROPRIETARY RIGHTS DERIVING FROM THE 
RAMSDEN V DYSON PRINCIPLE 
Introduction:· Remedy Not Limited But at Di screti on of Court 
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Recent decisions have thrown considerable light upon the nature 
of the remedies and rights which can be obtained from a successful 
reliance upon the Ra~sden v Dyson principle. The overall general 
effect of these decisions is to show that the rights which can derive 
from the principle are virtually unlimited. It does not appear 
possible to clearly systematise the nature or parameters of the 
remedies which ~can flow from the estoppel. A few points are, however, 
clear. 
The principle can give rise to the established equitable and common 
law remedies such as injunction and de.mages. Unlike part perfor-
mance in the law of contract the relief is not confined to any speci-
fic remedy. No remedy like the specific performance of the expectation 
which was raised by tne representor has been evolved. Any remedy 
therefore is notlimfted to simply making good the expectation which 
was raised by the representor. Instead the courts will, it appears, 
in each case determine now best the equity may be satisfied. How they 
do so is apparently completely at their discretion. This raises the 
issue of whether or not there is any specific proprietary right which 
derives from the principle. The decisions would appear to indicate 
that rather than according satisfaction to any specific proprietary 
right the remedies awarded have been tailored to fit the wrong suffered 
by the representee. The remedies which have been provided are thus 
of a highly idiosyncratic nature. 
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It should be emphasised that the Ramsden v Dyson princ.iple is not 
limited to the creation of a proprietary right in the prpperty of 
another. In many instances the representee will not be seeking the 
creation of a proprietary right in his favour but will be desiring 
merely to use the principle as a defence against an action by another. 
However it is in its ability to create a proprietary right that we 
see the Ramsden V Dyson principle at its most aggressive. It is in 
this respect that a clear distinction between the Ramsden v Dyson 
prinCiple and other heads of estoppel becomes; obvious. 
The Proprietary Rights Deriving from the Principle Arise From An 
Assessment of the Nature and Extent of the Equity. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Pascoe v Turner confirmed 
also that as well as 'taking into account all relevant circumstances' 
in determining the remedy available to the representee, the courts 
will also consider all relevant circumstances in determining the 
nature and extent of the equity. It is this which gives rise to the 
proprietary right which the representee has in the property. 
Pascoe v Turner indicated that there is virtually no limit to the 
extent to which the courts can range in order to assess the nature of 
the equity and its consequent proprietary right. These circumstances 
can be quite unrelated to the conduct of the representor but pertain 
to the personal conditions of the representee. In Pascoe v Turner it 
will be recalled, the male party to a defacto relationship was 
attempting to oust the woman from a house property he had promised her. 
In Pascoe v Turner three possibil ities by way of proprietary inter-
est presented themselves. Firstly there could be a beneficial inter-
est deriving from the I constructive I trust arising from the 'words and 
1 
conduct of the parties 11. Secondly, the representee could be granted 
a licence to occupy the property for life, that is a life interest in 
the property. As at the date of the hearing the representee had 
merely a licence revocable at will. The third alternative available 
to the court was to actually perfect the gift, that was grant speci-
fic performance of the expectation raised, and order the transfer of 
the fe.e simple. 
The court in assessing the circumstances of the case placed con-
siderable emphasfs upon the physical circumstances of the representee. 
? It recognised that the representee was 'a widow in her mid fifties'~' 
that rduring the p~riod she lived with the plaintiff her capital was 
reduced from .... ' lsave for her invalidity pension that was all that 
she had in the world' and most significantly, focusing upon the 
conduct of the representor,. 'The history of the conduct of the plaintiff 
in relation to these proceedings leads to an irresistible infer-
ence that he is determined to pursue his purpose of evicting her from 
the house by any legal means at his disposal with a ruthless disregard 
of the obligations binding on conscience. The court must grant a 
remedy effective to protect her against the future manifestations of 
his ruthlessness,3. The court then went on to consider that if she 
. _. 
were granted a licence then she could find herself ousted by a 
purchaser for value without notice. Also if she was to go on and do 
1. This \'las the remedy found by the High Court but the Court of 
Appeal held that there was nothing in the facts from which a 
constructive trust could be inferred. 
2. As per Cumming-Bruce L.J. (1979) 2 All E.R. 945 at page 951 
3. (1979) 2 All E.R. at page 951 
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further repairs to the property she may have to charge it and this 
would not be possible if the interest which she had was merely a 
licence. In the circumstances the court found that the equity could 
only be effectively satisfied by the representor transferring the 
fee simple to the representee thus making her the registered title 
holder. 4. The nature of the equity was thus that of registered 
proprietor. 
This decision indicates the highly specific nature 6f the particu-
lar equity and the various circumstances which contribute to that 
, 
equity. The conduct of both the parties was considered to be relevant 
as well as their individual circumstances. The court was intent in 
protecting not only the immediate interest of the representee in the 
property but also in securing her future· interest in the property. 
No SpecifiC ProprietarY Right Derives from The Ramsden v [}yson Principle 
If the equity founding the estoppel is specific to the parties 
then it follows that the proprietary right deriving from the equity is 
also peculiar to the parties. The proprietary right is therefore, 
like the remedy, idiosyncratic and not possessed of any predetermin-
able form. The nature of the particular proprietary right is ascer-
tained at the discretion of the court in each individual instance. 
This, hOvlever, poses problems. One problem is the point of time 
at which the proprietary right arises. Does the right arise at the 
time the actual equity arises or does it arise only when it is speci-
fied by the Court? This could raise difficulties in respect to the 
4. In doing so Cumming-Bruce L.J. cited with approval the decision 
of the New Zealand High Court in Thomas v Thomas [1956) N.Z.L.R. 
785, ~!here the defendant representee was ordered to execute a 
proper transfer of the house property after orally abandoning 
it to his \AJife. 
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interests of third parties. A proprietary right deriving from the 
equity could be defeated by a bona fide purchaser without notice of the 
equitable interest, but what degree or quantity of notice would be 
required of the third party before the proprietary right deriving from 
the equity would be protected against the third party. If the right 
is not specified or quantified by the court this could be a difficult 
situation. If one takes PasCoe v Turneras an example, the representor 
could have sold the property with the representee in possession osten-
sibly as a tenant and with the third party una\,Jare of the proprietary 
interest of the representee. Unless the third party was aware of the 
representation made to the representee by the representor he \'JOuld 
obtain a clear title to the property. The equity could presumably 
not be enforced against him. The representee would then no doubt be 
left with an action against the representor and the court would then 
probably be required to quantify the proprietary right and award the 
appropriate compensation. But a further problem could be the question 
of whether the representor who had disposed of the property would be 
. 
liable for any further equity which may have arisen follo\~l;ng his 
disposal of the property to the third party. In some instances it is 
possible that the detrimental reliance could have taken place following 
the disposal of the property. 
Proprietary rights arising from the estoppel are transmissible. 5. 
In the pre.sent ci.rcumstances, with the nature of the right so highly 
dependant upon the discretion of the court~ it would appear probable 
that in many instances the parties would have to resort to litigation 
in order that they could ascertain precisely what was available to 
transmit. The uncertafnty of the situation is illustrated by the facts 
tn rner. Assume for exampl e that both of the parties were 
5. See E.R. Ives Investments Ltd v High I1967J 2 Q.B, 379, 
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agreed there that the representee did have a interest for life and she 
had sought to assign that interest and this assignment was agreed to 
by the representor. Would the assignee there be obtaining not a life 
interest but the fee simple unbeknown to all the parties including 
himself? 
It does appear oBvious from Pascoe v Turner that neither of the 
parties was aware of their exact proprietary rights in the property. 
Indeed the representee would have been prepared, it appears, to have 
settled for less than she obtained and the representor defeated his own 
purposes by taking the litigation to appeal. 
The vital question therefore remains whether or not the proprie-
tary rights deriving from the estoppel actually exist only after having 
been specified and quantified by the courts. The proprietary right can 
be something quite beyond the contemplation of the parties. 
The Principle Can Revest a Registered Title Under the Land Transfer 
System 
Recent decisions would appear to make it clear that the estoppel 
can deprive a party of title to property even to the extent of revest-
ing the fee simple in the representee. 
The estoppel goes back in history to a point of time considerably 
earlier than that of the Torrens system of land registration, now 
contained in the Land Transfer Act 1952 and the definitive relationship 
as between estoppel based rights and those of the registered proprietor, 
no doubt, has yet to be formulated by the courts. However there can 
be no doubt that as between the immediate parties to the estoppel the 
fact of registration will not serve to defeat a right arising from the 
estoppel. 
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There has possibly been a slight hesitation in arriving at this 
position especially by the New Zealand courts. One feels, for example, 
that in McBean v . where the representee was seeking an injunc-
tion to protect a right of way over the property of his neighbour which, 
he claimed, was based upon estoppel, the major obstacle in the way of 
the representee was the registered title in favour of the representor. 
In the later decision in Webb v Blenheim Borough Counci1 7. there 
is explicit reference to the problem of the capacity of estoppel to 
overcome a registered title. There, it will be recalled, the council 
sought to call the estoppel into aid as a (defenceto an action in 
trespass. In that case Beattie J. said, 'Apart from the difficulty 
of being faced with a guaranteed land transfer title,8. 
However any inhibitions which might have existed as to the ability 
of the principle to revest a registered title can now be regarded as 
well and truely spent. 
The New Zealand High Court decision in Thomas v Thomas9. appears 
to have established a precedent in this area and was one of the very 
few decisions relied upon, indeed the only one on this point, by the 
English Court of Appeal in Pascoe v Turner. In both those decisions 
the court ordered the representor to execute a transfer of the fee 
simple to the representee. Pascoe v Turner sets out the grounds upon 
which the court will order the revesting of the fee simple, that is, 
that it is the most effective way in which the equity can be satisfied. 
Provided the satisfaction of the equity requires the transfer of the 
fee simple the fact of a registered title will provide no barrier. 
6. 11958J N.Z.L.R. 25 
7. 11975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 57 
8, Ioid at page 62 
9. I1956] N.Z.L.R. 785 
Proprietary Rights Less Than That of Registered Proprietor 
Proprietary rights arising from the estoppel can give rise to 
statutory remedies where these are appropriate. In Plimmer & 
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Another v Wellington City corporation10 . the considerable flexi-
bility of the principle in creating proprietary rights was illustrated. 
In 1848 Plimmer had taken possession of part of the foreshore of 
Wellington Harbour and erected a jetty thereon with the consent of 
the Provincial Government. Later he reclaimed land and, at the 
suggestion of the Provincial Government, erected thereon a warehouse 
for the accommodation of immigrants, for which ~t was used until 1882, 
when the possession of the land was resumed by the City Corporation. 
The assignees of Plimmer claimed compensation under section 4 of the 
PuBlic Works Act 1882, which enabled any person 'having any estate 
or interest in or out of the lands by the said Act vested in the 
Corporation I to make a claim for compensation and provided that in 
determining th.e titl e of any cl aimant the Court shall not I be bound 
to regard strict legal rights only but may award compensation in 
respect of any claim which the Compensation Court may consider reason-
able and just having regard to the circumstances ' . 
The right derivtng from the principle in this instance was a 
licence. Their Lordships found no difficulty in bringing this licence 
und~r the appropriate provisions of the Public Works Act. The licence 
had, when first granted, been revocable at will, but the subsequent 
10. (1883) 9 App.Cas. 699, N.Z.P.C.C, 250. 
This Privy Council decision was cited with approval in Pascoe v 
Turner (1979) 2 All E.R. 945 at page 949; Taylors Fashions Ltd 
v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd I1982] 1 Q.B. 133 at page 
148; Crabb v Arun District Council T1976] 1 Ch. 179 at page 
188; E.R. rYeS Investments Ltd v High 11967] 2 Q.B. 379 at 
page 400. 
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conduct of the City Corporation had been sufficient, by virtue of the 
operation of the principle to turn this licence revocable at will, 
into a perpetual right to a licence. According to their Lordships 
that conduct had been 'sufficient to create in his (Plimmer's) mind 
a reasonable expectation that his occupation would not be disturbed,ll. 
This decision in Pltrrmer v Wellington City now provides a very 
sound precedent upon which to build rights deriving from the estoppel. 
rt was applted in Hauhungaroa 2 C Block v Attorney General 12 . where 
the Crown was permitted, on the basis of the estoppel, to continue 
with a ltcence over Maori land to obtain access to a power plant when 
the Maori' owners had stood by while the Crown constructed a road over 
the land. 
The right to an equitable charge or lien was demonstrated in re 
Whiteheadl3 . where a son had expended money in the erection of a 
cottage on land owned by his father in the apparent expectation of the 
transfer of the title to him at some time in the future. The action 
fatled in the Higli Court upon the evidential ground that there was no 
promise to transfer the fee simple nor that the son had, by his conduct, 
established any equitable claim. But on appeal an equitable lien was 
granted in reversal of the decision of the High Court where it appears 
to have been assumed that nothing short of the acquisition of the trans-
ferable title would have satisfied the claim of the appellant. The 
Court of Appeal was emphatic that such was not the case. The amount of 
the lien was assessed at £400 in accordance with the actual expenditure 
which had been incurred by the appellant in the improvements to the land 
11. N.Z.P.C.C. page 260 
12. I1973J 1 N.Z.LR. 389 
13. I1948] N.Z. L. R. 1066 
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in dispute. 14 . 
It now appears that the right to a lien can derive from a success-
ful plea of the principle. This is an extremely flexible right. As 
indicated in re Whitehead it could attach to property to give the 
representee an interest less than that of registered proprietor and 
as such could be claimed in instances where the representee was unable 
to prove an actual expectation in respect to the fee simple of the 
property but could prove an expectation in respect to some lesser 
interest. It could also be useful in cases where the representee 
desired to recover his expenditure on the property but was not inter-
ested in residing in it. The lien provides the necessary security 
for this. 
The courts do not appear, in granting relief, to be overtly inhi-
bited by any difficulty in quantifying the nature and extent of the 
interest of the representee. In re Whitehead the lien was readily 
quantifiable;the amount of the interest could be assessed. The 
question also arises of what interests could be represented in the 
form of an eqaitable lien. It could be used as security for compensa-
tion which may be awarded and as such could probably be used to secure 
any proprietary right which derived through the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle, 
The equitable lien is thus an extremely useful weapon. It could be 
used to strip a representor of any improvements which the representee 
had made to the property. It may, for example, have been an appropriate 
14. Authority for this course of action was found in Hamilton v 
Geragnty (1901} 1 N. S. W. S. R, CEq} 81. 
' ... either ln toe form of a specific interest in the land, or 
in the snape of compensation for the expenditure, a Court of 
Equity would give relief' ibid at page 89. 
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solution to Pascoe v Turner. It does appear remarkable that the lien 
has not oeen more frequently used by the courts in the present resur-
gence of the principle. It would appear to be a remedy which afforded 
a greater degree of justice that the actual transfer of the fee simple 
in that it could restore Hte parties to their previous position. 
The Remedy is Not Limited to a Making Good of the Expectation Raised 
But Will at the Courtfs Discretion be Tailored to Fit the Wrong in 
Each fndividual Case. 
Although the oasis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle is the creation 
of an expectation deriving from a representation, the remedy provided 
is not limited to a making good of that specific expectation. The 
process of the remedy available in the case of the principle thus 
differs significantly from that provided in the case of the part 
performance of the contract which was found to De unenforceable for 
non compliance with the Statute of Frauds. Relief was permitted there 
oy equity and the equitable remedy of specific performance was the only 
remedy evolved. Also in the case of High Trees estoppel, where estoppel 
acted as a defence, the effect of a successfu 1 plea is also essenti ally 
in one direction and that is simply to prevent the representee from 
resiling from his promise. It is clear that no such limits are placed 
upon the remedy which can derive from the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
There is thus not necessarily any specifi c performance of the parti cu-
lar expectation raised. Rather the courts have assumed a discretion, 
which they will exercise in each individual instance, as to how best 
to make good the equity: 
'The equity having thus 5een raised ..•. , it is for the 
courts of equity to decide in what way that equity should 
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be satisfied , .15 . 
It would appear that the remedy does not thus need to be that 
specifically sought by the representee. Indeed the uncertainty of the 
actual remedies which are available would tend to accentuate this 
point. In many cases the representee may not be aware of what remedy 
there is available to him. The remedy could go much further than that 
initially sought by the representee. 16 . 
In seeking the 'minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff ,17 . 
the rul es upon wtl5ch the courts will operate have had more 1 i ght thrown 
upon them oy recent decisions. Thus 'there can be no doubt that since 
Ramsden v Dyson Ute courts have acted on the basi s that they have to 
determine not only tne extent of the equity, but also the conditions 
. necessary to satisfy it, and they have done so in a great number and 
variety of cases,.18. This would clearly indicate that the courts 
are not prepared to encumber themselves with rigid general rules but 
will consider each case upon its own merits; ISO the principle to be 
applied is that the court should consider all the circumstances 119. 
The question therefore arises as to whether there is any limit to the 
remedy. 20. 
15. As per Lord Denning M.R. in Greasley v Cooke 11980J 3 All E.R. 
710 at page 713. 
16. See the decisions referred to infra. 
17. As per Scarman L.J. in Crabb V Arun District Council I1976J 
1 Ch. 179 at page 198 cited with approval by Cumming Bruce L.J. 
in Pascoe v Turner [1979J 2 All E.R. 945 at page 950 
18. fbi d. 
19. ioid. 
20. The fl exfbtl ity of the remedy avail ab 1 e was confirmed in Pl immer 
v Mayor of Well ington (1884) 9 App, Cas. 699, wlli ch was c 
witn approval on this point in Haufmngaroa 2 C Block V Attorney 
General 11973J 1 N.Z.L.R. 389. 
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The extent to which the courts are prepared to go in order to 
satisfy the equity was aptly shown in the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Pascoe v Turner, where the representee was seeking to rely 
upon the estoppel, the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle that is, to resist 
an action for possession of a house property which she claimed had 
been promised to her By way of gift. Council for the defendant 
representee sought a declaration tnat the representor held the reality 
upon trust or that he had given the representee a licence to occupy 
and tnat he was estopped from denying tne trust or the licence. 
Significantly however, the court in tnat instance decreed specific 
performance of the expectation which had Been raised by the represen-
tation and held that 'the equity to which the facts in this case give 
rise can only be satisfied by compelling the plaintiff to give effect 
to his promise and her expectations ,21 • and that there 'be a declara-
tion tl:lat the estate in fee simple in toe property .. " is vested "in 
the defendant,22. 
Confusion as to the nature of the possible remedy is also evident 
in the earlier New Zealand case of re Whitehead23 . as between the 
decision of the High Court and that of the Court of Appeal. There a 
son had expended money in the erection of a cottage on land owned by 
his father in tne apparent expectation of a transfer of the title to 
him at some time in the future. Christie J. in the High Court held, 
inter alia, that tne son had failed to establish any equitable claim 
in the property. But on appeal, where the son claimed, in the alter-
native (a) a declaration of title to the property or (b) the value of 
the asset whicn he had created, the court granted an equitable lien 
over tne property. 
21. 11979J 2 All E. R. 945 at page 951 
22. ibid 
23. I1948J N.Z. L. R. 1066 
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It is possible that the decision in the later case of Pascoe v 
Turner may have resolved what the court perceived as a problem in the 
earlier instance. The court in re Whitehead appears to have been 
intent upon matching an equitable remedy with the right deriving 
from equity. In Pascoe v Turner the right deriving from equity, that 
is the Dillwyn v Llewelyn prinCl'ple, was clearly seen as not limited 
to an equitaole remedy. The representee oBtained an order vesting in 
her the estate in fee simple, whidl is, of course, statutory'. It 
would appear therefore that it is irrelevant to the remedy whether 
the relevant estoppel is of equitable or common law in origin. 
So, having as"ce.rtai:ned that there i·s1an equity established l 
and Ithe extent of the equity, if one is established 1 that is, for 
example whether or not it is possessory in nature, the court will 
then go on to consider Iwhat i.s the re.l ief appropriate to satisfy 
the equityl24. Although this approach may be fully in accord with 
the traditional application of the equitable jUrlsdtction it certai.n-
ly is not free from difficulty. The courts appear to be assuming to 
themselves a virtually unlimited discretion in seeking the remedy 
which they believe best fitted to satisfy the equity. The. re.sult ;s 
that no certain remedy flows from the estoppel; the remedy ;s quite 
idiosyncratic and special in character. This has, it appears, on 
occasions confused both courts and litigants. The remedy can amount 
to the specific performance of the actual expectation whtch has been 
raised in the mind of the representee but it is clearly not limited 
24. As per Roskfll L.J. ih JOh~s(A~E~}V JOh~s(F~W.} [1977] 2 All 
E.R. 231 at page 236 ctting with approval from Scarman L.J. in 
Crabb v Arun DistrittCoancil [1976] Ch 179 at page 193. 
to that. Equally it is clear that the remedy need not be equitable 
in nature despite that the original proprietary right may have 
existed only in equity. 
Injunction and Damages 
The estoppel can give rise to the remedy of injunction. This 
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has been confi rmed by the de.c is i on of the Court of Appeal in Crabb v 
Arun District Council where the injunction was issued by the Court 
to prevent the District Council from interfering with an access way 
which derived from a successful pleading of the estoppel. The right 
of access way which the estoppel confirmed as existing in the 
plaintiff representee derived from acquiescence by the representor 
and was thus equitable in nature. The Court perceived no theoretical 
objection in issuing an injunction to secure such a right and in 
doing so was applying established authority in the form of the decision 
of the Court of Appeal in E.R. Ives Investments Ltd. v High25 . where 
the injunction was also issued to prevent successors in title to the 
representor from interfering with a right of way which had, arisen 
through acquiescence. The injunction was issued in these instances to 
protect equitable rights which derived from the estoppe1 26 . There would 
appear to be little need to conjecture as to whether or not an injunction 
would be available to protect rights which arose from other forms of 
representation, for example a specific promise. There would appear to 
be no objection to th~ issuing ~f an injunction to protect any rights 
deriving from an estoppel ariSingfrom any form of representation. 
25. [1967] 2 Q.B. 379 
26. See also the earlier New Zealand case of Burns v Dil~orth Trust 
Board 11925J N.Z.L.R. 488, where an injunction was issued to 
restrain the representor from departing from a plan of subdivision 
upon which the lease of the representee had been granted. 
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Presumably, however, the issuing of an injunction would be subject 
to the normal rules which perta"in to such a remedy and being equitable 
in nature it could be defeated by the su~sequent conduct of the repre-
sentee. 
Having established that the injunction can issue to protect 
rights deriv"ing from the estoppel if follows that damages would be 
available in appropriate cases by substitution under The Chancery Amend-
ment Act 1858, Lord Cairn's Act. 27 . But an award of compensation or 
restitution would also be possible. Again it isa moot point whether 
this would be limited to those instances where the estoppel was speci-
fically of equitable origin. Compensation and restitution are, of 
course, equitable remedies. The right to compensation for a success-
fu1 plea of the estoppel was early established in P1immer v Mayor of 
wellington28 . and was confirmed by the New Zealand Courts in 
Hauhungaroa 2 C Block v Attorney Genera1 29 . where the Maori owners of 
land had stood by while the Ministry of Works constructed a road over 
thei r 1 and .. Moreover it has been confi rmed that compensati on may be 
awarded, as for example, for money spent in reliance upon the expectation 
even when the expectation itself is not fulfilled. 29a, 
27. This substitution of remedies was considered in the Court of 
Appeal in Shaw v Applegate (1978) 1 All E.R. 123 where the 
estoppel was unsuccessfully pleaded to attempt to prevent the 
enforcement of the terms of a restri ctive covenant affecting 1 and. 
28. (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699 This was confirmed by way of dicta in the 
High Court in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees 
Co Ltd. [1982] 1 Q.B. 133 at page 148. 
29. [1973] 1 N.Z.L.R. 389 The Court there considered the best way to 
satisfy the equity and concluded that this could be achieved 
best by the continuing of the license rather than the granting 
of compensation. 
29a, As in Dodsworth y Dodsworth t1973} 228 E.G. 1115. 
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Conclusion - The Flexibility of Rights and Remedies Deriving from the 
Estoppel 
It is now obvious that the rights and remedies deriving from the 
estoppel are highly idiosyncratic in nature. They will be tailored 
by the court to fit the circumstances of the successful representee 
in each individual case. Pascoe v Turner demonstrated the lengths to 
which the courts are now prepared to go in order to best satisfy the 
equity which has been raised in favour of the representee. Factors 
which are highly personal and subjective to the domestic circumstances 
of the representee and which have nothing at all to do with the con-
duct of the representor, can be considered relevant and taken into 
account by the court in assessing the extent of the proprietary right 
in favour of the representee. 
It is clear that I •••• the equity arising from expenditure on 
land need not fail merely on the ground that the interest to be secured 
has not been expressly indicated ,30 . The interest can be something 
which was entirely beyond the contemplation of the parties. The interest 
need not amount to a mere maki ng good of the expectation .rai sed by the 
representation of the representor; it is not limited to the specific 
performance of the expectation. The conclusion is that no specific 
proprietary right is protected by the estoppel but once the equity as 
deriving from the estoppel is demonstrated to exist in favour of the 
representee the courts will formulate the proprietary right in each 
individual case so as to best satisfy that equity. This can raise 
questions, not yet settled, as to the existence of the right pri.or to 
30. As per White J. in Dennv v Jensen (1977] 1 N. Z. L. R. 635 at page 
638, citing with approval from Plimmer v Mayor of Wellington 
(1884) 9 App Cas 699 at page 713. 
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its formulation by the court. It i.s not clear at what time it 
actua lly comes into exi stence. 
Once effectively formulated by the court the proprietary right 
is completely concrete and real and can take its place alongside rights 
obtaining from a formal conveyance as by means of a contract. The 
proprietary right deriving from the. estoppel is not, as has been said, 
'a mere negative title ,31 . and lexcept in that sense, no title whatso-
ever is established by the estoppel 1 32. 
Similar arguments are appl icable to the remedy which flows from 
a successful plea of estoppel. The remedy could well be something 
which, it seems, was not within the contemplation of the parties. Once 
the court,· has.,; established the equity, and formulated the appropriate 
propri etary ri ght, it wi 11 decree whatever remedy it regards, in its 
discretion as best fitted to attaining that right. Thus like the right 
itself the remedy can be idiosyncratic and specific to the indiviudal 
case. 
In granting a remedy the courts have not shown any inclination to 
restoring the parties to the state in which they were prior to the 
estoppel. Restitutio in integrum is clearly not relevant in the issuing 
of a remedy. Rather the courts will tend to secure the future of the 
representee. Also mutuality does not appear to be much within the minds 
of the judges. Emphasis has been not so much upon justi.ce to both 
parties but upon securing the rights of the representee. 
31. Spencer-Bower G. and Sir Alexander Turner 'The Law Relatinq to 
Estoppel bv Representation I 3rd ed. London, Butterworths, 1977, 
paragraph 13 page 17. 
32. ibid; the editor Sir Alexander Turner subsequently points out 
that these were the words of Spencer-Bower in the first edition 
and that they now require modification in the light of subsequent 
developments in the law. 
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The flexibility and discretionary nature of the available remedies 
was aptly illustrated by Dodsworth v Dodsworth 33. where the Court 
deemed it appropriate not to protect the expectation but nonetheless 
awarded compensation in respect to expenditure incurred in reliance upon 
the expectation. Thus although the Court was not -there prepared to find 
any propri ary right it was still able to award compensation. 
In conclusion a few words in respect to the possible destruction 
of the equity, and consequent destruction of the rights deriving therefrom, 
by the later conduct of the representee. 
This point was directly in issue in Williams v Staite 34 where an 
equitable licence to occupy land for life had been granted to an elderly 
couple. The tenants later attempted to obstruct a subsequent purchaser 
of the fee simple in his enjoyment of the property and an adjoining 
property which he had also purchased. This was done by resorting to 
generally obstructive and abusive tactics. 
The new owner thus commenced an action in ejectment. The point in 
issue was whether the conduct of the tenants, after having established 
their equitable right to a license, was such as to now destroy the 
equity which had been found earlier in their favour. 
The action in ejectment had suceeded in the County Court but 
failed on appeal. 
Lord Denning M.R. maintained that the equity could possibly be 
revoked in an extreme case. Goff L.J. was more adamant that once the 
equity is established it cannot be defeated: 
33. (1973) 228 E.G. 1115. 
34. [1979J 1 Ch. 291. 
open: 
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'Excessive user or bad behaviour towards the legal owner cannot 
bring the equity to an end or forfeit it. It may give rise to an 
action for damages or trespass or to injunctions to restrain such 
behaviour, but I see no ground on which the equity once established 
can be forfeited. Of course, the court might have held and might 
hold in any proper case, that the equity is in its nature for a 
limited period only or determinable apon a condition certain ' 35. 
On the other hand Cumming Bruce L.J. leaves the matter more 
II do not think that in a proper case the rights in equity of the 
defendants necessarily crystallise forever at the time when the 
equitable rights come into existence ' 36. 
It was recognised in Williams v Staite that this issue was novel. 
Although the finding of the Court of Appeal can hardly be 
described as unanimous, it tends to the view that once the expectation 
has been raised and the equity crystallised it will require extreme 
conduct on the part of the representee to defeat his own equity. Can, 
indeed, it be destroyed at all? 
To apply this argument to a topical example: if a parent should 
promise a child a house property on the condition that the child come 
and live in the house and there care for the parent during his lifetime, 
a subsequent conflict between the parent and child would probably not 
defeat the equity in favour of the child. 37. Provided the child had 
suffered the necessary detriment in living with the parent the equity 
would probably be secured even if the row had been caused by the child. 
35. Ibid at page 300. 
36. Ibid 
37. c.f. Burridge S.J. 'A Metric Measurement of the Chancellor's Foot' 
[1982J 41 C.L.J. 290. 
Thus if the parent attempted to sell the property to spi 
latter could probably successfully invoke the Ramsden v 
1 
the child the 
principle 38. 
The facts of Williams v Staite also served to illustrate the 
subsequent problems which can arise between parties especially when a 
proprietary right less than that of the fee simple has been decreed. 
Are there overtones here of the traditional recognition of the limitation 
of the remedy of specific performance by the courts of equity especially 
in regard to contracts of personal service. To take the reverse of the 
situation in Williams v Staite, one could well imagine attempts being 
made to defeat proprietary rights granted upon the basis of the Ramsden 
v principle by the holders of competing rights. The holder of --~~ 
the simple, for example, could make the life of an equitable licensee 
very difficult. An attempt to resolve this problem was clearly made in 
Pascoe v Turner but it is a problem which, could have to be faced in 
the future. 
38. c.f. Dodsworth v Dodsworth (supra) Griffiths v Williams (1977) 
248 E.G. 947. 
Chapter Ten 
THE RAMSDEN V DYSON PRINCIPLE AS THE 
BASIS FOR AN EDIFICE OF ESTOPPEL 
Introduction: The Consequences of a Rejection of 'Strict Categori-
sation ' 
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Bearing in mind the rejection of a strict categorisation of 
estoppel by both Oliver J. (as he then was) in the High Court in 
Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd1. and by 
Robert Goff J. in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in 
liquidation v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. 2. the question 
which then presents itself for resolution is the role, if any, which 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle plays as providing a foundation stone 
for other heads of law including other heads os estoppel. 
It is now possible to see the Ramsden v principle as 
providing a theoretical base, at least, for an edifice of various 
heads of law which have hitherto been generally regarded as having 
little in common with the principle. 
This process of the osmosis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle into 
other areas of 1 aw has been assi.sted in some cases by the absence of 
coherent development of the law in these other areas. In some cases 
the assumption of the Ramsden v Dyson principle to these other heads 
of law has been a conscious act on the part of the courts, while in 
others it has been very much implicit. 
Three areas, in particular, immediately present themselves as 
possible targets for encroachment by the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
Two of these, that is common law estoppel by representation, and the 
1. [1982] 1 Q.B. 133 at page 147. 
2. [1982] 1 Q.B. 84 at page 104. 
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equity to perfect a gift, that is the principle laid down in Dillwyn 
v Llewelyn,3. have traditionally been regarded as aspects of estoppel, 
while the other, that is non contractual waiver, has been seen judi-
cially, as both distinct from estoppe1 4. and akin to estoppel. 
The Possible Subsumption of Common Law Estoppel by Representation or 
Conduct by the Ramsden v Dyson Principle. 
A substantial body of law relating to estoppel by representation, 
or conduct, has envolved in the common law and it is now possible to 
see this as being affected by recent developments in the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle. This could be assisted by the fact that this common 
law estoppel is not only devoid of precedents which, in effectiveness, 
match that of Ramsden v Dyson but is beset with a number of obvious 
difficulties to the representee. 
If the starting point to an action under the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle is accepted as the raising of an expectation, by the repre-
sentor, then a specific representation will, equally with conduct, 
suffice to do this. But the common law has long allowed specific 
representations, and' also conduct, as founding an estoppel. 
An examination of older decisions based ostensibly upon common 
law estoppel, reveals that,in the light of recent developments in 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle, some of them, at least, could now be 
3. (1862) 4 De G F & J 517; 45 ER 1285. 
4. 'When its true foundations are stated, it will be seen that 
estoppel is separated from waiver in point of principle by a very 
board line of demarcation I as per Isaacs J. in Craine v Colonial 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 at page 327. 
'Whether it be called waiver or forbearance on his part, or an 
agreed variation or substituted performance, does not matter. 
It is a k"ind of estoppel' as per Denning L.J. (as he then was) in 
Rickards (Charle~),LtdvOppenhiam (1950) 1 KB 616, at page 623; 
(1950) 1 All ER 420 at page 423. 
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seen as coming within that principle. 5. 
As estoppel by representation was ~eset with many difficulties, 
especially as regards the establishment of the necessary representa-
tion,6. the creation of the required expectation to establish the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle would appear, in many instances, to present 
t~e representee with less problems than setting up the representation 
necessary to found a common law estoppel by representation. The common 
law appears to have concentrated, to a large extent,upon the nature 
and form of the actual representation, rather than upon its overall 
effect, as now appears to be the test applicable to the expectation 
required under the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
This movement of the principle into the area of common law estoppel 
could probably be assisted by the fact that in regard to the estab-
lishment of the required detriment there would now appear to be no very 
5. For example in Yorkshire InsutanCe Co LtdvCtaine [1922J 2 AC 541, 
the Privy Council applied what was referred to as I estoppel by 
conduct I to prevent an insurance company which had taken possession 
of the insured premises, following a fire, and remained in posses-
sion for some four months from then falling back upon a clause in 
the policy to evade liability. The estoppel was there applied 
without reference to precedent. It would appear than the conduct 
of the Insurance Company was quite sufficient to raise the necessary 
expectation to support the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
Also in Rodenhurst Estates Ltd. v Barnes Ltd [1936J 2 All ER 3, where 
despite no formal assignment of a lease both parties acted as land-
lord and tenant and the tenant was thus estopped from denying that 
he was an assignee and was thus liable for rent. Carr v London & 
Northwest Railway Coy. (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 307, a case of common 
law estoppel by conduct was there relied upon. It seems clear, 
however, that Rodenhurst Estates Ltd v Barnes was a clear case of 
convention and the Ramsden v Dyson principle would, in the light 
of contemporary decisions, clearly be applicable to it. 
6. For example: it was necessary that the representation be effectively 
communicated to the representee, Robettsv TuCker (1851) 16 Q.B. 560; 
the representation was required to relate to a matter of existing 
fact, Taylor v Knapman (1884) 2 N.Z.L.R. 265; a statement as to future 
intention or promise was inadequate, Guy vWaterlOw BtOS & Layton Ltd 
(1909) 25 TLR 515; a stateme.nt of opinion was inadequate to establish 
the necessary representation, Ge.Otge WhitechUtch·l td v Cavanagh [1902] 
A.C. 117, H.L. The establishment of the requirements was thus a 
highly tenuous process which lent itself to innumerable fine, and 
sometimes, inane, distinctions. 
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clear distinction as between common law estoppel and the RartJsden v 
Dyson principle. 
This movement of the Ramsden v Dyson principle into the area of 
common law estoppel by representation could be seen as a reversal of 
the trend which took pl ace in Jorden v Money7. which it will be 
recalled, was determined in equity, but where distinctly common law 
principles were applied in finding that a statement of future inten-
tion could not amount to an estoppel. It could be argued that that 
celebrated but much criticised decision has already been outflanked 
by construi ng a represe.ntati on of fact from what appears to be a 
statement of intention,8. and also by the application of the High 
Trees principle. The decision in Jorden v Money stands to be out-
flanked yet again by the development of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
The Eguity to Perfect a Gift But one Specialised Aspect of the Ramsden 
v Dyson Principle 
A long established and well respected principle of equity is that 
laid down in Dillwyn v Llewelyn9. This was the equity to perfect an 
imperfect gift. The principle was aptly set out by Lord Westbury when 
he said; 
'A voluntary agreement will not be completed or assisted by 
a court of equi ty, in cases of mere gift ... But the subsequent 
acts of the donor may give the donee that right or ground of 
7. (1854) 5 H. L. Cas. 185. 
8. As was done in Salisbury (Marquess) v Gilmore [l942[ 2 K.B. 38, 
where a statement by landlords that they intended to demolish a 
building at the terminati.on of a lease which, despite the wording, 
was held to be a representation of fact sufficient to support an 
estoppel. 
9. (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517. 
claim which he did not acquire from the original gift ... So 
if A puts B in possession of a piece of land, and tells him 
II give it to you that you may build a house on itl, and B 
on the strength of that promise, with the knowledge of A, 
expends a large sum of money in building a house accordingly. 
I cannot doubt that the donee acquires a right from the sub-
sequent transaction to call on the donor to perform that 
contract and complete the imperfect donation which was made l10 . 
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This specifie~, it is submitted, the essential requirements to 
establish the Ramsden v Dyson principle. The making of the initial 
gift and the subsequent conduct of the donor in standing by while the 
donee acts to his detriment would amount to the raising of the 
required expectation. It is noted that detrimental reliance would 
also be required to establish this principle. The clear specification 
in the di cta of Lord Westbury tHat I A voluntary agreement wi 11 not be 
completed or assisted ... ' but that it is subsequent acts of the donor 
which are vital infuses the element of acquiescence or encouragement 
thus serving still further to equate this principle with that of 
Ramsde.n v Dyson. 
There have been a number of cases where the courts have applied 
both the Di 11 wyn v L 1 ewe 1 yn pri nci p 1 e and the Ramsden v Dyson pri nci p 1 e 
with no attempt to differentiate between them. 11. This process was 
continued in Pascoe v Turner. 12 . 
10. ibid at page 521. 
11. See for exarnp 1 e, Pli.mmer v Major etc of We 11 i ngton (1884) 9 App. 
Cas. 699; Inwards V Baker (1965) 2 QB 29; also Chalmers v Pardoe 
£1963J 1 W.L.R. 677; (1963) 3 All E.R. 552 where although neither 
principle was referred to it appears that both were equally appli-
cab 1 e; see also cases r.eferred to infra. 
12. [1979] 2 All E.R. 945. 
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Dillwyn v Llewelyn preceded RariJ S'd en v Dyson in point of time by 
some four years'. Be,tween 1895 and 1956 the Dillwyn v Llewelyn prin-
ciple was very rarely applied as it appears to have been taken by the 
courts to have been subsumed in the wider Ramsden v Dyson principle, 
of which it was merely one aspect. 'However in 1956 there appears to 
have been somethi ng of a revival of that princi p 1 e, as an independent 
head of liability, by its application by the New Zealand High Court 
in-Thomas v Thomas. l3 · Since that time Dillwyn v Llewelyn has been 
applied quite consistently.14. 
But even in quite recent cases there appears to have been a re-
luctance 0n the part of the courts to see Dillwyn v Llewelyn as an 
independant head of law. There has been, for example, a tendancy to 
see it as requiring the support of common law contract with the 
acquiescence of the representor, that is his raising of the necessary 
expectation, as the equivalent of consideration in contract. 15 . It 
will indeed be recalled that in Dillwyn v Llewelyn itself Lord 
Westbury L.C. had used the expression Ito perform that contract l16 . 
Also he apparently based the rule on an analogy with part perfor-
mance. It is submitted, with respect, that any analogy which might 
have been drawn in earlier times between the Dillwyn v Llewelyn 
principle and contract, especially involving confusion as to the nature 
of consideration, is no longer appropriate, or indeed accurate. 
13. [1956] N.Z.L.R. 785 
14. See cases referred to infra and supra. 
15. As in Raffaele vRaffaele I1962] WAR 29; see also in ReDiplock 
[1947} Ch. 716, where Wynn-Parry J.treated-DillwynvLlewelyn as 
a species of contract and Vaughan v Vaughan [1953J 1 Q.8. 762, 
where Denning L.J. cited as authority for the proposition that 
to establish a contractual licence there must be a promise 
supported by consideration or acted upon. 
16. (1862) de D.F. & J. 517 at page 521. 
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The. que.stion rematns' then wne;tber the courts are correct in 
regarding tneDillwyn v Llewelyn principle as out one aspect of the 
wider Ramsden v Dyson principle. There is a clear analogy between the 
two principles in several respects. It snould De pointed out that the 
apparent extension in the scope wnich has taken place in the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle i.n recent times' would tend to indicate a greater 
general willingness on the part of tne courts to extend it to situa-
tions which might otnerwise have been seen as the province of the 
narrower Dtllwynv Llewelyn principle. 
Firstly, the Dillwyn v Llewelyn princi.ple is narrower in that it 
requires as its starting point an intention to make a gift. This 
appears to require a specific promise. This promise proves to be 
invalid at law because the gift is imperfect, that is the donor has 
not complied with the legal requirements to perfect the gift. It is 
submitted that this woul d De s·uffici.ent, in many instances, at 1 east 
to satisfy the requirement of the raisi'ng of the expectation necessary 
for the Ramsden v Dyson principle. But this would probaoly depend 
upon the conduct of the donor fo 11 owing, or subsequent to, the maki ng 
of the promi.se. In terms of the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle this 
future conduct of the donor, subsequent to the making of the promise of 
the gift, was vital to the establishment of the equity. This may have 
gone somewhat further than the requirement necessary to raise the 
expectation to establish Ramsden v Dyson but whether this is so or not 
is not ascertainable from the decided cases. 
Likewise detrimental reliance is common to both principles. The 
represente.e cannot succeed in establ ishing either the Ramsden v 
principle or that in Dillwyn v Llewelyn unless he can establish detri-
ment if the. prinCiple is not asserted tn his favour. As yet there would 
appear to De no distinction oetween the detriment required to establish 
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either. 
One tenuous line of demarcation between the two principles could 
still exist in respect to the pos-si'ble remedy. The Dillwyn v Llewelyn 
principle relies initially upon a promise, that is a promise to make 
a gift and the question arises whether any remedy granted under that 
printiple is limited to the fulfilment of that promise only. It has 
been shown that ;n respect to the Ramsden v Dyson principle the remedy 
available is not limited to a making good of the expectation raised 
but it entirely at the discretion of the court. I7 . It is not clear, 
as yet, whether the same discretion is available to the court when 
the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle is successfully pleaded. 
The clear diffusion between the Dillwyn v Llewelyn principle and 
that in Ramsden v Dyson is aptly demonstrated by the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Pascoe v Turner18 . where, it will be recalled, 
words indicating the gift of a house property had been made by the 
male to the female party of a defacto relationship and, after having 
spent money upon repairs, the woman sought to enforce the prorili se. 
The Court there did not apparently concern itself with ascertaining 
the issue of whether there had been a promise of a gift but pointed out 
that I ••• the plaintiff not only stood by and watched but encouraged 
and advised, without a word to suggest that she was putting her money 
and her personal 1 abour ; nto hi shouse. What is the effect in equi ty?19 . 
... The cases in point illustrating that principle in relation to real 
property are Dillwyn v Llewelyn, Ramsden v Dyson ... ,20. 
17. See under 'Remedies: Proprietary Rights Deriving From the Ramsden 
v Dyson Principle, Chapter nine supra 
18. (1979) 2 All E.R. 945. 
19. (1979) 2 All E.R. at page 949 
20. ibid 
This decision makes no clear attempt to differentiate between 
the two principles but appe.ars .to treat the two as illustrating some 
broader principle of equity. 
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One approach may be to treat the principle confirmed in Dillwyn 
v Llewelyn as part of the law relating to gifts, that is more appro-
priately considered as an aspe.ct of tne law of property. It is sub-
mitted that pending some cl ear formul ation of the Dillwyn v Llewelyn 
principle as a disti.nct head of liability in equity it is more appro-
priately considered as part of the wide.r Ramsden v Dyson pr-inciple. 
The Ramsden v Dyson Principleasa Basis for Waiver. 
The concept of waiver is not clearly defined. It is most fre-
quently taken as applying in contract where one party has agreed to 
forbear upon the performance of a term of the contract. In this in-
stance waiver is not easy to distinguish from situations which could 
be covered by that form of estoppel confirmed·1m·Hi Trees House Ltd 
v Central London Property Trust21 . However there is no doubt that 
waiver is not confined to strictly contractual situations. 
The possible application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle to cases 
of waiver was illustrated by the decision of the House of Lords in 
Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd22 . The 
point in issue there was the waiver of a right to a defence under a 
statute. Lord Diplock pointed out that IThe ordinary principles of 
estoppel apply ... ,23 to this category of waiver. He went on to point 
21. [1947] K.!L 130; [19561 1 All E.R. 256. 
22. [1971] A.C. 850 
23. ibid at page 883. 
out that estoppel in the 'strict se.nse. 1 was unavailable in that instance 
because there was no representation of existing fact~ However he then 
specified that either High Trees estoppel or 'the older doctrine of 
acqui escence expounded by Fry J. in Wi llmott v Barber 124. may be app 1 i-
cable. He then proceded to apply the probanda of Fry J. and reached 
the conclusion that they were not fulfi:lled i.n the instant case. 
If this 1 ine of reasoning is developed the results would appear to 
be qui te remarkable.. What Lord Dip lock appears to have been searchi ng 
for was a firm foundation upon which to base the,possible waiver of the 
right to a defence. But in view of what he said it would be a very 
easy step to extend the Ramsden v Dyson principl e into the area of non 
contractual waiver and possibly encroach upon the domain of what is now 
regarded as High Trees estoppel. 
The High Trees principle commenced lifetn what could be described 
as a some.what uncertain manner. Denni ng J. (as he then was) was 
clearly sttl1 dogged with the conception of estoppel as limited to a 
representation of an existing fact, tnus continuing to pay deference 
to the ghost of Jorden v Money. Moreover he concentrated upon the 
enforcement of a specific promise, which in that instance was in writing, 
and which in his view could not give rise to an estoppel for the simple 
reason, following Jorden v Money, was not a statement of existing fact· 
but was merely a promise to do something in the future. But he disting-
uished Jorden v Money upon the ground that there the promise was not 
intended to be legally binding. 
Denning J. at no time referred to Ramsden v Dyson but instead fell 
back upon a line of autho.rity deal ing with the enforcement of promises in 
24. ibid. 
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equity wh.ere that promise had been acted upon. 25 . 
However later developments of the'HighTrees principle, it is 
submitted, have tended to bring it much closer to that of Ramsden v 
Dyson. Thus in Charles Rickards Ltd v oppenhiam?6. the conduct of the 
representor was held sufficient to invoke the High Trees principle; 
in Ajayi v R.T. Briscae(Nigeria)Lfd27 . detrimental reliance was 
confirmed as an essential ingredient of estoppel. 
~"----'--
On the other hand it may be possible to see the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle as applicable in contract in cases' where the High Trees 
principle clearly will not operate. It is claimed that the High Trees 
principle is limited to contractual situations28 . It is clear that the 
_Ra_m_s_d_en_v_'-!£-___ principle is wider in scope and bearing in mind the 
decision in Taylors Fashions Ltd v LiverpoolVictotia Trustees Ltd 
there would appear to be no reason to preclude the Ramsden v Dyson prin-
ciple from forming the basis of a waiver of contractual provisions. 
In Woodhouse AC Israel CotoaLtdSAv Nigerian Produce Marketing 
Co Ltd. 29 . the Hi Trees principle waS unsuccessfully pleaded in an 
attempt to establish an estoppel based upon a letter, written after the 
contract had been concluded, and changing~hat had been agreed in the 
contract. It is submitted that if both the parties had accepted the 
25. The.se were; Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Com an (1877) 2 App. 
Cas. 439; Birmingham and District Land Co. v on on & North 
Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch.D. 268; Salisbury (Marquess) v 
Gilmor~ (1942) 2 K.B. 38. 
26. [1950} 1 KoB. 616. 
270 [1964] 1 W 0 LoR 0 1326; (1964) 3 All E. R. 556. 
28. Hogenas v Hatton I1955] N.Z.L.R. 684; but see Evenden v Guildford 
City Association Football Club Ltd (1975) Q.B. 
29. [1972] A.C. 741; (1972) 2 All E.R. 271. 
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contents of the letter and mutually acted upon them the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle could have been asserted. 
The later decision of Robert Goff J. in the Queens Bench Division 
in Societe Italo-Belge pourleCommerteetl,'Irldustrie S.A. v Palm and 
Vegetable Oils (Malaysia) SdnBhd' 'ThePostChaser, 29a shows a quite 
remarkable merger of the Hi Trees principle with aspects of t~e 
Ramsden v Dyson principle. The decision was clearly based upon the 
High Trees principle but Robert Goff J. confirmed that Ian unequivocal 
representation ... that they did not intend to enforce their stfict legal 
right' was sufficient to found the Hign Trees principle and that it did 
not require a statement of existing fact. But that case is probably 
more significant in confirming the concept of unconscionability as 
applicable to High Trees situations. This would appear to supply an 
answer to the problem which has been encountered in High Trees situations 
but is not so evident in Ramsden v Dyson situations and that is the issue 
of the resumption of rights. In determining whether the representor 
can resume his legal rights under the High Trees principle Robert Goff J. 
appears to have applied the same principle as has been applied where the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle is apposite. That is the representor can 
resume his former posHion only where it would not be inequitable to the 
representee for him to do so.' That is once the parties have so altered 
their positior. that the equity has crystallised in favour of the repre-
sentee there can be no resumption of the former position where it would 
be inequitable to do so. In applying this concept of unconscionability 
the specific situation would have to be taken into account. Thus the 
continuing contractual relationship which would be a factor in instances 
where the High Trees principle is applicable, would probably have to be 
considered in determining what was unconscionable in specific cases. 
Thus for example although the revers'ion to a former position upon the 
29a [1982J 1 All E.R. 19 
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giving of reasonable notice has been considered as a factor under Hiqh 
Trees estoppel this could De cons'idered as merely specific to the 
contractual relationship rather than some clear theoretical distinction 
between the High Trees principle and the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
It could be argued that the High Trees principle would appear to 
be based upon how to satisfy an equity tnat has arisen after a contract 
has been concluded rather than upon any general concept that non 
contractual promises must De kept and kept in full. If the alternate 
view is adopted that the law should focus not upon the making good of prom-
ises or representations but upon when and to what extent expectations 
shoul d be ful fi 11 ed, then it woul d appear that we have a common basi s 
for the application of both the High Ttees principle and th~ Ra~sden v 
Dyson principle. 
It is submitted that the decision of the House of Lords in Woodhouse 
A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. S.A. v Nigerian Pr6d~Ce Marketing Co. Ltd. 30 ·to 
the effect that 'an ambiguous statement has (never) formed the basis of 
1 · 1 ,31 .. f A h f . h a pure y promlssory estoppe . was un ortunate. s te acts ln t at 
case did not warrant it there was no consideration in that case of when 
the High Trees principle could arise in the absence of an express repre-
sentation. As Lord Salmon explained in a later case; 
'To make an unequivocal representation or waiver it is not neces-
sary for the buyers to say 'we hereby waive it' It is quite 
enough if they behave or write in such a way that reasonable 
sellers would be led to believe that the buyers were waiving any 
d f t th . ht b .. th t· ,32. e ec sere mlg e ln e no lce .... 
30. (1972) A.C. 741. 
31. Ibid at page 757. 
32. Bremet Hande 1 sgese 11 scha ft mbh v Vanden Avelilie .:. I zegem PVBA (1978) 
2 Lloyds Rep. 109 at page 126. 
This, it is submi.tted, is an approach clearly indicating that the 
raising of an expectati.on will De sufficient to found the High Trees 
estoppel just as the raising of an expectation is sufficient to found 
the Ramsden vmDyson estoppel. 
Conclusion: The Ramsden v Dyson Principle as a 'DiStinctHead of 
Liabili 
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The rejection of a strict categorisation of estoppel appears to be 
an accurate reflection of current developments in the. law. 
It must be remembered that, to some extent, the evolution of bench 
mark precedents, which have the effect of according nomenclature to 
equitable principles, is unfortunate and is, indeed, a relatively 
modern phenomenon. It is probable that the robust Chancery Judges of 
past years would have derided such a practice as it would have served to 
limit the scope of equity to intervene. 
It is possible to see all the areas of law referred to above, plus 
the Ramsden v pri nci p 1 e itself, as' amounti ng to nothi ng more than 
a bundle of examples of instances where equity has, in the interests of 
rectifying an unconscionable situation, deemed it appropriate to assert 
jurisdiction. 
Alternatively, it is possible to perceive the Ramsden v Dyson prin-
ciple as the manifestation of a basic equitable estoppel which began life 
as a potentially relatively narrow concept, limited to real property, 
and then by a gradual, incremental process, extended its scope to gifts, 
to give rise to what is now sometimes referred to as the Dillwyn v Llewelyn 
principle, to contract, in the form of the High Trees principle, and 
eventually into statutory waiver. It is possible to take the matter 
further and see the doctrine of part performance in the law of contract 
as but one aspect of the same principle. 
Current trends with the emphasis placed upon the rectification of 
unconscionable situations and away from the application of rules 
certainly indicate a reversion back to the broad conception of equit-
able intervention. 
190 
191 
Chapter Eleven 
THE lIMITS OF THE PRINCIPLE MAKE AN APPEARANCE 
Introduction: The Pendulum Begins to Swing Back. 
Following the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Crabb v Arun District 
Council 1. Amalgamated Investment & Property Co ltd (-in liguidation) v Texas 
Commerce International Bank ltd 2. and Habib Bank ltd v Habib Bank AG , 
Zurich, 3. .it appeared that the Ramsden v Dyson principle was in full 
flood. Some very recent decisions, however, appear to have served to 
indicate the possible limits to the principle. 
These possible reins upon the scope of the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
have assumed several different thrusts. There would appear to be some broad 
general judicial misgivings over the lengths to which the principle has 
extended. This would include the hint of a reversion away from the 
application of the principle in favour of the more narrowly based estoppel 
by specific representation. A clear attempt has been made to limit the 
proprietary rights deriving from the principle. 
There would appear to be limits set to the extension of the concept of 
convention as the initial steping stone for the principle. 
The historic and intricate problem, still it appears, by no means 
resolved, of the relationship between estoppel and statutory authority has 
again surfaced. The very recent authority indicates yet again the impotence 
of estoppel in the face of statutory authority. 
1. 11976] 1 Ch. 179. 
2. [1982] Q. B. 84. 
3. 11981] 2 All E.R. 650. 
1 
But it is not finally established, by any means, that estoppel can play 
no role at all where statutory authority is involved. 
It is not possible to determine whether these very recent trends are 
the beginning of a wholesale retreat from the broad application of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle to a more restrictive application of estoppel and 
perhaps a reversion back to the more limited estoppel by express 
representation, or whether they represent the introduction of a period of 
consolidation. There has not been any attempt to clearly demarcate the role 
of the Ramsden ,v Dyson principle from other heads of estoppel. 
It is reasonable to assume that the departure of Lord Denning M.R. from 
the judicial scene would have the effect of taking some of the momentum from 
the liberal application of the principle as seen in Crabb v Arun District 
Council and in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce 
i 
International Bank Ltd. 
-
A Retreat From the Broad Approach to the Ramsden v Dyson Principle 
Spearheaded by Lord Denning. 
That a visible retreat from the broad approach to the Ramsden v Dyson 
~rinciple as laid down by Lord Denning has now set in is indicated by 
several recent decisions. But that this broad approach was not to attract 
universal judical agreement was evident in Western Fish Products Ltd v 
, 
Penwith District Council and another 4. where it was sought to invoke the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle to prevent a District Council from resiling from a 
decision which had been made by one of its planning officers. 
In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal Megaw L.J. is 
emphatic that the principle ought to be carried no further. He went 
further; 
4. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204. 
'We know of no case, and none has been cited to us, in which the 
principle set out -in Ramsden v Dyson and Crabb v Arun District 
Council has been applied otherwise than to rights and interests 
created in and over land. It may extend to other forms of pro-
perty: see per Lord Denning M.R. in Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd 
v Twitchings ••. In our judgment there is no good reason for 
extending the principle further. As Harman L.J. pointed out in 
Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1961] 2 All E.R. 97 at 103, 
[1961] 1 Q. B. 445 at 459, the system of equ i ty has become a 
very precise one. The creation of new rights and remedies is a 
matter for Parliament, not the judges'. 5. 
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This dicta was set down before the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International 
Bank Ltd, which, in fact, confirmed the principle in Crabb v Arun District 
Council. But Lord Denning M.R. played a significant role in both those 
judgments. Later cases hint at a move towards the direction taken by Megaw 
L.J. if not, as yet, at least, going so far as to confirm that the creation 
of new rights is a matter for Parliament. 
Further misgivings over the broad application of the principle, based 
upon unconscionability appear by way of very fleeting dicta in the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal, delivered by Oliver L.J. in Habib Bank Ltd v Habib 
Bank AG Zurich 6. After having listened to counsel recite from his own 
judgment in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, to 
5. Ibid at page 218. 
6. [19811 2 All E.R. 650. 
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the effect that I .•• the Ramsden v Dyson ... principle ... requires a 
, 7 
very much broader approach ... ' . Oliver L.J. ruefully replied Iwhilst 
having heard the judgment read by counsel I could wish that it had been more 
succinct, that statement at least is one to which I adhere' 8. 
Oliver L.J. did however go on to find that the conditions of the 
principle were satisfied in Habib Bank v Habib Bank AG Zurich and 
probably not too much can be read into his attitude to the citation from 
his previous judgment. 
A further and possibly more significant step back from the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle appears to have been taken in Avon County Council v 
Howlett 9. The Court of Appeal could well have determined the issue of 
overpayments of wages made by a local authority to an employee upon the 
basis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. Instead however, after having 
paid cursory attention to Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v 
Tex'as Commerce International Bank, the Court preferred to base the 
estoppel, which it there found to exist, upon the specific representation 
by the employer, to the employee, that he was entitled to treat the money 
as his own. The Court found the supporting authority in a series of 
decisions dealing with the payment of money by mistake. 10. 
It would appear that the issue of estoppel in Avon County Council v 
Howlett could have equally been determined under the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle. The necessary expectation had clearly been raised by the 
representor County Council. 
7. [1982] 1 Q.B. 133 at page 151 cited in Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank 
AG Zurich (1981) 2 All ER at page 666. 
8. [1981] 2 All ER at page 666./ 
9. [1983] 1 All ER 1073. 
10. Skyring v Greenwood (1825) 4 B & C 281, (1824-34) All ER Rep 104, 
Holt v Markham (1923) 1 K.B. 504, Lloyds, Bank Ltd v Brooks (1950) 
6 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers 161. 
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However Avon County Council v Howlett serves to bring out what could 
be a limitation upon the application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
as against other heads of estoppel, and, in particular, estoppel by 
representation. In that case estoppel was raised as a defence to an 
action in restitution as the Avon County Council, which was the plaintiff, 
was seeking to recover the overpayments of wages from .the defendant 
employee who raised the estoppel as a defence to the action in restitution. 
The Court found that the overpayments were the result of a mistake of 
fact. The burden of proving this, on the balance of probability, was 
successfully discharged by the County Council and had not the defendant 
representee been able to raise estoppel the action in restitution would 
have succeeded. 
The paucity of authority in this area is indicated by the fact that 
extensive reference was made, especially in the judgment of Slade L.J. to 
Goff and Jones 'Law of Restitution I ·which specifies the requirements of 
estoppel as a defence to a claim in restitution as; a. the plaintiff must 
generally have made a representation of fact which led the defendant to 
believe that he was entitled to treat the money as hiw own; b. the 
defendant must have, bona fide and without notice of the plaintiff's claim, 
consequently changed his position; c. the payment must not have been 
primarily caused by the fault of the defendant. 11. 
In Avon County Council v Howlett there was a specific representation 
and the Court was thus not called upon to cqnsider the applicability of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle as a defence to a claim for restitution in that 
instance. 
11. Goff Sir Robert and G. Jones 'Law of Restitution' 2nd ed. London, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1978 pages 554-555. 
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In respect to restitution a gap now appears to have opened between 
the English and New land law. It is .clear that estoppel can oper-
ate as a defence to ~n action in restitution in both jurisdictions. 
However New Zealand has gone further and provided a statutory defence12 . 
which incorporates the defence of change of position. This must not 
be confused with estoppel. It was confirmed in Hollidge v Bank of 
New Zealand13 . that this defence is an alternative to estoppe1 14 . If 
estoppel is established then section 94B is irrelevant15 .. Under New 
Zealand law the courts appear to have made a clear di inction between 
the defence of estoppel and that provided by statute16 •. This dis-
tinction is not so clear cut under present English law, where some 
confusion appears to exi as to the existence of change of position 
as a defence as separate from estoppel as a defence. 
As indicated above the present section 94B does not include 
estoppel as an ingredient as there is no requirement of a representa-
tion. However the viability of that provision as a defence depends 
largely upon the standard of detriment required of the payee. It has 
been indicated that a higher standard of detriment is required in cases 
of change of position than in estoppel 17 .. If the limited requirement 
of detriment as seen in recent estoppel cases 18 . can be maintained it 
12. Section 94B Judicature Act 1908 
13. (High Court, Nelson, 29 March 1982(M 1840)Hardie Boys J). 
14. Ibid at page 8. 
15. This defence exists in American Law; Restatement of the Law of 
Restitution, paragraph 142. 
16. See e.g. Davies v Bank of New South Wales [1981J 1 N.Z.L.R. 262 
which was determined on the statute as estoppel was regarded as 
irrelevant. 
17. C.f. Jones G.H. 'Change of Circumstance in Quasi-Contract' 
(1957) 73. L.Q.R. 49. 
18. As in Avon C.C. v Howlett supra 
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could be that estoppel will be a more useful weapon in restitution than 
change of position. This would especially be so if the raising of an 
expectation became established as sufficient to provide the founda-
tion for the necessary estoppel. 
As long ago' as 1944 in Transvaal and Oelagoa Bay Investment Co. 
v Atkinson19 • it was stated that the plaintiff must have 'expressly or 
impliedly represented to the defendant that the money paid was truely 
due and owing to the defendant,20. This would appear to indicate 
that the representation necessary to found an estoppel as a defence to 
an action in restitution is not limited to express representations. 
The raising of an expectation would probably suffice. 
19. [1944J 1 All E.R. 579. 
20. Ibid at page 585. 
Limitation of Proprietary Rights Deriving From the Pr-inciple. 
In Western Fish Products v Penwith District Council the Court of 
Appeal distinguished Crabb v Arun District Council and limited the 
proprietary right deriving from the principal as required to be over the 
land of another. In Western Fish Products v Penwith District Council the 
representee had improved its own land in the expectation, raised by a 
representative of the Council, that it had the required planning authority. 
According to MegawL.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
'There was no question of their acquiring any rights in relation to any 
other person's land, which is what proprietary estoppel is concerned 
with' 21. 
With respect this would appear to represent a quite unwarranted 
restriction of, the Ramsden v Dyson principle. What the representee 
sought here was to raise estoppel to prevent the Council denying planning 
authority. It could be argued that this is hardly a proprietary right. 
In any event the principle is clearly not limited to the creation of 
proprietary rights. 
In ~Iestern Fi sh Products v Penwi th Di stri ct Council it was obvi ous 
that an equity had been raised in favour of the representee. He had 
expended money, albeit on his own land, in the expectation of possessing 
the requisite planning approval. He had suffered detriment. On this 
point there would appear to be no reason why the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
ought not to have been invoked. 
Limits Set Upon Convention as a Foundation for the Ramsden v Dyson 
PrinCiple. 
If Oliver L.J. in Habib Bank v Habib Bank AG Zurich, 22. indicated 
some misgivings over the broad approach to application of the Ramsden 
21. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204 at page 219. 
22. [1981] 2 All ER 650. 
v Dyson principle in Keen v Holland 23. he went much further and 
indicated clear limits to the extension of the principle in respect to 
situations of convention. It will be recalled that convention had clearly 
been laid down in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co 
Ltd 24. and Amalgamated Investment and Property Co v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd 25. as one possible basis for the Ramsden v D~son 
principle. 
But Oliver L.J. in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Keen v Holland was not prepared to apply that principle to the instant 
facts despite that Amalgamated Investment v Texas. Commerce International 
Bank was vigorously pleaded by council in support of the existence of 
estoppel in that case. 
v Holland involved a conflict between an agricultural tenant 
and his landlords. Legislation, that is the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 
(U.K.)which served to protect tenants of agricultural holdings, was in 
issue and relevant to this tenancy. The landlords required repossession 
of the holding and gave the tenant notice. The landlords were, however, 
prepared to allow the tenant to remain on until he had obtained another 
holding suitable to his needs. The landlords extended the tenancy upon 
two separate occasions to accommodate the tenant who was unable to find 
alternate premises. However the extension was granted upon the 
understanding. agreed to by both the parties, that any further tenancy 
negotiated would be such as not to attract the protection of the 
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948. A third tenancy was then agreed to but 
when this expired the tenant sought the protection of the Act to remain 
in possession. The landlords pleaded estoppel and relied upon the 
23. [1984] 1 All E.R. 75. 
24. [1982] 1 Q.B. 133. n 
25. [1982] 1 Q.B. 84 
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principle of convention as laid down in Amalgamated Investment and 
Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank. The substance of 
the convention was that in respect to the first two extensions of the 
tenancy both the parties had accepted that any tenancy granted would be 
such as not to attract the protection of the Act. This was therefore, 
according to the landlords, the basis upon which the third tenancy was 
granted. 
This argument Oliver L.J. was not prepared to accept. He distinguished 
the earlier decision upon the ground that the instant case was I ••• not 
strictly a case of the parties having established, by their construction 
of their agreement or their apprehension of its legal effect, a 
conventional basis on which they" have regulated their subsequent dealings 
as in the Amalgamated Investment case ,26 . He went on to point out that 
the deal ing alleged to give rise to the estoppel is the entry of the 
parties in this particular case into the agreement itself in the belief 
that it would produce a particular legal result, and that, in fact, for 
reasons that had nothing to do with the defendant the plaintiff got it 
wrong. He pointed out that what counsel appears to be contending for is 
a much wider conventional estoppel that previously established by the 
authorities. That is one where parties are shown to have a common view 
about the legal effect of a contract into which they have entered and it 
is established that one of them would not, to the other's knowledge, have 
entered into it if he had appreciated its true legal effect, they are, 
without more, estopped from asserting that the effect would be otherwise 
than originally supposed. 
Although Oliver L.J. did concede that this view of convention was 
supported by the broad proposition put forward by Lord Denning M.R. that 
'When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying 
26. [1984] 1 All E.R. at page 82. 
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assumpti on ... on whi ch they conducted the deal i ngs between them, neither 
of them wi 11 be all owed togo back on that assumption I 27. he poi nted out 
that Lord Denning M.R. was alone in expressing the proposition as broadly 
as that. 
With respect it would seem that the distinction made between the 
instant facts and those in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v 
. Texax Commerce Internati ona 1 Bank Ltd, wou 1 d appear to be more apparent 
than real. In Keen v Holland it was clear that both parties had clearly 
negotiated upon the basis that the tenancy negotiated would not be a 
protected tenancy. The tenant must clearly have understood this when he 
took advantage of a delay in 'signing the lease to claim a tenancy from 
year to· year whi ch cou 1 d only be determi ned in accordance wi th the 
provisions of the Agricultural Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act 1977. (U.K.). 
Equally unimpressive was the treatment of unconscionability in Keen 
v Holland. Counsel for the landlords argued that it was unconscionable 
for the tenant to now rely upon the statute. But the judge in the Court 
below had found that it was not unconscionable for the tenant to rely 
upon the statute because of the unequal bargaining position as between 
landlord and tenant and having regard to the purpose of the legislation. 
This was apparently accepted by the Court of Appeal. 
The wider subterranean stream which appears to flow through the 
decision in Keen v Holland is a retreat from the broad approach which was 
spearheaded by Lord Denning M.R. in the earlier decisions. The case would 
seem to indicate that with the departure of Lord Denning from the judicial 
scene the momentum has been lost from the broad sweeping development of 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
27. (1982]Q.B. 84 at page 122. 
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On the face of·i t Keen v Holl and looks to be a stronger case for 
equitable relief than either Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees Co Ltd or Amalgamated Investand Property Co v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd, as in both those instances a mistake had been 
made as to the true positi on, whereas in Keen v Ho 11 and the party who 
sought to resile and take advantage of the statute had full knowledge, all 
along, as to the basis upon which the negotiations were being conducted. 
To see the distinction between these cases upon the ground of 
unconsci onabil i ty; it is u nconsci onab le to res i 1 e where both parti es have 
acted upon the basis of a common mistake as to the true position, but it 
is not unconscionable to resile when one has full knowledge of the intentions 
of the other party. 
The Viability of, the Ramsden v Dyson Principle in the Face of Statutory 
Authority. 
Keen v Holland raised again the issue of the effectiveness of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle, and estoppel in general, in the face of 
statutory authority. This subject is extensive in its scope and the 
point in issue in Keen v Holland, although very broad within itself, 
covered only a very limited aspect of the total area of the relationship 
between estoppel and statutory authority. However the finding of the 
Court of Appeal in that case served to confirm what appears to be the 
current attitude of the courts to the application of estoppel where a 
statute is involved. 
In its application in the face of statutory authority it is not 
possible, to any substantial extent, to sift out the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle from estoppel as a whole. Generally the application of the 
principle merges into the broader issue of the viability of estoppel, as 
a theoretical concept, in this area. However it will be shown that there 
have been a very few specific instances where the principle itself, as 
distinct from a wider concept of estoppel, has been applied. 
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As indicated the issue in Keen v Holland was wide, and was whether 
or not the parties could contract outside the provisions of the 
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (U.K.). 
The Act did not specifically prohibit contracting out of the 
particular provision in issue, although there were such prohibitions in 
regard to other sections of the Act. It was contended by counsel for the 
1 andl ords that the parti es were attempti ng to conclude an agreement whi ch 
did not attract the protection of the Act, and which was therefore not 
prohibited by the Act. It was submitted that, if such a term was agreed, 
there was no legal impediment to the parties being estopped from denying 
that that was what they had, in fact, done. 
This was an argument which was soundly rejected by the Court of 
Appeal with the simple rejoinder that 'Once there is in fact an actual 
tenancy to whi ch the 1948 Act app 1 i es, the protecti on of the Act follows 
and we do not see how ... the parties can effectively oust the protective 
provisions of the Act by agreeing that they shall be treated as in-
applicable' 28. The Court found that once the factual situation described 
in the Act is found to exist the terms of the relevant section were 
mandatory. The Court concluded I ••• it is a little difficult to see how 
the parties can, by estoppel, confer on the court a jurisdiction which 
they could not confer by specific agreement l 29. 
With respect this contention would appear to be taking the matter 
somewhat too far. It would appear that there was no specific provision 
prohibiting the contracting out in respect to the relevant provisions 
here. But there were prohibitions in respect to contracting out of the 
Act in respect to other provisions which were not in issue in the instant 
case. This being so it is not easy to see the objection taken by the 
28. [1984] 1 All LR. pages 81-82. 
29. ibid page 82. 
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Court to the attempt of contract outside the Act in this specific 
instance. If the legislature had clearly intended that there should have 
been no contracting out in respect to this specific provision then it 
surely would have specifically provided for that. The Court of Appeal 
appears to have looked at the spirit of the Act as a whole, which was, of 
course, the protection of agricultural tenants, and interpreted the 
facts of the case before it in the light of what it saw as the spirit. 
In respect to the creation of a jurisdiction which could not be 
conferred 'by express agreement I it is difficult to see that what, the 
parties did in this instance went anywhere near that. If a specific course 
of action is not prohibited by the Act then presumably there is nothing 
to prevent the parties from engaging in it. It could well be argued that 
in declining the estoppel the Court prevented the parties from attempting 
what they would have been quite entitled to do under the Act. 
This can be contrasted with the position in Taylors Fashions Ltd v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, where, it will be recalled the High 
Court had no hesitation in applying the Ramsden v Dyson principle to enforce 
the provisions of an option which was void because of non registration 
under the Land Charges Act 1925. (U.K.). Surely this is going further 
, 
than creating a jurisdiction which was not conferred by the Act. The 
application of the Ramsden v principle there rendered effective 
something which was, in fact, void according to the Act. 
On the other hand the decision in Keen v Holland on this point, 
would appear to be in the broad spirit of not extending the estoppel to 
trammel statutory powers which appeared in the earlier decision in Western 
Fish Products Ltd v Penwith District Council,30. where the Ramsden v Dyson 
prinCiple was specifically pleaded to attempt to hold a District Council 
to a representation which had been made by one of its planning officers.31. 
As indicated above, in that case, the fundamental policy exhibited by the 
-30. [1 S8l] .2 A 11 ER 204. 
31. See also Rootkin v Kent County Council [1981] 2 All E.R. 227 where 
estoppel was declined thus enabling a local authority officer to 
revise a discretion which had been based upon a misconception. 
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Court appears to have been not to extend further the scope of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. 
On the other hand it is possible to go back to the House of Lords 
decision in Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. 32 • 
which was another case where a statute dealing with the landlord tenant 
relationship was in issue and Lord Diplock specifically referred to the 
construction of statutes designed for the benefit or protection of one 
party ~ thus; 
'Upon the purposive approach to statutory construction this is the 
reason why in a statute of this character a procedural requirement 
imposed for the benefit or protection of one party alone is 
construed as subject to the implied exception that it can be 'waived' 
by the party for whose benefi tit is imposed even though the statute 
states the requirement in unqua 1 ifi ed and unequivocal words' 33. 
Admittedly this is referring to matters of procedure but could not 
the situation have been stretched to cover the facts of keen v Holland. 
In Kammins Ballrooms v Zenith Investments Lord Diplock had no hesitation 
in applying the Ramsden v Dyson pr"inciple but found that the requirements. 
of it had not there been fulfilled. Could not it be argued that the 
tenant had expressly waived his protection in Keen v Holland by negotiating 
to conclude an agreement which did not attract the protection of the Act. 
It would have appeared appropriate in Keen v Holland that the ~amsden v 
Dyson principle should have been allowed to prevent the tenant from 
f~lling back upon the protection which he had clearly waived. 
Generalisation is difficult in respect to the application of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle~ or indeed estoppel as a whole~ to statutory 
32. [1971] A.C. 850. 
33. [1971] A.C. 850 at page 881. 
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authority. This is because of the variety and multiplicity of 
circumstances which can arise under a statute, ranging from the actual 
exclusion of a statute to the exercise of discretions permitted by statute, 
to ostensible authority to the waiver of provisions. The mood of the 
Court of Appeal currently appears to be opposed to allowing the Ramsden v 
Dyson pri nci p le to operate so as to trammel the exerci se of statutory 
authority. 
It has been readily accepted by the courts that estoppel would not 
operate to render lawful that which the legislature, has, by statute, 
rendered unlawful, 34. or to give effect to an action which was ultra 
vires. 35. But at quite an early point of time the courts were prepared 
to go further and lay down a general principle to the effect that a public 
authority cannot be estopped from performing its public duties; 
'Nocorporate body can be bound by estoppel to do something beyond 
its powers, and therefore cannot be bound to do something which is 
regulated by statute in any way other than the statute requires' 36. 
Lord Denning later attempted to carve out an exception to this general 
rule in allowing estoppel in cases of representation by officers of 
government authorities, thereby binding the authorities, irrespective of 
whether the representations were correct. 37. In other words he sought 
to extend the concept of ostensible authority to render government agences 
bound by representations which had been made by officers. 
Recent deci s ions wou ld i ndi cate that even in thi s 1 imited area the 
final nail is in the' coffin. The role of estoppel in general, and the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle in particular, in the face of statutory authority 
34. Chalmers v Pardoe [1963] 3 All ER 552. 
35. Il.1aritime Electric v. General Dairies [1937] A.C. 610. 
36. Editorial note [1937] 1 All ER 748. 
37. Wells v Minister of Housing [1967] 2 All ER 1041., .=..:;,.:--'----'-'--'--__ , 
Ltd v Westminister Corporation [1971] 1 Q.B. 222. 
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is now far from clear. The best conclusion to draw at present is that 
it has at best a very limited role. 
It may be that equity will still assert jurisdiction to prevent a 
statute being used as a vehicle of fraud. The decision in Taylors Fashions 
Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd. (in relation to the representee 
Old & Campbell) could be justified on that bais. The representor landlord 
had encouraged expenditure upon the property which he could have taken 
the benefit of had not the Ramsden v Dyson principle been asserted. The 
option in dispute there, it will be recalled was invalid because of non 
registration under the Land Charges Act 1925 (U.K.) 
Conclusion; The Broad Approach of Lord Denning Now Seen as Too Broad? 
That there has been sane retreat from the broad approach to the 
application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle seen in such cases as Crabb 
v Arun District Council and Amalgamated Investment and Property Co v Texas 
International Bank, is clear. But what is not clear is the direction and 
extent of this retreat. 
The objections expressed to an extension of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle, as, for example, those of Megaw L.J. in Western Fish Products 
v Penwith District Council, have assumed, so far, a very general 
complexion. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Keen v Holland would 
appear to amount to quite a jolt to the principle and could well be based 
upon a general reluctance on the part of the courts to allow for any 
further extension of it. 
In respect to its application to situations where statutory authority 
is sought to be impeded the retreat from the application of the principle, 
as with the application of estoppel as a whole, would seem to be more 
definite. The current state of the law in this area would appear to be 
that the Ramsden v Dyson principle is not available as against the exercise 
of powers conferred by statute. While it is true that the House of Lords 
decision in Kammins Ballrooms v Zenith Investments, still stands in 
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respect to the waiver of a procedural provision contained in a statute, 
it remains to be seen whether this will be built upon. 
One is left with the conclusion that the departure of Lord Denning 
from the judicial scene has left the Ramsden v Dyson principle without a 
powerful advocate. It is probable that he took the principle rather too 
far in believing that it could sustain itself upon such a wide base as 
unconscionability for any length of time. Some of the more profound 
problems associated with such an approach will be considered in the next 
chapter. There are no present indications that there has been a revival 
of constraints upon the principle. In particular the probanda of Fry J. 
in y!illmott v Barber have not, so far, shown that they will again come 
to the fore as requiring to be satisfied before the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle can be successfully pleaded. To this extent the principle is 
still, to use the words of Lord Denning M.R., Ishorn of limitions l 38. 
At the same time the authorities have not provided any clear 
indication of the intention of retreating from the concept of the 
'creation of an expectation as a requirement of the conduct of the 
representor. There still seems to be a considerable degree of latitude. 
permitted in respect to the conduct required of the representor in order 
to provide a foundation stone for the application of the principle. 
38. [1982] Q.B. 84 at page 121. 
Chapter twelve 
CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE 
RAMSDEN V DYSON PRINCIPLE. 
Introduction: From Pragmatism to Principles Back to Pragmatism. 
In reviewing the development of the Ramsden v Dyson principle from its 
inception by the courts of equity, until the present day, it is possible to 
perceive a drift in the basis of the administration of the principle. From 
a position of being administered upon the basis of pragmatism in its very 
early years the principle sustained a period, in the later years of the 
nineteenth century, when attempts were made to subject it to rules, until 
it finally emerged again in the later years of the present century as based 
essentially upon pragmatism. 1. 
Even with the handing down of the House of Lords decision in Ramsden 
v Dyson in 1866, the principle was still essentially an indeterminate head 
of equity, to the broad effect that equity may assert jurisdiction in 
instances where a party had suffered loss, while another party stood by and 
allowed the first party to act to his detriment. The decision in Ramsden 
v Dyson itself, did not significantly develop the principle, but did help to 
define and identify it in according it the maximum of authority in respect to 
precedent and giving it nomenclature. But even with the handing down of the 
House of Lords decision the principle could still reasonably be described 
as but nothing more than a bundle of instances in which equity had shown 
that it was prepared to grant relief. 
1. C.f. Atiyah P.S. 'From Principles to Pragmatism Changes in the Function 
of the Judicial Process and the Law' An Inaugural Lecture Delivered 
Before the University of Oxford on 17 February 1978. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1978. 
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The systematisation which took place shortly after the House of Lords 
decision was comprised mainly of setting out the conditions of 
unconscionability. This took the form of a series of probanda spelt out by 
Fry J. in Willmott v Barber. 2. This did not, of itself, take the principle 
away from its equitable origins. The administration of the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle was still basically to rectify situations of unconscionability. 
However the probanda tended to provide a vehicle whereby the principle could 
be detached from its base in that the rules could be emphasised to the 
exclusion of the fundamental basis of the principle. 
The probanda of Fry J. together with other rules which evolved, were 
subsequently, upon frequent occasions, resorted to as defences. Had they 
been rigidly applied as defences they could well have proved very effective 
in that role and would thus have served to limit the scope of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. 
However from the mid 1960 ls Lord Denning M.R. perceived the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle as having a much wider role. He saw it, together with 
estoppel as a whole, as a weapon which was lone of the most flexible and 
useful in the armoury of the law' 3. and as a 'principle shorn of 
limitations' 4. which could thus be resorted to in order to rectify 
unconscionability in a wide variety of different situations. This was an 
application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle based upon pragmatism, and not 
limited by deference to rules. The principle was applied to do justice as 
the dictates of individual cases required. It was applied in a manner not 
designed to lay down rules which could be seen as determining the future 
conduct of the courts and the course which the application of the principle 
was to take in the future. The basis of this application of the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle was the rectification of unconscionable situations and to 
2. 
3. 
4. 
(188a) 15 Ch. D. 96. 
As per Lord Denning M.R. in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd 
v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] Q.B. 84 at page 122. 
Ibid. 
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encumber the principle with rules would have most certainly limited its 
utility as a weapon to use in such situations. As yet no attempt has been 
made to specify unconscionability "in accordance with rules. The concept would 
appear to be entirely a subjective judicial value judgment. 
This is a situation which tends to favour the representee, that is 
usually the party seeking to rely upon the principle, and it has no doubt 
brought forth litigation which would not otherwise have seen the light of a 
court room. 
At present the Ramsden v Dyson principle could be said to have arrived 
at a state of suspension. After a period of being applied in accordance with 
the dictates of pragmatism it has recently shown some signs of uncertainty 
as to what is likely to be its future direction. There are indications 
that the conception of Lord Denning M.R. as the proper role of the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle is not universally shared by the judiciary. Are we now to 
see a period of movement from pragmatism back to principles? 
However the past ten years of development along the road of pragmatic 
application cannot be lightly cast aside. A number of very strong Court of 
Appeal precedents have been laid down, and the approach of Lord Denning has 
no doubt given the principle at least enough momentum to allow it to be 
pleaded to such an extent as to enable future development to be ascertained, 
and crystallised. 
Whether or not the Ramsden v Dyson principle moves from a pragmatic 
application back to one based upon principles will depend largely upon 
the viabil ity of unconscionability as a base for the principle. Can 
unconscionability be sustained "in its present state? This issue will 
subsequently be considered in nlore detail. Before doing so, however, 
attention will be directed to the more basic issue of the enforcement of 
expectations and in particular the justification fo~the enforcement of 
expectations which are not based upon contract but are based upon gratuitous 
promises. 
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Theoretical Justification For the Enforcement of Non Contractual Expectations. 
As has been indicated the Ramsden v Dyson principle provides a very 
effective weapon in the hands of the courts for the enforcement of non 
contractual expectations. It has also been indicated that, as the law 
appears to lie at present the basis upon which these non contractual 
expectations are enforced is that it would be unconscionable to the representee 
not to do so. But how do non contractual expectations differ from expectations 
arising from other causes and why ought the courts enfor~e non contractual 
expectations together with or in preference to the enforcementof expectations 
arising from other causes? 
Should the courts enforce an interest arising from an expectation this 
means that they would endeavour to place the representee in as good a 
position as he would have been in had the representor performed his promise. 
This situation can be contrasted with two others. Firstly that where the 
courts enforce merely reliance interests whereby they endeavour to place the 
representee in as good a position as he was before the promise was made. 
Secondly that where the courts are concerned merely with enforcing a 
restitution interest. That is where the courts seek to prevent a 
representor from making an unjust reward from his promise by placing the 
parties in the same position that they would-have been in before the 
representation or promise was made. It will be noted that in the latter 
two instances the courts are concerned to restore the status quo whereas if 
the courts enforce an expectation they actuallygive effect to the promise or 
representation and place the representee in a better position that he would 
have been in prior to the making of the representation. 
The enforcement of an expectation deriving from the application of the 
Ramsden v Dyson principle clearly falls within his latter category. As has 
been indicated the principle is not basically concerned with restoring the 
status quo or with rectifying instances of unjust enrichment. It is 
directed towards the enforcement of expectations in cases where that 
expectation has been raised by the other party. This is clear from the fact 
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tl\~t th,e. Ramsden v Dyson principl e can extinguish the interests of the 
representor, in favour of substituting therefore the interests of the 
representee, in satisfaction of or protection of the expectation which the 
representor has created. If on the other hand it was clear that the 
effect of the Ramsden v Dyson principle was merely suspensory then it could 
be seen as protecting merely status quo interests rather than expectationary 
interests. 
Now expectationary interests can be seen as deriving from two broad 
sources. Firstly there are those expectations which are bargain based. 
That ;s they derive from contract. Secondly there are those which are non 
contractual in nature, that is they derive from a gratuitous promise which 
would not be enforceable as a contract. It is this latter class which the 
Ramsden v Dyson principl~ can enforce. But should the law leave bargain 
promises and possibly those made under seal as the only binding promises 
and protect only the status quo interests for other detrimentally relied 
upon promises or should the law go further and fulfil expectations 
engendered by detrimentally relied upon gratuitous promises? 
An examination of the cases reveals at least two instances where the 
fulfilment of non contractual expectations based upon a gratuitous promise 
would appear to have a perfectly rational base. There are those cases where 
the parties clearly intended to create legal relationships but where for 
some reason, possibly indolence, incompetence, lack of ability to obtain 
the services of a solicitor, or vagueness as to actual intentions, the 
promise is not encased in a form which is legally binding. 5. In such 
instances the Ramsden v Dyson principle provides a machinery whereby such 
expectations may be given legal effect. 
The decided cases reveal another much more general type of situation 
where the enforcement of non contractual expectations based upon gratuitous 
promises would appear to be justified. This is where the courts can be seen 
to be fulfilling a social welfare role. This element is evident in 
5. As in Greasle) v Cooke (1980) 3 All E.R. 710; Crabb v Arun District 
Council (1976 1 Ch. 179. 
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several cases where the Ramsden v Dyson principle has been successfully 
invoked. Thus we see the principle applied to prevent elderly women 
being deprived of their accommodation, 6. to prevent a hard working young 
farmer being deprived of his land. 7. This appears as a quite viable role 
for the principle in the area of domestic relations but if this policy of 
using the Ramsden v Dyson principle as a device to secure social welfare is 
continued then the realisation that cases will continue to be determined 
essentially upon their own facts will have to be accepted. This will mean 
that the cases decided will have little value from a precedent point of 
view. This could be acceptable in respect to domestic situations but would 
be a problem in respect to commercial situations where clear guidelines for 
future conduct maybe demanded by the parties and by the commercial world 
in general. 
Thus which non contractual expectations are fulfilled by the courts is 
very much a question of policy the answer to which will depend upon the 
assessment of the behaviour of the parties by the court as well as upon the 
general philosophy of the times. It could be argued that the advent of the 
welfare state has meant a tendency for the courts to construe promises 
widely. In the past the courts have tended to shun the protection of 
expectation interests because of clear laissez faire attitudes. Market 
forces have been behind the protection of bargain based expectations and such 
elements which could upset that protection, such as mistake, duress or 
misrepresentation have been very narrowly defined. 
But what motivating forces can ensure that the courts will continue to 
protect expectations based not upon bargains but upon mere gratuitous 
promises? It could be that this will depend upon the extent to which the 
courts feel themselves free to. become involved in people's lives and in 
particular to the extent to which the courts feel themselves free to 
redistribute property rights. Should there be a general move in society in 
6. As in Greasley v Cooke and Pascoe v Turner I1979J 1 W.L.R. 431. 
7. As in Beech v Beech (High Court, Wellington 24 February 1982, (A No 
144/80) Jefferies J.) 
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the direction of back to the unyielding protection of the legal rights to 
property which was evident in Victorian times it could be that the 
protection of non contractual expectations will wane. 
The Viability of Unconscionability as a Basis for the Ramsden v Dyson 
Principle. 
The evolution of a broad concept of unconscionability could serve to 
provide a quite tenable theoretical base for the principle. If 
unconscionability became clearly entrenched as the foundation stone for an 
action it wouJd at least have the effect of driving out other possible 
bases, such as agreement, or fault, or fraud, which have occasionally, in 
the past, acted to confuse this principle with other heads of liability. 
Unconscionability could thus enable the Ramsden v Dyson principle to be 
kept theoretically Ipure! 
Assuming unconscionability as the conclusively established basis for 
the action the representee would then be called upon to set up three 
requirements in order to successfully call the principle into aid. Firstly 
he would have to show that an expectation had been raised by the 
representor. Secondly he would have to show the requisite detrimental 
reliance. Having established these two requirements he would then have 
to show that it would be unconscionable that equity did not assert 
jursidiction and apply the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
The clear supremacy of unconscionability as a basis would mean that 
litigants would know that, in order to succeed in pleading the principle, 
they would have to direct their submissions and evidence to establishing 
unconscionability. Hence much of the mispleading which has been evident 
in recent actions could be eliminated. In particular pleading directed 
to satisfying the rules, such as whether there is the required state of 
knowledge to fulfil the probanda of Fry J. 
Unconscionability would appear to be the only possibility as a cornmon 
denominator if the principle is to be retained as a flexible weapon in 
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view of the wide variety and diverse situations which are 1 ikely to arise 
in contemporary society. Unconscionability does not place any situational 
limits upon the applicability of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. 
Unconscionability does not limit the courts in extending the principle. 
Of course such a broad concept as unconsci onabi 1 ity gives the courts 
a much greater scope within which to do justice as between the parties. 
The decided cases would generally appear not to- be hortatory in judicial 
orientation in that they have shown a great concern with resolving the 
lis as between the immediate litigants as against laying down rules 
intended to be followed in subsequent cases. Unconscionability enables the 
courts to carve out avery wide area of discretion for themselves. 
If a broad basi s, resti ng upon unconscionabil ity" for the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle, has some advantages, its "inherent disadvantages are also 
obvious. 
Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich could have amounted to Oliver 
L.J. being hoist with his own petard. His rueful comment, after having 
heard his dicta in Taylors Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd 
read by counsel, to the effect II could wish that it had been more 
succinct ... I 8. may have meant that he harboured some misgivings over the 
length of the pleadings. This tends to reveal what could be very real 
difficulties associated with unconscionability as a basis for the Ramsden 
v Dyson principle. But these problems are not new and, indeed, were 
anticipated over a century earlier by Lord Blackburn when, in reference to 
the issue of 'whether the balance of justice or injustice is in favour of 
granting the remedy or witholding it' he stated; 
8. [1981] 2 All E .R, 650 at page 666, 
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'The determination of such a question must largely depend on the 
turn of mind of those who have to decide, and must therefore be 
subject to uncertainty; but that, I think, is inherent in the nature 
of the inquiry' 9. 
Clearly if one discards rules which have been built up over the years 
and reverts to a broad principle of unconscionability the result could well 
be longer hearings with an even wider and deeper analysis of the facts of 
a case. If the phenomenon of unconscionability is subjective to the mind 
of the individual judge then counsel will be inclined to devise an endless 
procession of; presentation of interrogatories, argument, submission of 
evidence, deletions from pleadings and cross examination so as to demonstrate 
the unconscionability of their client's case to the court. Indeed this is 
what appears to have taken place in Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich, 
where, it appears answers were even 'extracted from counsel in a moment of 
exasperation' 10. 
One problem which was highlighted quite vividly by the Court of Appeal 
decision is Pascoe v Turner 11. was that this broad approach has infused a 
substantial element of unpredictability into prospective litigation. It 
is clear that the plaintiff representor in that case would not have taken 
the action to appeal had he been aware of the ultimate result. 12. But 
there was little by way of precedent to guide him and if the courts are 
going. to continue to exercise a wide discretion 'to do justice' in 
individual cases then surely a party against whom the principle is raised 
has the right to at least some indication as to how he is likely to fair 
upon an appeal. Does equity require justice to both the parties? 
9. As per Lord Blackburn in Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (lQ78) 
3 App Cas. 1218 at page 1280, cited with approval by Oliver L.J. in 
Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich [1981] 2 All EJR. at page 666, 
Hll. [1981] 2 All E.R. 650 at page 668, 
11. [1979] 2 All E.R. at page 666, 
12. In Pascoe v Turner the female party had sought only a life interest 
in the property and the High Court found a constructive trust in her 
favour. But the Court of Appeal ordered the conveyance of the fee 
s"irnple to the woman. 
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Unpredictability is likely to remain if emphasis is placed upon 
judgments based. upon facts and inferences to be drawn from the facts. 
But Pascoe v Turner highlights yet a further problem which could be 
encountered and that is the extent to which the facts are extrapolated into 
the future and even into the realm of conjecture. It will be recalled that 
the Court of Appeal there considered the possibility relevant that the 
female party to the de facto relationship may, at some time in the future, 
desire to mortgage the property to order to obtain finance for repairs. 13. 
But if such a judicial process. is once engaged in where will it end? In 
Pascoe v Turner it wou 1 d have been poss i b 1 e for the male party to the de 
facto relationship to argue that the promise of the house was a gift 
conditional upon marriage, and that the conduct of the representee in 
refusing his overtures of marriage was an equally relevant factor in the 
overall assessment of the unconscionabil ity. It could have well been 
argued that in assessing unconscionability the Court of Appeal failed 
entirely to take into account the practicalities of the de facto relation-
ship.. The facts of any cases may well lend themselves not only to infinite. 
analysis but to endless fabrication and conjecture. 
But as Pascoe v Turner illustrated the state of unconscionability 
pertaining to any given situation can be highly subjective to the 
representee. It is obvious that the state of unconscionability of a 
particular situation can well become quite beyond the control of one or 
even both of the parties.. It would not be "inconceivable that a party could, 
with astute legal advice, contrive a situation which he believed would 
secure his position in terms of the requirement of unconscionability. In 
other words he could, by his own conduct, render what was only a gratuitous 
promise by the representor binding. Reverting once ag.ain to Pascoe v Turner 
13. [1979] 2 All E~R. at page 951, 
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by way of illustration. The representee could have there deliberately 
engaged in expenditure upon the property in dispute with the specific 
intention of orienting the balance of unconscionability in her favour as 
against her having to relinguish 'the property. It is admitted that equity 
would never have assisted a representee who engaged in such conduct but a 
representor could well be faced with a difficult evidential problem in 
convincing a court as to the true motive underlying expenditure on property. 
Many recent judgments appear to be nothing more than a rejoinder to 
pleadings. This is understandable where it is necessary to base pleadings 
upon facts and not upon legal principles. This has meant judgments which 
tend to be 1 ength ly, pro.l ix, and s howi ng a remarkable tendency to 
incoherence with different points being emphasised as between one judgment 
and the next. 
It could be contended that the move towards unconscionability 
represents a reversion to a past age, as well as to a past jurisdiction, 
when the common law and statute law was not able to provide the degree of 
protection which is possible today. The vastly more complex factual 
situations, together with the much greater volume of potential situations, 
which could arise today, would tend to make the apparent revival of the 
equitable jurisdiction in this area a highly dubious proposition. One 
could well pose the question whether it is appropriate that a jurisdiction 
which was initially devised to provide redress in cases where the primary 
jurisdiction was inadequate should not only be revived but should be 
permitted to evolve into something resembling a general residual head of 
liability. Thus unconscionability could be seen as giving judges a carte 
blanche to adjudicate upon disputes in accordance with their own ideas of 
justice. The principles of equity would once again become as long as the 
chancellor's foot. 
In previous times the courts of chancery applied unconscionability 
with a robustness whi.ch would make the more circumspect judges of today 
hesitate. Holy Scripture was called into aid and unconscionability was 
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equated with sin, deserving of the wrath of the l\ l!:ui ghty, B.ut what can 
unconscionability be based upon in today1s more moderate society? It is 
submitted that it is liable to gravitate to what appears as reasonable in 
the circumstances and so equate to the Basis for at least some contract law. 
But this is likely to have different inflections in different circumstances. 
As indicated above social welfare factors have clearly been relevant in some 
recent decisions especially those of a domestic nature. To contemporary 
society social welfare is an acceptable value as a basis for action. This 
could continue as a basis for the determination of unconscionability in 
respect to domestic transactions but it would clearly not be a satisfactory 
basis for the determination of unconscionability in, say commercial 
transactions. To find what was reasonable in such cases the courts would 
probably view current commercial practice as well as utility and also 
would probably be inclined to take into account the likely consequences 
of a decision, Thus the basis for what amounted to unconscionability 
could vary as between different classes of factual situations. 
So just as contract law has tended to move away from a strict 
reliance upon an assessment of whether or not there is agreement to an 
assessment of what is a reasonable interpretation of the contract so 
unconscionability could shift from having a moral base to one based 
upon what was reasonable in the light of current values in society as a 
whole in the specific circumstances, To place this in somewhat more 
specific terms; the courts would enforce the reasonable expectations 
deriving from a reasonable promise in what appeared to be the most 
reasonable manner in the circumstances. 
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From Pragamatism Back to Principles? 
A vital issue for the future of the Ramsden v Dyson principle will 
be whether or not unconscionability can sustain itself as the basis of the 
principle. It is unlikely that such an obviously unruly concept will not 
be subject to some degree of ,taming in the future. It is reasonable to 
assume that like all large generalisations unconscionability will need and 
receive qualifications in practice. 
It must be remembered that many of the cases so far determined under 
the Ramsden v Dyson principle have dealt with domestic situations and those 
which have concerned commercial matters have been such that they can be 
contained within their own facts; they have not had ramifications which 
have reflected into commercial practice to any significant extent. It is 
reasonable to assume that should a decision upon the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle be handed down. which had effects upon commercial practice. as 
for example in the field of bills of exchange. there would be a demand for 
clear rules which showed precisely the application of the principle. This 
could well prove imperative for the day to day practice of the commercial 
world. 
Upon a more general basis it is reasonable to assume that there will 
be a move back to a period when control of the principle by means of the 
application of rules will be reached. But what form would the rules which 
controlled the future application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle take. 
It is possible to conceive of a balance being reached between the broad 
approach based upon unconscionability and that based more specifically 
upon the application of predetermined rules. It is not likely that the 
probanda of Fry J. will come back into favour by way of general 
application to the establishment of the right to call the principle into 
aid. This would probably be too restrictive for the modern courts and 
would greatly limit the degree of judicial discretion in the application 
of the principle. 
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What presents itself as a more probable option is that the standard 
of what is against conscience will become more or less canalised or 
defined, but that the juristic concept of unconscionability will remain 
in tact as the basis of the Ramsden v Dyson principle. That is 
unconscionabil ity itself will be subject to l"imitations and more 1 imited 
aspects of the principle, such as the conduct required of the representor 
will be left in a relatively rule free state. This would still enable a 
very broad judicial view to be taken of individual cases, but at the same 
time would not allow deserving cases to be denied the benefit of the 
principle because of non compliance with technicality. 
lihe continued build up of precedent, especially an accumulation of 
decisions handed down by the Court of Appeal makes it inevitable that the 
broad approach will be subject to some limitations at least. It would 
seem therefore that the fundamentals of unconscionability will not be able 
to remain implicit for any great length of time in today1s world. We are 
in the age of judge made law and it seems inevitable that no matter how 
compelling the facts of cases may be they must eventually take second place 
to an analysis in terms of prior decisions. As the decisions build up 
categorisation will continue and become more refined. However this could 
be dependent upon a poss ib 1 e restatement of the Ramsden v Dyson pri nc; p 1 e 
by the House of Lords and this is commented upon later. 
Disengagement From Contract. 
Whatever confusion may have existed in ~egard to the distinction 
between estoppel and contract as separate heads of liability can probably 
now be taken as finally dispelled. 
Theoretically at least the distinction between the two is cleqr. 
Estoppel is based upon the concept of unconscionability, which in turn 
gives rise to an equity. Contract, on the other hand, is clearly based 
upon agreement, and what is more this agreement extends to the 
consideration for the offer. All the aspects of the contract, excepting 
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such eventualities as frustration etc, are within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time the contract is concluded. There must be a mutual 
intention to contract. This is not the case with estoppel. Estoppel 
arises generally in what might be termed the course of executory interaction. 
Its intervention or effect could well be quite beyond the wildest 
contemplation of the parties. 
This is not to say that estoppel cannot arise within the execution of 
a contract so as to alter the course of that contract. It is true that 
estoppel may serve to secure what is an apparent agreement which is found 
to be defective in relation to the cornman law requirements. But it is 
submitted that generally estoppel has no place where the contractual 
liability is secure. There can be no place for an alternate liability in 
contract or estoppel. This, it appears, confused even the most august of 
tribunals in SiewSoon Wah v YongTong Hong 14. where the Privy Council, in 
hold-ing that there was a valid lease, went on to hold that there was an 
equity in favour of the defendant. The conclusion of the Privy Council 
merely served to confuse. To place the issue upon a fundamental, basis, if 
the plaintiff has a common law remedy he cannot revert to an equitable 
remedy. 
Another case whi~hwas ultimately decided in estoppel but which caused 
confusion to some 15. as to its potential to be determined in contract was 
Crabb v Arun District Coun..£:!.l, decided 1111975, • where, it will be 
recalled, the representor had sold a piece of his land in the expectation 
that he would be granted an easement by the representor, from a proposed 
road to his exist-ing land. At a meeting between the two parties the 
representee gained the impression that an easement would be granted. The 
representor constructed the road and initially left a gap in the boundary 
fence, ostensibly to provide for the intended easement. Later the gap was 
14. [1973] A.C. 836. 
15. See e.g. Atiyah P.S. 'When ;s an Enforceable Agreement Not a Contract? 
Answer lAfhen it is an Equity' (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 174. also, in reply, 
IVlillett P.J. iCrabb v Arun District Council - A Riposte' (1976) 
L.Q.R. 342: 
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closed and the representor council refused to grant the easement unless a 
substantial payment was made. The representee plaintiff sought to plead 
in estoppel rather than contract. 
Two major difficulties apparently stood in the way of an action in 
contract. Firstly the I agreement I could well have failed for uncertainty. 
But more important the representee would have experienced great difficulty 
in proffering the necessary consideration. While it is true that a 
detriment to the offeree can amount to consideration~ and this could 
possibly have been found in the sale of the property~ although even this is 
very doubtful ~ it could not be said that this had been agreed to by the other 
party. 
Also while it is true that the conduct of the parties can be relevant 
in constru i ng i ntenti on to, contract, the representee cou 1 d no doubt have 
made more of this conduct in respect to proving estoppel than to proving a 
contract. Assuming that the I agreement I was uncertain the representee could 
use the subsequent conduct of the representor to secure the expectation 
without having to prove any agreement in respect to consideration. 16. 
Although in a few instances the dividing line between common law 
contract and estoppel may be very fine it is submitted that the broad drift 
of the two are still very much apart. In some respects they appear to be 
moving even further apart. The development of the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
and the evolution of acquiescence as a major factor in estoppel, has, it is 
claimed, no obvious counterpart in the common law rules of contract. While 
silence and merely standing by can operate to found an estoppel it would not 
be easy to sustain such conduct as evidence of an agreement sufficient to 
support a contract. The legistalure has intervened in common law contract to 
mitigate the rigours of inequality or bargaining power in the form of a mass 
16. The Law of Property Act 1925 (U.K.), and the absence of a written 
agreement maya 1 so have caused the representee some 
difficulty had he proceed in contract. 
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of legislation to protect consumers, and to do justice as between the 
parties. It is most unlikely that estoppel and contract will ever merge as 
a single head of liability. Estoppel is more likely to develop its main 
stream along its own lines but will continue to operate in those 
circumstances, where it considers it appropriate, on the outer fringes of 
the common law rules of contract. 17. 
To look at a few examples of the operation of estoppel in the creation 
or alteration of a contract; estoppel can serve to create an agreement 
when otherwise there would be no agreement; 18. estoppel can render effect 
to a contract which would otherwise be void for mistake; 19. estoppel 
could create an effective agreement out of a situation which would otherwise 
fai 1 for uncertainty; 20. estoppel can render effect to an agreement 
which would otherwise be ineffective through non compliance with statute. 21. 
Conclusion: Whither the Ramsden v Dyson Principle? 
What is likely to be the future of the Ramsden v Dys'on principle? 
An obvious deficiency in the present law relating to the Ramsden v Dyson 
principle is the absence of a definitive authority which can act as a 
benuhmarbiauthority. The existing Court of Appeal decisions tend to be in 
conflict with each other and an increasing volume of decisions from that 
Court could accentuate the problem. The time would thus appear to be 
opportune for a restatement of the Ramsden v Dyson principle by the House of 
of Lords. The comments made by Lord Hailsham L.C. in relation to the High 
Trees principle would appear to be equally appropriate to the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle; 
17. As e.g. in the development of the doctrine of part performance. 
18. As in Smith v Hughes (18Z1) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597. 
19--. As inlV1cGr:a!h's Stock and Poultry Ltd. v McCullough [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 
428. 
20. As in Crabb v Arun District Council (1976) 1 Ch. 179. 
21. As in Taylors Fashions Ltd. v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltp. 
(1982) 1 Q.B. 133. 
226 
the time may soon come when the whole sequence of cases based 
on promissory estoppel ... may need to be reviewed and reduced to a 
coherent body of doctrine by the courts. I do not mean to say that 
they are to be regarded with suspi ci on. But as is common with an 
expanding doctrine, they do raise problems of coherent exposition 
which have never been systematically explored I 22. 
Similar thoughts may have been in the mind of Lord Denning; 
IThe doctrine of estoppel ... has become overloaded with cases I 23. 
The possibility therefore of a restatement of the principle by the House of 
Lords cannot be ruled out. 
On the other hand it is somewhat difficult to see the direction which 
any restatement of the principle could take. One is tempted to draw an 
analogy with the restatement of the doctrine of part performance which was 
handed down by the House of Lords in Steadman v Steadman 24. Restatement of 
part performance was facilitated by the simple reality of the presence of a 
contract upon which any rules could be made to focus. The Ramsden v Dyson 
principle is much more diffused in character and thus does not lend itself 
to such a simple resolution by such judicial codification. 
An alternate possibility is the continued incremental development of 
the principle by means of continued Court of Appeal decisions. As indicated 
above this could prove difficult unless at least the rudiments of the 
principle become entrenched by consistent and persistent application. 
Conflicting Court of Appeal decisions would only serve to compound the 
existing confusion. 
22. Woodhouse AC Isreal Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co 
Ltd [1972] A.C. 741 at page 758. 
23. Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd [1982] Q.B. 84. 
24. [1976]A.C.536. 
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It is possible that the future of the Ramsden v Dyson principle 
could be influenced by social and judicial attitudes to the redistribution 
of property rights. The propensity of the courts to use the principle as a 
basis for the redristribution of property rights has been very evident over 
the past twenty years. 25. It could be assumed that moves towards the 
protection of the legal rights attaching to property would make the 
application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle less attractive. 
With the present state of the case law the place of the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle in the field of· estoppel appears to be quite secure. It 
appears to be more than capable of holding its own against estoppel by 
mere representation owing largely to its much greater scope. On the other 
hand it has not received the jolt which High Trees estoppel sustained in 
Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd 26. 
No alternate concept of estoppel based upon acquiescence has yet evolved. 
25. See under 'Remedies; Proprietary Rights Deriving From the Ramsden v 
Dyson principle ' chapter nine supra. 
26. [1972] A.C. 741. 
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